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ABSTRACT 
Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis 
examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory.  
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legisla-
tive authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special 
standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian au-
tonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral 
norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concern-
ing the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which 
Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly 
universal and necessary imperative.  
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian 
autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint 
and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a 
means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular in-
terpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance 
to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a 
categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections 
between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of 
reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly 
unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light 
the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the 
will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
There are many people without whose guidance and support I could not have written 
this thesis. I would first like to thank my supervisors, Jens Timmermann and Sarah 
Broadie, whose work continues to be a source of great inspiration to me. I am ex-
tremely grateful for their comments, their encouragement and their unfailing patience.  
I would also like to extend my great thanks to the staff and students of the Philosophy 
Departments at the University of St Andrews. In particular, I would like to thank my 
fellow St Andrews Rhinemaidens, Alice Pinheiro Walla and Lucy Richmond, as well 
as our one and only Rhineman, Ralf Bader, for their insightful and helpful feedback 
on many of the arguments presented in this thesis.    
During the course of my study, I received scholarships from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Overseas Research Students Awards 
Scheme and the St Andrews Department of Philosophy. I gratefully acknowledge 
these sponsors, whose financial support made it possible for me to undertake this 
project. 
Finally, I would like to extend my very deepest thanks to my wonderful family and 
friends for their unfaltering support. I truly could not have balanced the countless 
changes and challenges of the past year in particular without them. This thesis was 
completed under quite special circumstances, as its submission followed the birth of 
my beautiful daughter, Katherine Isla. Thanks to Katie and to her wonderful father, 
Richard; I love you both with all of my heart.  
CONTENTS 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 
Tensions within the Notion of Autonomy.............................................................................................. 8 
1.1  The Principle of Autonomy 9 
1.2  Self-Legislation 16 
1.3  Legislation and Choice 20 
1.4  Freedom 29 
1.5  Lingering Objections 35 
A Will Giving Universal Law .............................................................................................................. 41 
2.1  The Command Thesis and Radical Constructivism 42 
2.2  Reason and Reasoning 50 
2.3  The Law and the Good 60 
2.4  The Two Faces of Legislation 65 
2.5  The Fate of Command 74 
Pure Rational Constraint ...................................................................................................................... 76 
3.1  A Teleology of Practical Reasoning 77 
3.2  The Rational Grounds of Morality 89 
3.3  The Legislation of Reason 98 
3.4  From Autonomy to the Dualism of Practical Interest 107 
Material Principles and the Form of Law........................................................................................... 109 
4.1  Form and Matter 111 
4.2  Duty and Desire 120 
4.3  The Heterogeneity of Moral and Non-Moral Concern 127 
4.4  Interest, Dialectic and Character 132 
On the Purity of the Moral Disposition .............................................................................................. 137 
5.1  The Concept of a Supreme Maxim 139 
5.2  Empirical and Intelligible Character 145 
5.3  Conditioned Goodness 152 
5.4  Assessment and Luck 163 
Moral Identity..................................................................................................................................... 167 
6.1  The Tyranny of Reason 170 
6.2  Confronting the Moral Law 174 
6.3  Identity and Moral Education 180 
6.4  Identity and Normative Ethics 189 
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................... 194 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 197 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
 
Central Problems and Aims 
 
Connected as it is to concepts such as liberty, integrity, independence and 
self-expression, the idea of autonomy has played a significant role in twentieth and 
twenty-first century moral and political philosophy. To the degree that philosophers 
wish to ground its importance on its Kantian ancestry, however, they face formidable 
difficulties. As some have recently argued, Kant’s understanding of the meaning and 
value of autonomy is quite foreign to the highly personalised concept at work in con-
temporary debate; because of this, it is associated with a unique set of puzzles and 
worries, which bear little resemblance to those affecting the popular notion.1  
Because my focus is Kant’s particular conception of self-legislation and its place in 
his ethical thought, this thesis largely disregards many of the interesting problems 
brought to light in the recent literature on personal and political autonomy. Instead, 
my aim is to come to grips with the continually troubling problem of understanding 
what Kant meant when he proclaimed that the moral law is a law that the rational will 
legislates and to defend the implications of my preferred interpretation against a clus-
ter of important criticisms. As such, the following is primarily an internal project; 
whilst I hope to provide a picture of Kantian autonomy that can be appreciated by 
anyone who is interested in normative ethics, my primary goal is to provide answers 
to questions that find their home within Kantian ethics in particular. As will become                                                         
1 This point is argued convincingly by Onora O’Neill in ‘Autonomy: The Emperor’s New 
Clothes,’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (2003): 1-21. See also Thomas E. 
Hill, Jr., ‘The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,’ Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s 
Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992) 76-96.   
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clear, I take many familiar Kantian starting points for granted throughout the argu-
ments to follow. Where my reader disagrees with these, he or she is unlikely to be 
persuaded by the story that builds on them.2  
My aim in the first part of this thesis is to provide an interpretation of Kantian au-
tonomy that does justice both to the distinctness of Kant’s ethics and to the legal 
metaphor at its heart. Recently, interpretations of Kantian autonomy have tended to 
assume two different postures. On the one hand, scholars have sought to provide rela-
tively literal interpretations of the idea of ‘legislating for oneself,’ in which the pow-
ers, capacities and activities of individual agents play a central role in explaining the 
authority of the moral law; on the other, there has been an attempt to maintain a more 
straightforwardly realist interpretation of moral constraint, according to which the 
normative authority of the moral law is not in any sense ‘created’ by human beings.3 
Problems attend both approaches. Where emphasis is placed on the supposedly 
norm-generating powers and capacities of rational agents, what we find is that key 
features of the Kantian moral law (its categoricity, universality and necessity) are no 
longer accommodated. By contrast, where emphasis is placed on the independent 
authority of the moral law, what is needed is a detailed and coherent account of the 
sense in which ‘self-legislation’ is a term that still finds a place in Kantian ethics. Al-
though preliminary explanations of this second sort are to be found in the literature                                                         
2 In this regard, my aim differs from the more ambitious project of Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, which sought to establish that if one wants to believe in morality at 
all, one must believe in autonomy of the will.  
3 Examples of the first camp include the views proposed by Christine Korsgaard and An-
drews Reath (see chapters two and three). Karl Ameriks’s interpretation of Kantian autonomy 
provides a fine and convincing example of a moderate version of the second approach (see in 
particular Interpreting Kant’s Critiques [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003] chs. 10 and 
11; and Kant and the Fate of Autonomy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], esp. 
Part I). For a more straightforwardly realist interpretation of Kant’s metaethical position, see 
Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) esp. ch. 6. 
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(most notably in the work of Karl Ameriks), many of the central claims attached to 
this approach require much further elaboration and clarification, particularly when it 
comes to the claim that reason functions as the formal legislative ‘source’ of the mo-
ral law. In what follows, I will argue that the first tack sketched above applies only to 
a very specific (and limited) aspect of our obligation to the moral law. I will be offer-
ing an interpretation that follows largely in the spirit of the second tack, though one 
which deals with the vexing questions left unanswered in previous studies. In this 
sense, my work aims to supply much-needed bridgework for a realist interpretation of 
Kantian moral theory which is genuinely able to accommodate Kant’s insistence that 
the will is a legislator of moral law.4    
Careful attention to Kant’s arguments helps to clear up some of the interpretative 
controversies surrounding his claims. At the same time, however, it brings out the 
significant difficulties that an ethics of autonomy must confront. My aim in the sec-
ond half of this thesis is to focus on the connections between the interpretation of 
Kantian autonomy I will be advancing and the strict dichotomisation of reason and 
desire which lies at the heart of Kant’s conceptions of moral worth and character. 
Many of Kant’s most sincere supporters have found his motivational and character 
rigorism to be a highly undesirable feature of his moral theory; finding these elements 
to be either expendable or amendable, they have sought to temper Kant’s penchant 
for dichotomies by offering alternative ‘Kantian’ conceptions of motivation and 
character in which the line between reason and desire is rendered less stern. Yet be-
cause of the important relationship between the dichotomisation of these elements of 
our nature and the specific aspects of autonomy I will be highlighting, they can ad-                                                        
4 As will become clear, we must use ‘realist’ carefully in the context of Kantian ethics. This 
is a term that often obscures more than it clarifies, and in this context I merely use it to de-
signate a position according to which the authority of the moral law is not in any sense cre-
ated by human beings.  
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vance these alternatives only at the cost of putting great stress on the inner coherence 
of Kant’s moral theory. My hope is thus to defend what at times seems to be the more 
harsh and unreasonable of Kant’s tenets by bringing to light the ways in which they 
are ultimately tethered to his most prized discovery concerning the source of moral 
constraint.  
 
Context and Significance 
 
I undertook the following study in the hope that a detailed engagement with the com-
plications affecting Kant’s conception of autonomy can bring clarity and precision to 
contemporary interpretation. My research has been undertaken in the midst of a boom 
in English-language interpretations of Kant, in which non-realist, constructivist 
understandings of autonomy have taken centre stage. In this sense, my own interpre-
tation goes against the grain, and I will be spending much energy deflecting and re-
jecting the dominant English-language approach. One narrow significance of this 
project for the broader Kantian community, then, is its contribution to criticism of 
this strand of thinking. In a more positive light, it also carries significance for the 
Kantian audience in the sense that it provides an improved way of thinking about 
Kantian autonomy – one which is firmly rooted in orthodox Kantian doctrine, and 
one which has yet to receive a specific and coherent articulation in the vast literature 
on autonomy. More broadly still, my additional hope is to bring to light even to 
non-Kantians the distinctiveness of Kant’s approach to morality and the true extent of 
his firm anti-consequentialism. If my account helps in any way to convince 
non-Kantians that there are benefits to advancing an ethics of autonomy, so much the 
better.  
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The Structure of the Project 
 
This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter one, ‘Tensions within the Notion of Au-
tonomy,’ introduces the key starting points for the chapters to follow and includes a 
brief sketch of Kant’s introduction of the concept of autonomy (both principle and 
property) in the Groundwork. It also introduces two important interpretative theses, 
which have historically played an important role in coming to understand Kantian 
autonomy, and it explores the various complications and tensions attached to each. In 
chapter two, ‘A Will Giving Universal Law,’ I focus in particular on the first of these 
theses, which I call the Command Thesis. This is the approach most intimately con-
nected to what has come to be known as Kantian constructivism, and in this chapter I 
argue that there are inherent difficulties in reconciling this approach with Kant’s 
conception of the key characteristics of morality. I argue that the language of 
‘authorship’ when it comes to the moral law is less straightforward than the Com-
mand Thesis makes it out to be and that there is evidence in Kant’s writing to support 
the existence of an important, and in my mind much more Kantian, alternative. In 
chapter three, ‘Pure Rational Constraint,’ my focus is the second of the theses out-
lined in chapter one, which I call the Rationality Thesis. The aim in this chapter is to 
make sense of the idea that the moral law is a ‘law of reason’ in a way that avoids the 
quite serious pitfalls afflicting recent constitutivist interpretations of this notion. It is 
in this chapter that I advance my positive interpretation of Kantian autonomy, one 
which ultimately incorporates elements from both the Command and the Rationality 
theses, though in very specific ways.  
Chapters four to six focus on the implications of this interpretation for some of the 
more difficult worries advanced against Kantian ethics. In chapter four, ‘Material 
Principles and the Form of Law,’ I begin by articulating the connection between the 
conception of autonomy I have been advancing and Kant’s derivation of the content 
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of the categorical imperative. One worry that commonly attaches to Kantian ethics 
concerns the way in which the moral law directs our attention to the form of our 
maxims and away from the objects of desire, a move which both solidifies the strict 
dichotomy between reason and desire in Kant’s ethics and would seem to render mo-
ral interest a very peculiar, almost inhuman matter. In this chapter, I defend Kant 
against the charges associated with this worry by emphasising the deep connections 
between his conclusions about moral interest and his conception of the moral law and 
its source. In chapter five, ‘On the Purity of the Moral Disposition,’ I turn to the con-
nection between the conception of autonomy outlined in chapter three and Kant’s 
seemingly unpalatable rigorism when it comes to moral character. Again, my argu-
ment is defensive; whilst I acknowledge that many are likely to find Kant’s conclu-
sions about character and moral worth unappealing, my hope is to make clear their 
deep connections to the central elements of his ethical thought, including autonomy, 
and so to make clear their (perhaps unfortunate) indispensability. In my final chapter, 
‘Moral Identity,’ I turn to the question of whether we have any reason to think that 
Kant was at all concerned about the apparently despotic character of reason in his 
moral theory, despite the necessity of presenting it as utterly separate, authoritative 
and pure. As I argue, attention to how Kant deals with this issue brings to light a 
promising solution to the problem of how to develop a lasting and settled commit-
ment to morality in the face of the obstacles afforded by our sensuous nature – a 
question which vexes both Kant himself and countless of his followers.  
 
Note on Quotations and Translations 
All references to Kant are to the volume, page and line numbers (where appropriate) 
of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences edition of Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte 
Schriften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900-). An exception is made for the Critique of 
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Pure Reason (KrV), for which page numbers for the first (A) and second (B) editions 
are provided. Specific published works are cited by means of the abbreviations listed 
below, and unless I have indicated otherwise, English quotations have been adapted 
from the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works, published under the general editorship 
of Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Unless there is an indication to the contrary, all 
italicisation reflects Kant’s original text.  
Abbreviations 
 
 
G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Meta-
physik der Sitten) (1785) 
KpV  Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft) (1788) 
KrV  Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) (1781, 1787) 
KU  Critique of the Power of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft) (1790) 
MdS  The Metaphysics of Morals (Metaphysik der Sitten) (1797) 
R Handwritten Notes: Reflections on Moral Philosophy (Hand-
schriftlicher Nachlaß: Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie) 
Rel Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason (Religion innerhalb der 
Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft) (1793) 
SF  Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit der Fakultäten) (1798)  
TP  ‘On the Common Saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no 
use in practice’ (‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie 
richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis’) (1793)  
UP Lectures on Pedagogy (Über Pedagogik) (1803) 
VC  Moral Philosophy: Collins Lecture Notes (Vorlesung zur Moralphilo-
sophie: Moralphilosophie Collins) (c. 1784-5 [perhaps 1774-79]) 
VL  Moral Philosophy: Vigilantius Lecture Notes (Vorlesung zur Moral-
philosophie: Metaphysic der Sitten Vigilantius) (1793-94) 
VM  Moral Philosophy: Mrongovius Lecture Notes, first and second set 
(Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie: Moral Mrongovius; Moral Mron-
govius II) (c. 1774-77; 1784-5) 
WA ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ (‘Beantwortung 
der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’) (1784) 
 
 
     
 
 
 
— 1 — 
TENSIONS WITHIN THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY 
 
 
Despite its frequent attachment to a certain sternness and asceticism, Kant’s ethical 
thought has something of a rebellious aspect. Like those who had made previous ef-
forts to determine the source and content of moral principles, Kant did of course em-
phasise the strict bindingness of morality and its standards; when it comes to mo-
rality, he writes, we are not volunteers, but are rather bound to the moral law in a re-
lation of unconditional duty (KpV 5:82). Unlike those who came before, however, 
Kant proposes that the very possibility of a categorically binding imperative is condi-
tional on the rational will's capacity to be a law to itself — on its capacity to lay down 
its very own commands, and so to possess the property of autonomy. Obedience to 
the practical rules imposed by church, state and custom must certainly have their 
place in our lives, and this Kant recognised; yet he also observed that any rule which 
has its source outside of the rational will can be acted on only in response to some 
equally ‘external’ attraction or constraint, some more fundamental interest, in which 
case the imperative contained within it must be viewed as conditional.1 In order to 
explain the possibility of a categorical imperative, Kant denies that the moral law                                                         
1
 See G 4:432-33 and KpV 5:147. For Kant’s criticism of heteronomous moral systems, see 
also G 4:432.25-433.11 and KpV 5:539-41.  
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might find its ultimate source in God, the state or nature and rather affirms the quite 
innovative idea that its source lies in the will of every single rational being. Where 
the rational will is indeed subject to the moral law, Kant took himself to have discov-
ered that it is ‘subject to it in such a way that it must also be viewed as 
self-legislating’ (G 4:431.21-22).2  
In this introductory chapter, I lay down some important exegetical ground for the ar-
guments to follow. Since Kant first introduces the concept of autonomy in the context 
of articulating a third variant of the categorical imperative, I begin by tracing the 
principle of autonomy, as it is introduced in Section II of the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. I then go on to explore some of the more difficult questions 
associated with autonomy as a property of the will, identifying two important inter-
pretive theses and the quite significant problems attached to each. The remainder of 
this chapter works toward a better understanding of the basic structure of the Kantian 
will, the relationship between autonomy and freedom, and the shape of our options 
when it comes to explaining and supporting the notion of self-legislation. 
1.1  The Principle of Autonomy 
At the close of the second section of the Groundwork, Kant claims to have shown that 
autonomy of the will is the supreme foundation of morality:                                                          
2
 Als selbstgesetzgebend; alternatively: ‘as itself lawgiving.’ In the Groundwork, the concept 
of autonomy is introduced at 4:431.16-18 and is more fully developed at 4:433.10 and 
4:440.14-32, where it is explicitly characterised as ‘the property of the will by which it is a 
law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition).’ In the second Cri-
tique, autonomy is officially defined at 5:33.8-33. 
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By explicating the generally received concept of morality we 
showed only that an autonomy of the will is unavoidably attached to 
it, or much rather lies at its basis [zum Grunde liege]. Thus whoever 
holds morality to be something and not a chimerical idea without 
any truth must also admit the principle of morality brought forward.  
(4:445) 
Autonomy first appears in the Groundwork at an important transition in Section II, 
where Kant suggests that a third ‘practical principle of the will’ follows from the pre-
vious variants of the categorical imperative — a principle here stated as 'the idea of 
the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law’ (G 4:431.6-8).3 
This rendition of the Formula of Autonomy is curious, for while it seems to describe 
a particular property or characteristic (Beschaffenheit) of the will (the property of 
legislating universal law), Kant introduces it under the guise of a variant of the cate-
gorical imperative, and so as a principle capable of regulating the selection of max-
ims.4 This complexity requires that we make sense of the connections between the 
various appeals to ‘autonomy’ in Kant’s text, on the assumption that there is a central 
idea uniting them. In this section, I briefly consider the principle of autonomy and its 
role in Kant's argument. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to considering how 
we might begin to interpret the more fundamental notion of autonomy as a property 
of the will.  
                                                        
3
 An ‘idea’ (Idee) for Kant is a necessary concept of reason, to which no empirical object can 
ever correspond (KrV A 327/B 383). 
4
 While Rüdiger Bittner argues that this ambiguity poses a problem for Kant’s position, both 
Henry Allison and Andrews Reath convincingly argue that this shift in meaning is not philo-
sophically problematic. See Bittner, What Reason Demands, trans. Theodore Talbot (1983; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 76-77, 75-80; Allison, Kant’s Theory of 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 105-6; Reath, 'Autonomy of the 
Will as the Foundation of Morality,' Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) 159n.5. 
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According to Kant, there is only one categorical imperative, the general formulation 
of which is stated at G 4:421.6-8 (the ‘Formula of Universal Law’).5 In addition to 
the general formula, Kant articulates three variants, which collectively constitute a 
‘progression’ (Fortgang) towards metaphysics. 6  For the purposes of practical 
judgement (i.e. determining what it is that we ought to do), we are to follow the ‘strict 
method’ of the general formula; the purpose of the variants, by contrast, is to help to 
secure subjective acceptance of the moral law. Because they involve terms that find 
analogies in familiar moral theories (a law of nature, an end in itself, a kingdom of 
ends), they bring closer to intuition the merits of acting morally well, strengthening 
our reverence for the moral law (G 4:436.26-437.4).7 The first variant tells us some-
thing about the form of a morally permissible maxim: it must be such that it can be 
willed as a universal law of nature. The second, by contrast, reveals something about 
the matter of a moral maxim, or its end: it is the objective end consisting in every ra-
tional being, and it restricts the choice of all subjective ends. The key ingredients in 
these variants are, accordingly, the ideas of universal law and rational beings, and                                                         
5 ‘There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in accord-
ance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal 
law.’ The first variant directs agents to ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by 
your will a universal law of nature’ (4:421.18-20; emphasis reduced); the second directs: 
‘[s]o act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (4:429.10-12). 
6 The Law of Nature formulation (the first variant of the general formula) introduces the 
metaphysical notion of a supersensible nature, and thus constitutes the initial pathway into a 
metaphysics of morals.  
7 The relevant ‘general formula’ here is the Universal Law formula from 4:421. This con-
trasts with Allen Wood’s suggestion that Kant’s reference to the ‘general formula’ at 
4:436.32-437.1 points to the formula of autonomy (see Kant’s Ethical Thought [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999] 188). Although Kant suggests in the Groundwork that the 
general formulation is sufficient for practical judgement, a more complicated story is pro-
vided in the Critique of Practical Reason’s ‘On the Typic of Pure Practical Judgement’ 
(5:67-71).  
 
TENSIONS WITHIN THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY  12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kant incorporates both in his identification of the idea of every rational being as a 
will giving universal law.8 As he writes, the ground of practical lawgiving lies objec-
tively ‘in the form of universality which makes it fit to be a law (possibly a law of 
nature)’; subjectively, however, it lies in the end, which in this case is ‘every rational 
being as an end in itself.’ What follows, then, is ‘the third practical principle of the 
will, as supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of 
the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law’ (G 4:431.9-18).9 
What makes interpretation of the Formula of Autonomy difficult, however, is the fact 
that Kant presents this variant in a number of different renderings. Worse still, the 
version picked out by Kant as a canonical formulation does not have the form of an 
imperative at all.10 Although it is difficult to make out precisely how the Formula of                                                         
8
 As Kant writes, ‘[t]he above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at 
bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and one of them of itself unites the 
other two in it’ (G 4:436.8-10) (the original Gregor translation, here amended, makes it sound 
as though any one of the variants can be seen as uniting the other two, which is obviously not 
an accurate description). For a helpful summary of the connections between the variants (and 
the general principle), see Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Mo-
rals: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 109-112.  
9 That Kant means to say that it is the Law of Nature variant that is combined with the End in 
Itself variant is confirmed at 4:431.25, where he makes clear that he is interested in the com-
bination of the idea of ‘conformity of actions with universal law similar to a natural order’ 
and ‘the universal supremacy as ends of rational beings in themselves.’ Compare with Pa-
ton’s interpretation in his commentary on the Groundwork, where he suggests that the For-
mula of Autonomy ‘is derived from combining the Formula of Universal Law and the For-
mula of the End in Itself.’ See ‘Analysis of the Argument’ The Moral Law: Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals (1948; London: Routledge, 1991) 19. See also Stephen Engstrom, 
The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009) 150-51. Curiously, Engstrom equates the general formula-
tion with the Law of Nature formula (160).  
10
 E.g. ‘... all maxims are repudiated which are not consistent with the will’s own giving of 
universal law’ (4:431); the moral law commands ‘that everything be done from the maxim of 
one’s own will as a will that could at the same time have as its object itself as giving univer-
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Autonomy is meant to function, what is at least clear is that it brings to light in ex-
plicit terms the nature of the subject of universal legislation — namely, that the un-
conditionally binding and universally valid moral law is in some sense imposed by 
every rational will on itself, such that the will transgresses its own law when it adopts 
an immoral maxim. The principle thus indicates a particular conception of the relation 
of any rational will to the necessary and universal law that governs it. 
The Law of Nature Formula emphasises a formal feature of maxims which are al-
lowed by the categorical imperative: their strict universality, and so their fitness for 
universal laws of nature. Because we are already familiar with the system of natural 
laws, the analogy with natural law helps to bring the content of the moral law closer 
to intuition: to present it in a more concrete manner for our reflection. Likewise, the 
End in Itself variant emphasises the objective end, the adoption of which is required 
by the moral law. Again, this exposes morality and its merits more vividly. In just the 
same way, Kant’s third variant of the imperative brings us to a new way of reflecting 
on what the moral law tells us to do. It may now be conceived as requiring that we act 
only on maxims which incorporate or embody a universal law that originates in our 
own will, or, put negatively, that we refrain from seeking the law which is to deter-
mine our actions in anything but the will, and so in any object external to it.11  
                                                                                                                                                              
sal law...’ (4:432); ‘...to act on no other maxim than one such that it would be consistent with 
it to be a universal law, and hence to act only so that the will could regard itself as at the 
same time giving law through its maxim’ (4:434); ‘The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to 
choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law 
in the same volition’ (4:440). The canonical formulation is presented at 4:432 and is de-
scribed by Kant as ‘the principle of every human will as a will giving universal law through 
all its maxims.’ 
11 As we will see, there are complications to this idea.  
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It is probable that the Formula of Autonomy does not of itself constitute a decision 
procedure.12 Rather, its usefulness lies in its ability better to secure motivation on the 
part of the moral agent to do what the moral law commands. Human reason’s ability 
to represent to itself the general formulation makes it such that it ‘knows very well 
how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is 
in conformity with duty or contrary to duty’ (G 4:404.2-3); the principle of au-
tonomy, by contrast, reveals to us that moral principles are grounded firmly in the 
will itself and that, because of this, we follow our very own laws when we do what 
we ought to do. What is needed in addition to an understanding of the general for-
mula is a means by which to make the ordinary agent more attentive and responsive 
to the will’s own principle, and it is here that the Formula of Autonomy finds its most 
useful purpose. As we see in Kant’s transition from the first section of the Ground-
work to the second, the reasons for embarking on a metaphysics of morals are largely 
practical: what is needed is a way to ‘provide access and durability’ for morality’s 
precepts in light of the attractions and distractions stemming from inclination (see 
4:404-8).13 To the degree that it represents moral laws as stemming from our very 
own will, the third variant connects obedience to moral law with a unique form of 
dignity; as a result it is likely, as Kant suggests, to bring the moral law ‘closer to intu-
ition … and thereby to feeling’ (G 4:436.12-13).14    
                                                        
12 This interpretation is complicated by the fact that Kant seems to suggest otherwise in a 
footnote at 4:432. Even if the claim in this note can be vindicated (and this would have to be 
shown), it might still be the case that the primary significance of the third variant concerns 
motivation, as described below.    
13 The significance of this problem will be the focus of chapter six. 
14 On the relationship between autonomy and dignity, see G 4:434-36. 
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According to Kant, all earlier systems of moral philosophy fall prey to the same mis-
take: they do not acknowledge the fact that the moral law must be a principle of au-
tonomy: 
Now, if we look back to all previous efforts that have ever been 
made to discover the principle of morality, we need not wonder now 
why all of them had to fail. It was seen that the human being is 
bound to laws by his duty, but it never occurred to them that he is 
subject only to laws given by himself but still universal and that he is 
bound only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however, 
in accordance with nature’s end, is a universally legislating will.  
(G 4:432.25-32) 
Not only types of will but also moral theories are to be classified as either autono-
mous or heteronomous, depending on which model of the will they assume (G 
4:441-4, KpV 5:39-41).15 This passage expresses a condition on any moral theory’s 
ability adequately to characterise the moral law: it must render the moral law as a law 
which the rational will gives to itself. That is to say, it must represent the will as a 
legislator of sorts, and not merely as subject to moral requirement. Just why this 
should be so requires that we consider in further detail what it means for a will to 
give itself its very own law.  
                                                        
15
 As we will consider in further detail in chapter three, Kantian ethics is an ethics of au-
tonomy to the extent that it presupposes that a good will determines itself in accordance with 
the moral law on the basis of its supreme authority alone, without having to put ‘underneath’ 
that law ‘some incentive or interest as a basis’ (G 4:444). Chapter three will also give sig-
nificant attention to Kant’s reasons for thinking that all heteronomous ethical theories had to 
fail in their quest to ground a genuinely moral imperative.  
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1.2  Self-Legislation 
As Kant’s description of the principle of autonomy makes clear, the property of au-
tonomy is to be understood at least in part in terms of the reflexive notion of 
self-legislation. The moral law is the will’s own law, both in the sense that it is given 
by the rational will and in the sense that it is given to the will. Beyond this observa-
tion, however, what we need to understand is what this activity of ‘giving law’ or 
‘legislation’ amounts to.16 
One option on this front is to offer quite a literal reading of self-legislation as involv-
ing the will's promulgation of law, where ‘promulgation’ is to be understood along 
the lines of the issuing or expression of a command. The role served by such a com-
mand might be interpreted in a number of ways, though one option would be to hold 
that it puts the moral law into effect for an agent, generating a practical obligation. 
This approach is characterised by its commitment to the following, which I shall call 
the Command Thesis:  
(CT):  The moral law is a law which the rational agent com-
mands to him- or herself, such that the act of command may be 
described as the source of the obligation to act in accordance with 
the law.17                                                         
16
 It is important to note that, while there are countless appeals to ‘law-giver,’ ‘lawgiving’ 
and ‘legislation’ in the Groundwork, ‘Selbstgesetzgebung’ and ‘Selbstgesetzgeber’ do not 
make a parallel appearance. We do encounter ‘selbstgesetzgebend’ at 4:431.22, however, 
along with ‘die Idee des Willens jedes vernünftigen Wesens als eines allgemein gesetzge-
benden Willens’ (431.16-18) and the idea that all maxims must agree ‘mit der eigenen allge-
meinen Gesetzgebung des Willens’ (431.19-21).  
17
 This is similar to what Andrews Reath has recently called the Sovereignty Thesis, accord-
ing to which ‘[a]n agent who is subject to an unconditionally valid principle (i.e., a practical 
law) must be (regarded as) the legislator from whom it receives its authority’ (Agency and 
Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory 122). The Sovereignty Thesis is a particular way of flesh-
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This interpretation has the peculiarity of associating autonomy with a notion some-
times linked to what must be seen as externally imposed requirements by Kant’s 
standards. Generally speaking, the language of moral command is most immediately 
associated with the kinds of theological moralities which Kant criticises, and in an 
important essay even Kant himself presents the essential activities of various external 
authorities — in particular the officer, the tax official and the clergyman — precisely 
in terms of strict command.18 With this said, however, the Command Thesis has the 
virtue of accommodating much of Kant’s language, which at times quite explicitly 
appeals to the commanding power of the rational will.19 What is more, it preserves 
the traditional association between the idea of law, or legislation, and the act of 
promulgation. It is natural, after all, to suppose that if there are requirements on us, 
this fact can be traced to our having been required,20 and though in the case of moral 
self-legislation the relevant act of the will might not take the form of a literal declara-
tion (consisting instead, perhaps, in a decision, endorsement, commitment, or choice 
                                                                                                                                                              
ing out Reath’s Legislation Thesis, which states that ‘the moral law, and the requirements to 
which it leads, are laws that the rational will legislates’ (92). It is important to note that the 
Command Thesis only accurately describes the autonomy of an imperfectly rational will. 
Since a perfect will does not confront the law as an imperative, its representation of the moral 
law to itself (while perhaps in some extended sense a ‘command’) does not generate an 
‘ought’ or an ‘obligation.’ 
18
 Consider Kant’s ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ 8:37: ‘The officer 
says: Do not argue but drill! The tax official: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do not 
argue but believe!’ 
19
 E.g. MdS 6:227: ‘A (morally practical) law is a proposition that contains a categorical im-
perative (a command). The one who commands (imperans) through a law is the lawgiver 
(legislator).’ 
20
 In support of this theme, see Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A 
Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 262-63. As we will see in 
chapter two, this common intuition must, in Kant’s case, be rendered more complicated.  
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that x be done), the idea that agents must be bound to morality by some form of law-
giving activity is likely to agree with many people’s intuitions.        
Besides the obvious problem of how to interpret the notion of ‘command’ in this 
context, there are at least two additional difficulties with this approach. On the one 
hand, the very notion of an individual self that actively and literally legislates may 
seem to capture the wrong idea when it comes to Kant’s conception of moral re-
quirement. Moral laws are not mere personal decisions: they are meant to apply to 
certain classes or groups of agents and to many different situations. But if individuals 
could issue genuine moral commands to others, those others would be bound by those 
laws, and so would be subject to the (moral) authority of another — a problematic 
conclusion for a supposed ethics of autonomy.21 On the other hand, if individuals can 
command moral laws only to themselves, the language of legislation becomes an ex-
aggeration: an overly dramatic way of describing what amounts to individual choice 
or commitment.  
On the face of things, then, there is a problem in supposing that individual legislation 
constitutes the source of moral obligation. Either we find ourselves saddled with a 
view according to which individual agents are subject to external moral authorities, or 
we would seem utterly to collapse the distinction between moral obligation and per-
sonal choice. As attractive as this latter move might seem to some philosophical 
camps, the worry is that individual ‘autonomy’ of this sort cannot provide an ad-                                                        
21
 This point is quite helpfully articulated in O’Neill, ‘Self-legislation, Autonomy and the 
Form of Law,’ Right, History, Religion: Kant’s Present Significance, International Sympo-
sium, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, 5th March, 2004. Printed in Recht – Geschichte 
– Religion: Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart, ed. Herta Nagl-Docekal and Rudolf 
Langthaler, spec. issue of Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 9 (2004): 14. 
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equate basis for a Kantian account of moral obligation, bound as it is to the concepts 
of universality and strict necessity.22 
Should we then deny the Command Thesis by stressing that it is the rationality of 
moral laws, and not the mere fact that we have chosen them, which binds us? Con-
sider, for example, the following view, which we might call the Rationality Thesis: 
(RT):  The moral law is a fundamental law of reason, and this 
fact explains its universal authority. 
Since reason’s standards would presumably apply to all rational beings on this view, 
the worry about arbitrariness and individual discretion is resolved. Yet in resorting to 
the Rationality Thesis, we risk being unable to make sense of the notion that au-
tonomy, or self-legislation, is the key to understanding moral obligation at all. What 
significance can the concept of self-legislation really have, if the authority of moral 
principles is located in some conception of reason? Rather than describing moral ac-
tion as a species of following the will’s own law (and emphasising the will’s legisla-
tive power), why don’t Kantians simply propose that in acting morally well we are 
doing what it is right or rational to do?23  
                                                        
22
 As Wood puts this worry, ‘[t]o make my own will the author of my obligations seems to 
leave both their content and their bindingness at my discretion, which contradicts the idea 
that I am obligated by them’ (Kant's Ethical Thought 156). Onora O’Neill similarly worries 
that conceptions of individual autonomy, ‘whether read voluntaristically as mere, sheer pur-
suit of preference or more cautiously as pursuit of the right sorts of preferences ... substitute 
self-expression for moral obligation’ (Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics [Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002] 90). 
23
 As Wood writes, we might very well question whether this view renders the notion of 
self-legislation ‘a deception or at best a euphemism.’ See Kant’s Ethical Thought 156. 
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The central dilemma facing the notion of self-legislation takes the following form. 
Kant’s description of morality would suggest on the face of things that there is a self 
that serves as the legislating source of the moral law. Yet to make myself the source 
of my obligation is, on the face of things, to introduce an unpalatable arbitrariness at 
the level of moral requirement, rendering questionable the idea that I am actually ob-
liged. The problem is that we run into significant difficulties if we abandon this tack 
and stress instead the fact that the moral law is a law of reason, binding all agents 
universally and with necessity. If we choose to pursue this horn, Kant’s description of 
morality as grounded in self-legislation becomes quite curious: for why ought we to 
understand the relation that the ‘self’ who is subject to moral requirements bears to 
the moral law as relevantly different from cases of heteronomy? Why not view the 
source of the moral law, understood in this way, as lying outwith the individual self 
to whom it applies, in the already-established ‘canons of reason’?24 
If we are to resolve these worries, we must consider in much further detail the rela-
tionship between self-legislation and practical reason in Kant’s ethical thought. As a 
means of embarking on this discussion, it will be helpful to think about the structure 
of the Kantian will and the roles assigned to its elements in self-legislation.  
1.3  Legislation and Choice 
Kantian autonomy is one of a cluster of Elizabeth Anscombe’s targets in her seminal 
paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’ in which she argues against the use of what she 
                                                        
24
 Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought 156. 
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takes to be culturally deracinated concepts such as ‘duty,’ ‘ought’ and ‘obligation’ in 
ethics. In support of this conclusion, she constructs a genealogy of these term, ac-
cording to which quite ordinary and indispensable words like ‘should,’ ‘needs’ and 
‘ought’ (‘the machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be oiled’) acquired a special 
sense over time by being equated in the relevant contexts with the idea of being ob-
liged, bound, or required, ‘in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, 
or something can be required by law.’25 The reason for this shift lies in history: 
Christianity, with its law conception of ethics, derived its ethical notions from the 
Torah, and the concepts of being bound, permitted and excused became securely es-
tablished elements in our language as a consequence of its dominance. Yet despite the 
secure place of such notions in everyday moral reflection, Anscombe proposes that, 
with the secularisation of ethics, the context which once gave them their significance 
has now been abandoned:  
To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for 
conformity with the virtues failure of which is the mark of being 
bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua craftsman or logician) – that 
what is needed for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not 
possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a 
law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a concep-
tion is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a 
natural result that the concepts of ‘obligation,’ of being bound or 
required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; 
and if the word ‘ought’ has become invested in certain contexts 
with the sense of ‘obligation,’ it too will remain to be spoken with a 
special emphasis and a special feeling in these contexts.26 
                                                        
25
 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’ Philosophy 33 (1958): 5. 
26
 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ 6. It is worth noting that Kant’s ethics is not ‘secular’ in the 
sense of excluding an important place for God in the general picture of morality and moral 
understanding. There is a way of representing the moral law, according to Kant, as a law en-
dorsed or commanded by God; what his ethics does not allow, however, is that God could be 
the source of the moral law in the usual way – the force that brings it into being and that 
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The idea of self-legislation arises in this paper as a potential reply to this worry. 
While the modern moral philosopher might not believe in God as the source of prac-
tical requirement, what is to prevent us from appealing to the now-familiar Kantian 
notion that we in some sense lay down moral requirements for ourselves? Might such 
a notion allow us to preserve the law-like bindingness of moral principles in the ab-
sence of the relevant theological framework? Anscombe’s remarkably brief reply is as 
follows: 
Kant introduces the idea of ‘legislating for oneself,’ which is as ab-
surd as if in these days, when majority votes command great re-
spect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote 
resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is over-
whelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires 
superior power in the legislator.27 
On Anscombe’s view, moral self-legislation is absurd: where there is the genuine 
legislation of a normative principle, there must be separate authority on the part of the 
lawgiving body. What one does ‘for oneself’ may of course be admirable, but ‘it is 
not legislating.’28 
                                                                                                                                                              
ultimately explains its authority for us. It is not the loss of a belief in God or God’s command 
per se that occasions Anscombe’s worry, but rather the loss of a belief in God as the sole 
source of moral obligation. 
27
 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ 2. There are in fact two separate criticisms embedded in this 
quotation. First, Anscombe mocks the very idea of an analogy between morality and 
self-legislation because of the connection, on her view, between legislation and voting. A 
second and perhaps more serious point concerns the idea that legislation requires ‘superior 
power in the legislator.’   
28
 ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ 13. This worry is anticipated by C. D. Broad, who suggests 
that ‘it is doubtful whether any clear meaning can be attached’ to the notion of a self-imposed 
principle. See Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 
Ltd, 1930) 133. 
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Let us consider this criticism in further detail. So long as we allow that Kant need not 
conceive of legislation on the model of a vote according to which a majority wins, 
what he must do in order to block Anscombe’s criticism is to provide positive justifi-
cation for thinking that the will is divided into two separate offices, one of which 
possesses ‘superior power.’ Kant is of course able simply to posit a distinction within 
the will and to show that self-legislation need not be an incoherent notion, but is there 
any reason to think that the provision of such a story could be anything more than an 
ad hoc addition?29   
In ancient philosophy, a strong motivation for endorsing a conception of the soul as 
divided into different stations is the relationship between such a picture and the 
possibility of inner conflict and acratic conduct. Here, the idea is that the explanation 
of situations where one finds that one is pulling oneself in different directions de-
pends on there being different parts of the soul. The acceptance of the phenomena 
provides a strong justification for speaking about ourselves in this way.30 In Kantian                                                         
29 Since Anscombe is in effect mocking the very idea that a will should be thought of as di-
vided into separate offices, simply positing such a distinction is unlikely to satisfy her criti-
cism. What we need is a positive argument in favour of such a picture.  
30 See, e.g. Republic IV 439a-441c, where we encounter the examples of the thirsty man who 
refuses to drink, along with Leontius and the corpses (Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, 
rev. C. D. C. Reeve, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, associate ed. D. S. Hutchinson 
[Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1997]). See also Aristotle’s Ni-
comachean Ethics, I.13.1102b14-25: ‘For in the continent and incontinent person we praise 
their reason, that is to say, the [part] of the soul that has reason, because it exhorts them cor-
rectly and toward what is best; but they evidently also have in them some other [part] that is 
by nature something apart from reason, clashing and struggling with reason. For just as para-
lysed parts of a body, when we decide to move them to the right, do the contrary and move 
off to the left, the same is true of the soul; for incontinent people have impulses in contrary 
directions … [W]e should suppose that the soul also has something apart from reason, 
countering and opposing reason’ (trans., ed. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1999]).  
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ethics, however, the motivation for supposing that the soul must have different parts, 
one exercising rightful authority over the other, does not stem from a posteriori psy-
chological observation. Instead, this picture is taken to follow as a consequence of 
positions which Kant thinks that moral philosophers must (and do) accept, in the 
sense that very fundamental tenets cannot be maintained in its absence. One striking 
example of this occurs in the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant discusses the idea 
of a duty to the self – i.e. a duty whose object is the agent him- or herself alone.31 
The existence of such duties is a central theme in Kant’s ethics: their importance is 
noted as early as the Collins moral philosophy lecture notes (27:340-41), and they 
take up one whole side of the classification table of types of moral obligation in the 
Groundwork (4:421-4, 429-30). In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant suggests that 
there is something of a puzzle attached to the idea of a duty to oneself: if they exist, 
then I would seem to play two roles with respect to them – I am both passively con-
strained (to the extent that I am bound) and actively constraining (as the obligating 
power), resulting in a situation where I am the very subject to which my duty is owed. 
In Kant’s words,  
… the I that imposes obligation [das verpflichtende Ich] is taken in 
the same sense as the I that is put under obligation [dem 
verpflichteten] … [T]he concept of duty contains the concept of 
being passively constrained (I am bound). But if the duty is a duty 
to myself, I think of myself as binding and so as actively con-
straining (I, the same subject, am imposing obligation).  
(MdS 6:417.7-12)32                                                         
31 As Jens Timmermann points out, the category of duties to the self is quite exclusive. Not 
any duty that happens to concern the very agent it addresses counts as a duty to the self. See 
‘Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended,’ Philosophy 81 (2006): 505-508.  
32 A guiding assumption, here, is that a duty to the self is owed to oneself qua obligator. In 
everyday speech, I might be said to ‘owe’ a duty to someone insofar as she is the recipient or 
object of my dutiful behaviour (e.g. I owe it to my neighbour not to steal his car, though it is 
not strictly the case that he imposes that obligation, in the sense of binding me directly). In a 
 
TENSIONS WITHIN THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY  25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The problem is that there is something incoherent, we might suppose, in the thought 
that a single agent could occupy both roles. Is there any sense in which I am genu-
inely bound by a duty if I am the very agent imposing the constraint? If I am not 
bound by a duty, in what sense is there a duty in play at all? Kant ultimately resolves 
this puzzle, in characteristic fashion, by appealing to two different ways in which we 
conceive of ourselves. On the one hand, we can consider ourselves as ruling noumena 
(purely intelligible beings endowed with genuine freedom), on the other, as con-
strained phenomena (sensuous beings subject to natural necessity).33 On the assump-
tion that such a distinction is possible, the ruler and the ruled need not be identical at                                                                                                                                                               
Kantian duty to the self, the idea is not merely that I owe x to myself qua recipient of x; ra-
ther, it is also that I owe x to myself qua the imposer of obligation. As a result, there might 
well be a sense in which all ethical duties (including duties to others) are in addition duties to 
the self; in the case of any duty to x, even where I am not the direct recipient of x, I might 
nevertheless be the imposer of the obligation to x. Kant supports the claim that duties to the 
self are foundational with the following short argument: ‘For I can recognise that I am under 
obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation, since the 
law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in every case from 
my own practical reason; and in being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one con-
straining myself’ (417.25-18.3). Compare Reath, ‘Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself,’ 
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 361, where the claim is that it is clearly wrong to think of all duties 
as coinciding with duties to the self.   
33 Kant thus follows his usual pattern of tracing the illusion of a paradox to the assumption of 
transcendental realism (the assumption, that is, that phenomena are identical to things as they 
are in themselves). Note that Gregor’s translation at 6:418.19 obscures what is actually an 
ambiguity in the original German. Where her translation suggests that homo noumenon is 
regarded as being able to be ‘put under’ obligation to himself, what it ought to convey is the 
idea that homo noumenon is regarded as being capable of ‘obligation’ (Verpflichtung), which 
can be interpreted either as being obligated or as obligating. Put in context, Kant’s thought 
must have been that, when considered as homo noumenon, the agent is considered as one who 
is capable of obligating himself. The original German reads as follows: ‘Eben derselbe aber 
seiner Persönlichkeit nach, d. i. als mit innerer Freiheit begabtes Wesen (homo noumenon) 
gedacht, ist ein der Verpflichtung fähiges Wesen und zwar gegen sich selbst (die Menschheit 
in seiner Person) betrachtet…’ (6:418.17-20). For a similar gloss on this complication, see 
Reath, ‘Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself’ 355.n. 
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all, though in the end they must be conceived as constituting different aspects of the 
same human being (6:418.5-23).  
Of course, we might not believe in duties to the self in Kant’s specific sense.34 What 
is more, although an implicit notion of different elements of the self is always at work 
when we speak of judging ourselves, respecting ourselves, or ‘owing it’ to ourselves 
(Kant himself points out the significance of this last expression in a footnote at 
6:418), this way of thinking is highly metaphorical. As I aim to show in chapter three, 
Kant’s ultimate argument in support of such a conception will hinge on the notion 
that unless such a picture of the will is available to us – unless self-legislation is a real 
possibility for moral theory – there can be no such thing as an unconditionally bind-
ing practical principle.35 The existence of a will in which a legislative power rules 
over and constrains a separate and subordinate executive power is a necessary condi-
tion of the possibility of morality, according to Kant, and it is this argument that pro-
vides his key response to the worry that the concept of self-legislation is meaningless 
when applied to the human will. This is not to say that we must accept the assumption 
that there is an unconditionally binding practical law, of course; but it is to suggest 
that the stakes are high if we wish to share Anscombe’s position, for if we do, we can 
no longer hold out hope for the possibility of a genuine categorical imperative.   
                                                        
34 In any case, we have reason to be suspicious of Kant’s quick equation of the object of the 
duty with the obligator of that duty in the passage outlined above from the Metaphysics of 
Morals.  
35 As we shall see, Kant will argue that not even the theological picture described by 
Anscombe in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ can ground a categorical imperative. Only an au-
tonomous ethics has room for such a principle.  
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Any claim that the will is divided into ‘parts’ does of course lead to questions con-
cerning the ontological status of the different elements (e.g. could these ‘parts’ exist 
separately, or are they analogous to elements of something that necessarily entails 
both, like the convex and concave sides of a curve?).36 Yet the simple fact that 
metaphysical questions such as these may be raised does not imply that the concep-
tion is incoherent or philosophically undesirable. Indeed, part of its desirability 
hinges on what it allows us to say about the nature and possibility of moral require-
ment, and it is this set of questions with which a foundational ethics is primarily con-
cerned.  
To speak of the will as divided is in the first place to identify a difference at the level 
of functions and capacities. Accordingly, Kant distinguishes two capacities within the 
rational will and their associated ‘parts’ or ‘powers.’37 The function of actively giv-
ing law is attributed to Wille, the legislative element of the will, while the function of 
choosing what to do in light of Wille’s legislation is attributed to Willkür, the exec-
utive element of the will (the free power of choice). As Kant writes at MdS 6:226:  
Laws proceed from the will [Wille], maxims from choice 
[Willkür]. In man the latter is a free choice; the will, which is di-
rected to nothing beyond the law itself, cannot be called either free 
or unfree, since it is not directed to actions but immediately to 
giving laws for the maxims of actions (and is, therefore, practical 
reason itself). Hence the will directs with absolute necessity and is 
itself subject to no necessitation. Only choice can therefore be 
called free.                                                          
36
 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1102a30-31. In characterising these metaphysical wor-
ries, I am indebted to Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991) 61. 
37
 This distinction is not explicitly drawn in the Groundwork or the second Critique, but it is 
necessary to appeal to something of this sort if we are to begin to understand how a will can 
at once be the ‘source’ of a practical law (active law-giving) and be bound by that very law. 
 
TENSIONS WITHIN THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY  28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At MdS 6:213-14, Kant distinguishes free (freie) Willkür as ‘choice which can be de-
termined by pure reason,’ and he describes Wille as having the power to determine 
choice. Thus Wille is identical to practical reason. Both elements comprise the 
broader faculty of Wille, understood as volition or will as a whole, though they ex-
press significantly distinct functions within this broader power.38  
This distinction is welcome not only because it provides a reply (of a limited sort) to 
Anscombe’s worry, but also because it helps to resolve a troubling ambiguity in the 
Groundwork, where Kant both equates the will with practical reason and describes 
practical reason as determining (or failing to determine) the will (G 4:412). Wille in 
the narrow sense legislates laws, and this explains why the will is identified with 
practical reason. Willkür, on the other hand, is able to choose in accordance with or 
against the dictates of narrow Wille, and this explains why Kant is able to describe 
reason as either determining or failing to determine the will.  
Following Henry Allison, then, we can say that it is the will as a whole (Wille in the 
broad sense) which gives the law to itself.39 Insofar as narrow Wille legislates the 
moral law to Willkür, and insofar as both faculties are ultimately united as different 
parts of a greater power, this broader faculty, the will proper, is ‘a law to itself (inde-                                                        
38
 It is somewhat unfortunate that Kant uses the term Wille both to describe the broad notion 
of the will as a whole, which is comprised of both elements, and to describe the sub-faculty 
of rational legislation, or pure practical reason. With this said, it is possible that Kant does not 
use the term Wille ambiguously in the Metaphysics of Morals. When considering the whole of 
his works, the notion is indeed ambiguous, but there is good reason to think that a clear divi-
sion was made by 1797. In what follows, I hope to have made my own usage clear by indi-
cating whether a broad or narrow meaning is to be applied.  
39
 For Allison’s take on the kinds of freedom that can be attributed to these different aspects 
of the will, see Kant’s Theory of Freedom 129-36.  
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pendently of any property of the objects of volition)’ (G 4:440). Kant’s parenthetical 
addition is crucial: a will with the property or character of autonomy imposes laws on 
itself, the validity of which is independent of any interests stemming from the agent’s 
sensuous nature. Autonomy thus refers at least in part to the will’s own ‘laying down’ 
or ‘legislation’ of laws of a certain sort, to which the faculty of choice must then re-
spond.40   
1.4  Freedom 
According to Kant, our everyday notion of free agency involves the (purely negative) 
thought that genuinely free action is not causally determined by preceding conditions. 
To use Kant’s language, freedom in this sense involves ‘the independence of our will 
[Willkür] from necessitation through impulses of sensibility’ (KrV A 534/B 562).41                                                         
40 As I have noted, Kant’s distinction between autonomy and heteronomy is also a distinction 
between two kinds of moral theory. A theory bases morality on autonomy of the will when it 
supposes that the basic principle of morality finds its source in pure reason alone, which is 
able to represent that law to the faculty of choice. By contrast, a theory of heteronomy sup-
poses that morality is grounded on some external good, in which agents have a contingent 
interest. Kant’s quite novel idea is that any satisfactory moral theory must represent the moral 
law as legislated by the will to itself: since the moral law applies unconditionally, and since it 
is conceptually true that agents who are subject to the moral law must be viewed as legisla-
tors, a moral theory that does not represent the moral law as self-legislated simply cannot ex-
plain its unconditional validity. See, e.g. G 4:441-444 and KpV 5:33. 
41
 Alternatively, independence from determination by ‘alien causes’ (G 4:446). See also KpV 
5:33 and MdS 6:213-14. On Kant’s view, the nonhuman animal will (arbitrium brutum) is 
such that it is always necessitated by some impulse afforded by inclination. The human will 
(arbitrium liberum) is not necessitated by inclination but merely ‘affected’ by it: its causality 
works via representations rather than direct material determination (KrV A 534/B 562). Im-
portantly, Kant objects to any view according to which free action is grounded in an ante-
cedent natural state – even where it is nonetheless caused ‘from within, by representations 
produced by our own powers’ (see KpV 5:95-97). As he explains, ‘all necessary events in 
time in accordance with the natural law of causality can be called the mechanism of nature, 
 
TENSIONS WITHIN THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY  30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attached to this notion is the positive idea of a will that is the cause of its own ac-
tions, such that it initiates a novel causal chain. If we are to rule out the possibility 
that free action might be utterly uncaused, governed by blind chance, there must be 
some causal force at its seat.42 We must thus suppose that a free will is not only in-
dependent of determination by ‘alien’ forces, but also spontaneous, in the sense that it 
constitutes an unconditioned cause, or the absolute beginning of a causal chain.43  
In addition, however, Kant proposes that the idea of a negatively free will – a will not 
subject to the ‘alien’ laws of nature – gives rise to the idea of a will that is governed 
by its very own law. According to Kant, there must always be a law in accordance 
with which, ‘by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect,                                                                                                                                                               
although it is not meant by this that the things which are subject to it must be really material 
machines. Here one looks only to the necessity of the connection of events in a time series as 
it develops in accordance with natural law, whether the subject in which this development 
takes place is called automaton materiale, when the machinery is driven by matter, or with 
Leibniz spirituale, when it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will were 
none other than the latter (say, psychological and comparative but not also transcendental, i.e. 
absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, 
when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself’ (KpV 5:97.7-20). Leib-
niz describes the human soul ‘as a kind of spiritual automaton’ (though it is not subject to 
what he calls an absolute necessity) in the Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard, ed. Austin Farrer 
(1710; La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985) ¶52, p. 151.  
42 On the idea that a mere absence of natural determinism does not in itself preclude govern-
ance by chance (a lawless efficacy), see KpV 5:95.14.  
43 Absolute spontaneity (Spontaneität) is equated to transcendental freedom at KrV A 533/B 
561. See also KpV 5:48.20-3 and 101.11. According to Kant, practical freedom presupposes 
that the cause of my action ‘in appearance was thus not so determining that there is not a 
causality in our power of choice such that, independently of those natural causes and even 
opposed to their power and influence, it might produce something determined in the temporal 
order in accord with empirical laws, and hence begin a series of occurrences entirely from 
itself’ (KrV A 534/B 562). Compare Hume’s description of the ‘liberty of spontaneity’ and 
the ‘liberty of indifference’ in A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.2.1 (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 
rev. P. H. Nidditch [1739-40; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978] 407-8).  
 
TENSIONS WITHIN THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY  31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
must be posited’ (G 4:446.16-18).44 Thus causality must operate in accordance with 
laws of some sort. If the free will were subject to the laws of nature, it would be de-
termined by alien causes, for the ‘causes’ linked to certain effects by natural laws can 
only be empirical, and so governed by the determinism that applies to the world of 
appearances. Given that a free will is not determined by alien causes (this is just the 
definition of negative freedom), we can conclude that it also cannot be governed by 
natural law. Yet according to Kant, if the free will is neither lawless nor governed by 
an alien natural law, it must be governed by its very own law.45 Negative freedom 
thus implies not only spontaneity, but also autonomy. What is more, because the 
will’s own law turns out to be nothing other than the moral law, ‘a free will and a will 
under moral laws are one and the same’ (G 4:447.6-7).  
There is thus a clear connection between Kant’s conception of free will and morally 
good action. For Kant, morally good action just is action in which the will conforms                                                         
44 A lawless cause is, for Kant, an absurdity (ein Unding). In the Groundwork, this assump-
tion is not given positive support. The connection between negative freedom and autonomy is 
given a more thorough articulation, however, in Reflection 7220, 19:289: ‘Imagine freedom, 
i.e. a power of choice that is independent of instincts or in general of direction by nature. This 
freedom in itself would be a rulelessness and the source of all ill and all disorder, where it is 
not a law to itself. Freedom must accordingly stand under the condition of universal con-
formity to rules and must be an intelligent freedom, otherwise it is blind or wild.’ See also R 
6961, 19:215.  
45 As Kant suggests in the Groundwork, freedom of the will is autonomy, ‘i.e. the property of 
the will to be a law to itself’ (4:446.24-447.2). See also KpV 5:33.15-21. Kant perhaps il-
legitimately assumes here that if a law is not a law of nature, it must belong to the will itself 
in some relevant sense. Given his identification of the will with practical reason (G 
4:412.28-30), the dichotomy between laws of nature and laws of reason is thus fully in play. 
Language which associates freedom with a kind of self-imposed law can also be found in 
Rousseau’s Of the Social Contract (1762), where the thought is that ‘the impulsion of mere 
appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself is freedom’ (I.8, 
¶3) (The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, trans. ed. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 54.  
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to the law of pure reason. As such, it consists in the realisation of freedom. For some 
of Kant’s critics, this spells trouble – for if only morally worthy action realises free-
dom, does this not suggest that only morally worthy action is free? Does Kant not 
seem to be saying that we are responsible only for our morally good actions, but 
never for those that are immoral? Where does this leave the concept of culpable 
evil?46  
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clarifies his position by proposing that the free-
dom of the will in the sense characterised by ‘autonomy’ must be conceived as a ca-
pacity to act in accordance with the moral law from the pure motive of duty 
(6:226.12-227.9).47 Put differently, to be ‘governed’ by the moral law is to possess 
the power to act from an a priori motive utterly unconnected to our sensuous nature.                                                         
46
 For an important articulation of this worry, see Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 
7th ed. (1874; 7th ed. 1907; Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981) 57-59, 
511-16. Here, Sidgwick suggests that we dispose of a conception of freedom as consisting in 
morally good or rational action whilst maintaining a conception of freedom as the capacity to 
choose. As Henry Allison points out, this criticism is also commonly attributed to Carl 
Leonhard Reinhold, who accuses Kant of rendering impossible free yet immoral actions. See 
Reinhold’s ‘Erörterung des Begriffs von der Freiheit des Willens,’ Materialien zu Kants 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed. Rüdiger Bittner and Konrad Cramer (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1975) 255-6. See also Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 133-5. For a discussion 
of these themes, to which I am greatly indebted here, see Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary 164-67. 
47 See also VC 27:267.37-9. This interpretation is developed by Henry Allison in Kant’s 
Theory of Freedom (see esp. 97-98). In contrast to this interpretation, Allen Wood proposes 
that we distinguish between autonomy and practical freedom and that the former is best 
understood as the full realisation of the capacity in which the latter consists (the freedom to 
act on moral, as opposed to natural, law) (see, ‘Kant’s Compatibilism,’ Self and Nature in 
Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen Wood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) 73-101. This 
interpretation allows us to draw a direct connection between autonomous action and morally 
worthy action, as Kant’s language sometimes suggests, and it helps to explain Kant’s claim 
that the categorical imperative ‘commands neither more nor less than just this autonomy’ (G 
4:440; my emphasis). As will become clear, I do not follow Wood’s terminology in what 
follows.  
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On this interpretation, even the immoral actions of a free will incorporate sensuous 
incentives without being necessitated by them (KpV 5:32.26-7). Whilst a free will 
might in certain cases choose to ‘borrow’ the law which is to determine its actions 
from nature (and so to act in accordance with it), it is not subject to that law. It thus 
‘stands under’ moral law in the sense that the latter constitutes an unconditionally 
authoritative principle by which the will is able to effect its particular form of cau-
sality, should it so choose. As such, on this interpretation, there is no intermediate 
between the full possession of autonomy (qua capacity) and the full lack of autonomy 
(the lack of the capacity). If a will does not possess the property of autonomy, it is 
heteronomous, and lacks altogether the capacity to be determined by the mere form of 
law.48 A finite yet autonomous will might of course fail to live up to this remarkable 
capacity when an agent chooses to act immorally. This does not, however, render the 
will any less autonomous. 
                                                        
48
 Here I am appealing to a useful adjective, though Kant does not use words like ‘autono-
mous’ and ‘heteronomous’ in his foundational ethical writings. It is helpful to note, in addi-
tion, that in Kant’s writings there is a sense in which a will might be more or less free to the 
degree that it is influenced by forces suggesting alternatives to the path set out by the moral 
law. As Kant writes in a note from (around) 1783-4, ‘The freedom of the divine will does not 
consist in its having been able to choose something other than the best; for not even human 
freedom consists in that, but in being necessarily determined by the idea of the best, which is 
lacking in the human being and thereby also limits his freedom’ (R 6078, 18:443). If it is to 
be made consistent with the notion that freedom consists in a capacity, the thought must be 
that different kinds of will are able to actualise or realise freedom (qua capacity) more or less 
perfectly (though the having of the capacity itself is not a matter of degree). Thus there may 
be a sense in which I realise my freedom ‘more perfectly’ when I act morally well, since in 
this case my inclinations do not interfere in my choice (though I am nonetheless affected by 
them) and reason is practical of itself alone (see, e.g. KpV 5:24.35-40). C.f. Descartes’s dis-
cussion of freedom in Meditation IV, where one important thought is that the more one is 
inclined by reason in a certain direction (as opposed to experiencing one’s options with com-
plete indifference), the freer is one’s choice (Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. ed. John 
Cottingham, revised ed. (1741; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 40.  
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This solution, should it be successful, would seem to clear space within Kant’s 
framework for the possibility of freely chosen immoral action. Nevertheless, a serious 
objection to this conception of freedom emerges from an attempt to explain, on its 
own terms, what immoral action might involve. As this interpretation asserts, the 
(free) will is not determined by natural causes. Such a will cannot effect its causality 
by means of natural law, for it is not ‘subject to’ or ‘governed by’ the laws of nature, 
but is instead governed by the moral law. As such, the moral law is a law in terms of 
which the free will can effect its causality, should it so choose. Yet if this is true, then 
the failure to choose the moral law as the law of one’s causality is ultimately mys-
terious. Moral weakness of this sort cannot be the result of determination by natural 
law (the effect of natural causes), but by definition nor can it be the result of deter-
mination by moral law (for then it would not constitute moral failure). Whilst we 
might speak of the morally weak will as one that allows itself to be affected by sensi-
bility, as one that in some sense chooses to borrow its law from nature, what we can-
not say is that it allows itself actually to be determined by natural law. But then what 
does it really mean to say that a will ‘borrows’ its law from nature? By what law does 
it effect its causality, if it does so via neither natural nor moral law?49  
 
It is beyond the scope of this project to attempt to resolve this seemingly ineluctable 
problem. For our purposes, the important point to note is that the will’s legislation is 
intimately connected to a positive conception of freedom on Kant’s view. To this 
point, then, we have come some way in identifying what Kant was up to when he 
wrote of the will’s own giving of universal law. We have considered the elements of 
the Kantian will and their designated roles in decision-making, identifying in particu-                                                        
49 In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, Kant develops the theme of the inexplica-
bility of moral failure. See, e.g. 6: 43.12-17.   
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lar the legislative power within every rational being, and we have examined (albeit in 
brief) the relationship between the will’s own legislative power and Kant’s concep-
tions of freedom. Nevertheless, there is much work to be done when it comes to 
clearing up the puzzles I outlined in §1.2, which concern in particular the relationship 
between self-legislation and the source of the binding authority of the moral law. Did 
Kant mean to introduce the notion of moral self-legislation as a part of the Command 
Thesis, tying our subjection to the moral law directly to the commanding activity of 
the legislative will, or did he mean to defend something more along the lines of the 
Rationality Thesis, linking the moral law’s authority for us to its basis in reason? 
Does either of these theses capture his conception of autonomy?50 Even with the dis-
tinction between Wille and Willkür in hand, these questions remain, for they concern 
the precise meaning and function of the ‘legislation’ of the former. Setting out the 
basic structure of the Kantian will and the significance of its parts for freedom is of 
course important and is a necessary step in coming to terms with the meaning of au-
tonomy, but this does not in itself resolve the tension between legislation and law in 
Kant’s thinking. 
1.5  Lingering Objections 
The tension between the Command Thesis and the Rationality Thesis hinges on the 
question of whether we want to emphasise the legislative activity of the will or the 
                                                        
50 To recap, the Command Thesis holds that the act of moral self-command constitutes the 
source of the obligation to act in accordance with the moral law (see p. 16). The Rationality 
Thesis, by contrast, holds that the moral law’s binding authority is fully explained by the fact 
that it is a fundamental ‘law of reason’ (see p. 19).  
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universally binding character of moral requirement.51 The move towards focusing on 
the ‘self’ in self-legislation may be tempting for some to the degree that one aims to 
connect morality to individuality, authenticity, self-realisation and to a certain con-
ception of freedom. If my will is the source of moral laws, then there might seem to 
be something very personal about my morality, something which links it inherently to 
me.52 Yet how can such a self-imposed law be said to bind me at all?53 Worse still, 
how could a law which finds its source in my legislative will ever be shown to be 
valid for every rational being as such?  
Some of Kant’s greatest supporters address this problem by attempting to reconcile a 
commitment both to the universal validity of moral laws and to the thought that their 
validity is grounded in an act of the will. On a cluster of quite popular antirealist,                                                         
51
 As Wood puts it, this tension depends on whether we highlight the ‘autos’ (self) or the 
‘nomos’ (law) in autonomia. See Kantian Ethics 106. 
52 As will become clearer, I take this personalised approach to autonomy to be deeply mis-
taken. The concerns articulated in this section are meant to set the stage for the chapters to 
come.  
53
 This worry of course echoes Anscombe’s concerns, as outlined above. In his comments on 
Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of autonomy, G. A. Cohen links this worry to an argu-
ment articulated by Thomas Hobbes (see Korsgaard et al., The Sources of Normativity, ed. 
Onora O’Neill [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2996], 167-70). As Hobbes writes, 
‘the Sovereign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man, is not Subject to the 
Civill Lawes. For having power to make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free 
himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; 
and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it 
possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and 
therefore he that is bound to himselfe only, is not bound’ (Leviathan II.26.6.137-8); see Le-
viathan, ed. Richard Tuck, revised student ed. (1651; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 184. As we have seen, this worry is repeated by Kant himself in his discussion 
of duties to the self in the Metaphysics of Morals (6:417). As we will see in chapter three, 
given that he held a sufficiently rich understanding of self-legislation, this criticism does not 
apply to Kant. On its own, it actually begs the question against those who hold that the will is 
the source of its own obligations (see Timmermann, ‘Duties to the Self’ 515-16).     
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antirelativist interpretations of Kant’s ethics, for example, a guiding notion is that 
autonomy implies that the rational will could never be subject to an ‘external’ or ‘in-
dependent’ order of standards and values, which find their source outwith the vo-
litional activity of rational agents. As John Rawls puts this idea, 
... it suffices for heteronomy that first principles are founded on 
relations among objects the nature of which is not affected or de-
termined by our conception of ourselves as reasonable and rational 
persons (possessing the powers of practical reason) and by our 
conception of the public role of moral principles in a possible 
realm of ends.54    
According to this general approach (which comes in many more specific varieties), a 
genuinely binding moral principle must be created or constructed by a legislative act 
of the will, via the use of certain privileged procedures (furnished by the familiar 
Kantian formulae, including the Formula of Universal Law).55 Objective norms are 
not valid independently of our conceptions and activities, but are instead 'constituted 
by the activity, actual or ideal, of practical (human) reason itself.'56 Because of the                                                         
54 Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University press, 2000) 236. 
55 Though many constructivist interpreters of Kant focus on the Formula of Universal Law, 
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. offers a constructivist approach to the formula of the End in Itself. See 
‘Kantian Constructivism in Ethics,’ Ethics 99 (1989): 752-770. Interestingly, constructivist 
views tend not to emphasise Kant’s distinction between Wille and Willkür (see §§2.1 and 
2.2).   
56
 Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 99. As Rawls 
explains elsewhere, ‘Kant’s idea of autonomy requires that there exists no moral order prior 
to and independent of those conceptions that determine the form of the procedure that speci-
fies the content of the duties of justice and of virtue. Heteronomy obtains not only when these 
first principles are fixed by our special psychological constitution, a psychology which dis-
tinguishes us from other persons, as in Hume, but also when first principles are fixed by an 
order of moral values grasped by rational intuition, as with Clarke’s fitnesses of things or in 
Leibniz’s hierarchy of perfections’ (Lectures 237). Compare Christine Korsgaard: ‘values are 
not discovered by intuition to be “out there” in the world’ but are instead ‘created’ by human 
beings by ‘the procedure of making laws for ourselves’ (The Sources of Normativity 112; see 
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vital role of the procedural construction of moral norms and of rational agents in this 
activity, the significance of the ‘self’ (or ‘selves’) in self-legislation is guaranteed to 
be more than a euphemism: moral requirements are at base a species of positive law, 
existing and binding us ‘because we legislate them.’57 Yet to the degree that the rel-
evant procedures are not arbitrary and indeed are such that they yield correct answers 
to moral questions, we are at the same time permitted – or so the story goes – to hold 
these norms to be objectively valid for all rational beings.58 
 
We will be examining this move toward constructivism in further detail in chapter 
two. This explicit connection of the moral law and the wills of individual selves has 
been a very popular move – so much so that it seems that, in denying its plausibility,                                                                                                                                                               
also ‘Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Arguments of Foundations I,’ The Monist 72 
[1989]: 311-340). Kantian constructivism of various stripes has been chiefly inspired by 
Rawls’s approach to Kant’s ethical thought: see in particular his ‘Kantian Constructivism in 
Moral Theory,’ Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-72. A very helpful account of the evo-
lution of Rawls’s own constructivist views (views which he takes to be Kantian, if not ex-
actly Kant’s) is given by Onora O’Neill in her ‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,’ The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 347-353. O’Neill traces Rawls’s account of what he takes to be Kant’s construc-
tivism on pp. 353-57 of this text. Relatively similar constructivist interpretations of Kantian 
autonomy have been proposed by Andrews Reath (‘Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation 
of Morality’ and ‘Legislating the Moral Law,’ Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory 
121-72 and 92-120) and J. B. Schneewind, ‘Natural Law, Scepticism, and Methods of Eth-
ics,’ Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (1991): 289-308; and The Invention of Autonomy: A 
History of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) esp. 512-525. 
For a particularly rich and subtle version of Kantian constructivism, which avoids presenting 
autonomy as something personal and arbitrary, see Onora O’Neill’s ‘Constructivism in Rawls 
and Kant’ 357-363 and Constructions of Reason: Explorations in Kant’s Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) ch. 11.   
57
 Korsgaard, ‘Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I' 331; my em-
phasis. 
58
 See, e.g. Korsgaard: ‘there are answers to moral questions because there are correct pro-
cedures for arriving at them’ (The Sources of Normativity 38). 
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we risk robbing Kant's ethics of one of its most appealing features. Yet we might 
nonetheless worry about the prospect of deriving categorical necessity, the hallmark 
of Kant's moral law, from the volitions, commitments, or endorsements of individual 
rational agents. Surely categorical bindingness cannot depend on any act of my will, 
no matter which ‘procedure’ I follow in my willing, for such a move would seem to 
leave Kant’s ethics open to the exact same charge that he levied against the theologi-
cal voluntarists: that such a law can only ever bind my will via some mediate interest, 
but never solely from itself. The worry, then, is that the Command Thesis is little 
more than a cleverly disguised endorsement of the idea that the explanation of our 
subjection to moral requirement (and the only available reason for our compliance 
with it) lies in the fact that we have created it. 
As we saw in §1.2, the retreat from the Command Thesis to the Rationality Thesis is 
not without its own problems. Perhaps most importantly, it risks portraying autonomy 
as an exaggerated metaphor: if the source of the moral law is really the mysterious 
faculty of pure reason (the same in each of us), then there would seem to be little 
force to the claim that the ultimate moral legislator is in any sense my self. To say 
that the moral law is a law of reason is, on the face of things, precisely to say that its 
authority is independent of any individual volitional act. But if this is the case, then 
we seem to lose the sense in which our acceptance of the moral law differs at all from 
our acceptance of church dogma or the edicts of the state, at least when it comes to 
the question of our ability to identify ourselves with its source. Indeed, it has seemed 
to some of Kant’s critics that the moral law possesses something of a dictatorial 
character when it comes to the finite rational agent, such that Kant’s ethics establishes 
a ‘tyranny of reason’ against those aspects of ourselves with which we most identify 
in our everyday dealings (our deep-seated desires, values, commitments and attach-
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ments).59 If reason functions as an internal despot, we may well wonder what appeal 
Kant’s ethics of autonomy really has – and indeed, whether it actually differs from 
the previous rationalist positions on which Kant took himself to have drastically im-
proved.  
                                                        
59
 This theme is developed in chapter six. 
     
 
 
 
— 2 — 
A WILL GIVING UNIVERSAL LAW 
 
 
 
As we have seen, Kant proposed that ‘the idea of the will of every rational being as a 
will giving universal law’ (G 4:432) is the key to explaining the possibility of a cate-
gorical imperative. Although it is subject to the moral law, the rational will must be 
regarded as also giving that law – as in some sense legislating the command by which 
it is bound. In the Groundwork, Kant associates this idea with the thought that the 
will may regard itself as the ‘author’ of the law, an idea which has been taken by 
some of Kant’s interpreters to provide a key to understanding the troubling concept of 
moral self-legislation. As Kant writes:  
‘… all maxims are rejected that are inconsistent with the will’s 
own giving of universal law. Hence the will is not merely subject 
to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must also be 
viewed as self-legislating, and just because of this as subject to the 
law (of which it can regard itself as the author) in the first place’ 
(G 4:431.19-24).1  
For many of Kant’s interpreters, the language of authorship of the moral law leads 
straightforwardly to the idea of the creator or maker of law, which would suggest that 
                                                        
1 I have strayed from Gregor’s translation on a number of fronts in this passage.  
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Kant subscribes to a form of the Command Thesis.2 Though this is a popular conclu-
sion, I argue in this chapter that there are inherent difficulties in reconciling a par-
ticular version of this thesis with the universality and categoricity which Kant pres-
umed to belong to morality. What is more, I suggest that Kant’s language of author-
ship is much less straightforward than it first appears. Though it may be tempting to 
interpret Kant’s claim about our status as authors of the law as implying this version 
of the Command Thesis, careful attention to Kant’s use of the authorship metaphor 
reveals that there is an important alternative to consider. In clearing the space for this 
interpretative option, I hope to prepare the ground for the more positive arguments of 
chapter three.  
2.1  The Command Thesis and Radical Constructivism 
The key idea behind the Command Thesis is that we impose moral law onto our-
selves, such that moral constraint can be viewed as the result of deliberative activity. 
Put differently, it suggests that the exercise or activity of the will is the source of the 
obligation to abide by morality’s prescriptions. These core ideas are quite general, 
and as such the Command Thesis must be made more specific if it is to stand a                                                         
2 Recall that, according to the Command Thesis, the moral law is a law which the rational 
agent commands to him- or herself, such that the act of command may be described as the 
source of the obligation to act in accordance with the law. In a recent study on autonomy in 
ethics, Charles Larmore quite explicitly equates Kant’s position with a strong version of the 
Command Thesis. As he writes, ‘In [Kant’s] hands, [autonomy] did have a distinct meaning – 
namely, self-legislation: principles of thought and action acquire their authority by virtue of 
rational beings imposing them on themselves, instead of supposing them to be endowed with 
an independent validity to which they must simply assent’ (The Autonomy of Morality [Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008] 43). See also p. 109: ‘Reason, Kant concluded, 
must be understood as self-legislating or “autonomous”: in endorsing principles, it does not 
so much recognise as establish their right to regulate our conduct.’  
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chance of helping us to understand Kant’s conception of self-legislation. What, for 
instance, lies behind the idea of creating moral obligation, and how might agents be 
conceived as engaging in such an activity? Does the Command Thesis imply that we 
are the source of the authority of the categorical imperative and its three variants, or 
that we are the source of the substantive (yet still general) practical laws that are de-
termined via the application of the supreme principle of morality?3 Finally, is it part 
of this view that the power to confer normative authority onto a principle is in any 
way connected to the power to determine its content?  
The first of these questions concerns the nature of the will’s legislative activity, and 
in this regard it will be helpful to draw a parallel between the Command Thesis and 
the version of Kantian constructivism offered by Christine Korsgaard.4 Broadly 
speaking, Korsgaard follows in the tradition of John Rawls, according to whom an 
essential feature of Kantian constructivism is the claim that particular practical laws – 
substantive prescriptions and prohibitions – are to be viewed ‘as specified by a pro-
cedure of construction,’ the structure of which is linked fundamentally to our powers 
of practical reasoning and to the self-conception that accompanies them.5 As I men-
                                                        
3 E.g. the unconditional command not to lie. 
4 Versions of constructivism are sometimes offered as interpretations of Kant, sometimes as 
substantive positions in their own right. Given my purposes, I will be focusing on 
Korsgaard’s own view, which she presents as a modified version of the Kantian account of 
the source of obligation.  
5 Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 237. In its widest sense, the construction 
metaphor might be taken to describe any view that focuses on the moral law as providing a 
‘constructive’ (positive, action-guiding) procedure for solving moral problems. This is the 
sense in which John Rawls first used the idea of construction in A Theory of Justice. Even 
here, Rawls contrasted ethical construction with intuitionism, which he viewed as being un-
able to settle practical disputes (and so as non-constructive) insofar as it offered a number of 
unranked principles (See A Theory of Justice [1971; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
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tioned in §1.5, this procedure is typically identified with the categorical imperative, 
and Korsgaard does not depart from this convention. What distinguishes her view 
from many other versions of constructivism, however, is her insistence on the idea 
that moral requirements are generated by the exercise of a process of deliberation, and 
so constitute its outcome. In this sense, the procedure of construction is meant to do 
more than allow us to identify the moral status of a proposed maxim.6 Rather, it ex-
presses a reflective process by which individual agents craft or fashion law for them-
selves.7 
On Korsgaard’s interpretation, the categorical imperative is a ‘test of reflection.’ As 
an impulse to action presents itself to me, I test it to see whether it is a reason to act 
‘by asking whether the maxim of acting on it can be willed as a law.’8 This question 
is asked from the standpoint of a certain self-conception (or cluster of 
self-conceptions): where a proposed law is shown on reflection to be compatible with 
the identity I have adopted for myself, it is imparted normative force and functions as                                                                                                                                                               
Press, 1999] 34, 39-40, 49, 52; see also O’Neill, ‘Constructivism vs. Contractualism,’ Ratio 
16 [2003]: 320).  
6 Though he goes beyond this thought in stressing that the categorical imperative procedure 
has the power to generate binding reasons, Andrews Reath also emphasises the role of the 
categorical imperative as a criterion of moral permissibility: ‘A constructivist account takes 
the FUL [formula of universal law] to be the basis of a procedure of moral deliberation (a 
‘procedure of construction’) that is the final criterion of right in the sense that the outcome of 
applying the FUL, whatever it is, defines the moral status of a maxim’ (Agency and Au-
tonomy 169.n40). 
7 Korsgaard labels her view a form of procedural realism, since she takes values to be con-
structed by a procedure: ‘the procedure of making laws for ourselves’ (The Sources of Nor-
mativity 112). Strictly speaking, on Korsgaard’s view, not every maxim that we find we can 
will as a universal law will count as a ‘maxim of duty.’ It is only when a maxim fails the test, 
she writes, that we get a duty – the duty of adopting the opposite of what the failed maxim 
proposes. See ‘Kant’s Analysis of Obligation in Foundations I’ 328-29. 
8 Sources 89, 113. 
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a source of reasons. Where it is shown to be incompatible with an identity I have ad-
opted for myself, I obligate myself to refrain from acting as it prescribes. Thus obli-
gation derives, according to Korsgaard, i) from my having adopted a certain 
self-conception, and ii) from my having reflected in accordance with the categorical 
imperative from the standpoint afforded by this self-conception.9 We confer the sta-
tus of law onto proposed maxims of action by engaging in this process of reflection, 
such that whilst it is true that in some sense the categorical imperative test allows us 
to discover that a maxim is fit to be a law, ‘the maxim isn’t a law until we will it, and 
in that sense create the resulting value.’10  
Construction is a metaphor. It is linked with the idea of activity and typically stands 
in contrast to views which posit that the relevant norms or truths exist independently 
of human reasoning, so that the latter might be used to discover or intuit them. On 
less radical constructivist views, the claim is that facts about obligation are grounded 
in facts about the possible conclusions of procedures hypothetically carried out by 
rational agents: a view which is consistent with there being genuine obligations which 
are independent of the actual carrying out of a certain form of reasoning or deliber-
ation. I have an obligation not to lie, on the moderate view, not because I have en-
gaged in a certain course of reasoning, but because there are facts about what a ra-
tional agent would choose if she were to deliberate in accordance with the procedure 
                                                        
9 As Korsgaard puts her idea, ‘the principle of choice [maxim] derives its ability to confer 
normativity on [a given] incentive from the way that the agent identifies herself … Norma-
tivity derives from our self-conceptions’ (Sources 248-9).  
10 Sources 112. This argument is summarised on pp. 112-113. Note that, on Korsgaard’s 
view, certain of our maxims (the subjective principles on which we act) will be made objec-
tively normative (actual laws with normative force) by our reflective endorsement. What we 
actually ‘legislate,’ on this view, are maxims.  
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in question.11 But a more radical constructivist reading of Kant, such as that pro-
posed by Korsgaard, takes him to be suggesting that human beings must create sub-
stantive principles of justice and morality by actually carrying out the categorical im-
perative procedure.12 The idea is not merely that there are procedures by which we 
can demonstrate that certain principles are justified and binding. The principal idea is, 
rather, that there is a procedure the observance of which confers validity or justifica-
tion onto certain principles, such that those agents who undertake that chain of rea-
soning can be viewed as the source of their normative force. It is true that before the 
use of the relevant procedure, we cannot know any of our moral obligations. But this 
is precisely because, before the use of the procedure, there simply are no moral obli-
gations to be known.13  
Does our volitional activity have any influence on the content or validity of the ‘pro-
cedure of construction’ itself, on Korsgaard’s view? Is this a principle that we can be 
said equally to ‘construct’? Here, some constructivists maintain that the answer must 
be ‘no.’ Rawls, for instance, proposes that while the substantive content of moral                                                         
11 In casting things in terms of what the fully rational agent would do, this version of Kant-
ianism would contain strong parallels to a virtue-theoretical way of thinking about the content 
of morality. For an insightful exploration of some parallels between Kantian and Aristotelian 
ethics, see Robert Louden, Morality and Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), esp. ch. 6. 
12 This contrast is nicely articulated by Eric Watkins and William Fitzpatrick, ‘O’Neill and 
Korsgaard on the Construction of Normativity,’ The Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2002): 358. 
Watkins and Fitzpatrick also label Korsgaard’s view ‘radical.’  
13 Because they hold that there are non-realist, justified, objective, action-guiding ethical 
prescriptions, most constructivist views are highly ambitious. See O’Neill, ‘Constructivism in 
Rawls and Kant’ 348-9. O’Neill’s own constructivist view avoids the language of creation 
and conferral of obligation, focusing instead on the notions of justification and vindication. 
For this reason, I will not be giving very much attention to her view here, where the idea is to 
work through possible specifications of the Command Thesis.  
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doctrine is indeed constructed, the same cannot be said for the categorical imperative 
procedure. The latter is simply ‘laid out’ and can be identified by considering the im-
plicit structures at work in our conception of the reasoning of free and equal, reason-
able and rational, persons.14 In a similar vein, Korsgaard suggests that the categorical 
imperative ‘does not impose any external constraint on the free will’s activities, but 
simply arises from the nature of the will.’15 On her view, the categorical imperative 
sets out what a free will must do in order to continue being what it is, such that not 
following this principle renders one unable to continue to view oneself as the free                                                         
14 Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 239-40. Though her constructivism differs in 
important ways from those offered by Rawls, Reath and Korsgaard, it is useful also to con-
sider O’Neill’s suggestion that human beings can be said to construct a common plan or pro-
cedure for the determination of substantive principles of behaviour. On her view, there is no 
independent order of reason that imposes a common procedure of this sort: ‘As Kant depicts 
the matter, the very predicament of a plurality of uncoordinated agents is all we can presup-
pose in trying to identify principles of practical reason: it is because reason’s authority is not 
given that it must be instituted or constituted – constructed – by human agents’ (‘Construc-
tivism in Rawls and Kant’ 357-8). If human beings are to organise their thinking together and 
to find common principles of behaviour, they need to construct some common authority. 
How is this to be done? O’Neill answers this query by suggesting that, ‘[s]ince all they have 
in common is their lack of a given “plan of reason,” all that they can do is to refuse to treat 
any of the various faiths and beliefs, traditions and norms, claims and propositions they vari-
ously adhere to as having unrestricted authority for organising thinking and doing. However, 
those who do not regard any specific faith or beliefs, tradition or norms, claims or proposi-
tions as having an unrestricted authority for organising thinking and doing in effect adopt the 
overarching principle of thinking and acting only on principles which they regard as open to, 
and followable by, all’ (‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant’ 358).  
15 Sources 98. A parallel thought is articulated by Reath, who argues that, whereas substan-
tive practical laws are generated via our employment of the universality test, the categorical 
imperative is ‘given’ by the will insofar as it ‘emerges from the very nature of rational vo-
lition’ and that this explains the sense in which we can be said to ‘legislate’ the categorical 
imperative (along with substantive moral principles) (Agency and Autonomy 99). For an im-
portant criticism of this view, see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., ‘Legislating the Moral Law and Taking 
One’s Choices to be Good,’ Philosophical Books 49 (2008): 102-3. On Reath’s view, the 
moral law is not a law that we impose on ourselves via some act of volition. This distin-
guishes him from Korsgaard (‘Autonomy, Taking One’s Choices to be Good, and Practical 
Law: Replies to Critics,’ Philosophical Books 49 [2008]: 126-29.)  
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cause of one’s actions.16 What is more, we must, as reflective rational agents, main-
tain a conception of ourselves as free in order to be able to act at all. Because this is a 
self-conception which we necessarily adopt in acting at all – because we must                                                          
identify with this self-image – we are committed to willing in accordance with the 
categorical imperative.17 With this last move, however, the story is complicated, for 
we now see that for Korsgaard there is a sense in which our own volitional activity 
can be said to ground at least the normative force – though not the content – of the 
categorical imperative. According to her interpretation, principles derive their ability 
‘to confer normativity on [a given] incentive from the way the agent identifies her-
self’; normativity, even at the level of this basic principle, derives from our adoption 
of a self-conception – in this case, our conception of ourselves as free agents who 
cause our own actions.18 Although we are not free arbitrarily to determine the content 
of the categorical imperative, its bindingness (its force as an obligation) is ultimately 
grounded i) in the fact that it describes what a free will must do in order to continue 
being a free will; and ii) in the fact that we must adopt a conception of ourselves as 
free in order to act at all.19 Because it is ultimately our actual identification with a 
self-conception that does the normative work, here, there is a fundamental sense in 
which our own activity can be said to ground the categorical imperative itself.                                                         
16 Sources 98, 235-7. Korsgaard presents this argument as an interpretation of the opening 
argument of Groundwork III.  
17 See Sources 90-113. 
18 Sources 248-9. On Korsgaard’s view, ‘[a]n obligation always takes the form of a reaction 
against a threat of a loss of identity’ (102). Here, Korsgaard is explaining her own view, but 
she suggests that this particular aspect (or one that is very similar) can be found in Kant’s 
thoughts on autonomy as well (see p. 249). Korsgaard’s complete argument is developed in 
chapters three and four of Sources.   
19 See Sources 257. Although I will not push this criticism here, both of these claims are 
suspect. The first prong of this argument (the idea that the moral law describes what a will 
must do in order to will at all) will be discussed in some detail in §3.1.  
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So much for the basic contours of Korsgaard’s explanation of the source of norma-
tivity. On her view, however, we must delve deeper if we are to account for the par-
ticular obligations that are to count as moral. Departing from Kant’s own distinction 
between the categorical imperative and the moral law, Korsgaard proposes that we 
think of the former as telling us to act only on maxims that can be willed as laws, the 
latter as telling us to ‘act only on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on 
together in a workable cooperative system.’20 Where the categorical imperative di-
rects us to act on any law that is consistent with our identity (on any universal princi-
ple), it does not on its own, she argues, get us to moral constraint. We enact laws (and 
reasons) from a first-person standpoint in which we identify ourselves as certain 
kinds of people, and whether a maxim can serve as a law for us will depend ‘upon the 
way that we think of our identities,’ such that different laws will hold for egoists, 
mothers, and mafiosi.21 If an agent is to bind herself to substantive moral obligations 
via reflective endorsement, she must identify herself simply as a human being – or as 
Korsgaard puts it, as a ‘Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends.’  
Korsgaard seeks to preserve the universality and necessity of moral obligation by ar-
guing that we must adopt a conception of ourselves as citizens of the kingdom of 
ends. Her argument involves the following five steps: i) human beings must act for 
reasons; ii) without a conception of her practical identity, an agent cannot have a rea-
son to act; she must therefore have some conception of her practical identity;22 iii) an 
agent can adopt a practical identity only if she adopts her humanity as a practical                                                         
20 Sources 99.  
21 Sources 113. See also p. 107: ‘Autonomy is commanding yourself to do what you think it 
would be a good idea to do, but that in turn depends on who you think you are.’ 
22 Sources 120.  
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identity; iv) to adopt one’s humanity as a practical identity is to value one’s own hu-
manity; v) valuing one’s own humanity involves valuing the humanity in others as 
well, and this gets us to moral obligations.23 Here, the general strategy is parallel to 
that by which Korsgaard argues for the normativity of practical laws in general. Mo-
ral obligations derive their binding force from the fact that they are the result of re-
flection in accordance with the categorical imperative from the standpoint afforded by 
a certain self-conception. Unlike certain of our identities, however, the particular 
self-conception in question is one that every agent by necessity must adopt (or so the 
story goes) if she is to act for reasons at all.  
2.2  Reason and Reasoning 
When it comes to constructivism more generally, the procedural generation of sub-
stantive moral norms need not be conceived as an exclusively individualistic matter.24 
On Rawls’s view, for instance, constructivism is meant to explain how the content of 
moral doctrine will look once it is revealed after reflection according to the relevant 
procedure. The reflection here is not best understood as individualistic reflection or as 
‘perfect reflection at the end of time’; rather, it is identified with ‘such increasing 
critical reflection as might be achieved by a tradition of thought from one generation 
to the next,’ such that there should be a continual progress in formulating the doctrine 
                                                        
23 Sources 121. 
24 Of course, there is nothing wrong in principle with a view according to which much of the 
stuff of morality (e.g. coming to know moral norms, being able to act on them) is an individ-
ual matter.  
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in its entirety.25 With this said, however, other constructivist accounts do tend to 
focus on the legislative authority of a process of reflection undertaken by individuals. 
As Korsgaard puts her view, the relevant idea behind Kantian constructivism is that 
‘[n]othing except my own will can make a law normative for me.’ By employing the 
universality ‘test,’ my will commits me to certain maxims, and in endorsing certain 
principles as carrying normative force, I myself bring moral laws into existence.26 
Yet even if the focus is on individual reflection, radical constructivists such as 
Korsgaard need not be viewed as allowing for the arbitrary or discretionary creation 
of moral obligations, which leads us to a second worry voiced in chapter one. On 
Korsgaard’s account, individual agents are in the first place to be viewed as the ulti-
mate source of the obligation to comply with particular moral principles, transform-
ing normatively neutral propositions into authoritative laws:  
The source of obligation is a legislator. The realist objection – that 
we need to explain why we must obey that legislator – has been 
answered, for this is a legislator whose authority is beyond ques-
tion and does not need to be established. It is the authority of your                                                         
25 Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 274. To be clear, ‘progress’ on Rawls’s view 
ought not to be understood as becoming better at grasping an independent set of truths. As he 
explains in his lectures, ‘[r]ational intuitionism says: the procedure is correct because fol-
lowing it correctly usually gives the correct (independently given) result. Constructivism 
says: the result is correct because it issues from the correct reasonable and rational procedure 
correctly followed’ (242).  
26 ‘Kant’s Analysis of Obligation in Foundations I’ 330-331. Crucially, this universality test 
is not a test of knowledge or truth, for Korsgaard. It is a test of ‘reflective endorsement,’ by 
which the individual will actively commits to the suitability and validity of certain principles, 
and by which the normativity of these principles is generated. An individualistic interpreta-
tion somewhat along these lines has also been offered by Robert Paul Wolff, who argues that 
‘I must be the source of unconditional obligation … [Kant believes] (I think correctly) that 
rational agents are bound to substantive policies only insofar as they have freely chosen those 
policies’ (The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals [Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1986] 181). For an even more radically indi-
vidualistic conception of self-legislation, see Rüdiger Bittner, What Reason Demands ch. 5.  
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own mind and will … It is not the bare fact that it would be a good 
idea to perform a certain action that obligates us to perform it. It is 
the bare fact that we command ourselves to do what we find it 
would be a good idea to do.27   
There is a sense in which Korsgaard would be happy to say that the content of sub-
stantive moral requirements, and not merely their binding force, is generated or con-
structed by the process of deliberation, to the degree that it is determined completely 
by the application of the constructive procedure to a practical situation or maxim.28 
Since one cannot say in advance whether a proposed maxim will pass the universality 
test – since, on Korsgaard’s view, there is no answer to this question independently of 
its application – the content of our obligations is wholly settled by this procedure. 
This is not to say, however, that moral agents have any immediate discretion over the 
content of their substantive obligations, for the question of whether a maxim is able 
to pass the universality test is not a matter of choice.29 As a result, radical construc-
tivists need not necessarily equate construction with arbitrary creation at the level of 
the content of practical laws. The generation of substantive principles can only be ef-
fected by the following of a deliberative procedure, and so long as the same maxims 
have been tested, the content of moral laws simply cannot vary capriciously from                                                         
27 Sources 104-5.  
28 See, e.g. Reath Agency and Autonomy 111. This reply assumes, of course, that the age-old 
concern that the categorical imperative ‘procedure’ is too formal a tool to generate substan-
tive practical implications (as voiced, for example, by Hegel and Mill) is unfounded. For a 
convincing defence of the practicality of the categorical imperative, see O’Neill, Construc-
tions of Reason Part II.  
29 Agency and Autonomy 147. What I mean, here, is that the content of our obligations (what 
obligations we have) will depend on the principles to which we are committed (and in turn, 
on the self-conceptions with which we identify – e.g. free cause, mother, mafioso), and in 
that sense it is not arbitrarily determined. With this said, Korsgaard is nonetheless vulnerable 
to the charge that she has not shown that we must take up any particular practical identity 
(from the standpoint of which certain maxims must be endorsed), and to the degree that iden-
tities may be chosen or constructed at will, the charge of arbitrariness might well infect her 
position after all.  
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agent to agent, from tradition to tradition. Similarly, a more detailed look at construc-
tivism reveals that we need not worry that it allows for the possibility of arbitrarily 
‘unbinding’ oneself from the moral laws one has constructed. The categorical impera-
tive procedure is a chain of reasoning that confers necessity onto substantive princi-
ples, generating obligation where there was no obligation before. The legislative ac-
tivity of an individual agent must follow this procedure if she is to be able to view 
herself as the cause of her actions. As such, she cannot release herself from the com-
mitments to which her reasoning leads without abandoning this self-conception. Thus 
if Korsgaard is correct about the necessity of this self-image for rational agency (itself 
a separate question), the worry that individual agents might be able easily to release 
themselves from the obligations that they at one point legitimately faced becomes 
much less threatening.30  
With these observations noted, however, fundamental worries are likely to persist. 
First, if we cannot guarantee that all agents bring the same maxims to the universality 
test – if we cannot guarantee that they engage in this constructive procedure at all – 
then we cannot guarantee the universal and unconditional validity of moral require-
ments for all (imperfect, morally responsible) rational beings. In effect, the radical 
constructivist owes us a story about why we should suppose that the individual moral 
agent or ‘tradition’ of moral thought actually undertakes the relevant procedure, ap-
plied to the same proposed maxims. If she cannot provide such an account, then little 
sense can be made of the very central Kantian notion that all imperfect rational agents 
are universally bound to observe the same moral duties. Now given a plausible story 
about the uniformity of human nature, some kind of response to this worry might in                                                         
30 As Korsgaard puts this idea, we cannot change the law without changing our minds; be-
cause ‘we cannot change our minds about just anything,’ escape from our own laws becomes 
more difficult (Sources 234).  
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the end be crafted by those who wish to defend the above approach. If it could be 
shown empirically that we have grounds for thinking that human beings tend to bring 
the same kinds of general maxims to the table, we would have reason to suppose that 
Korsgaard escapes this charge.31 Even if this could be shown, however, a second ob-
jection hinges on the thought that it is unlikely that constructivists could ever give us 
reason to think that every rational agent as such actually undertakes the relevant pro-
cess of reasoning, and so generates practical laws at all. Korsgaard, though optimistic 
on this front, admits that since obligation is constructed from the first-person perspec-
tive, ‘the obligatory is like the visible: it depends on how much of the light of reflec-
tion is on.’32 To the degree that an agent does not in fact identify as a member of the 
kingdom of ends or does not in fact reason in accordance with the categorical impera-
tive, she is not bound by the conclusions that would have followed from that perspec-
tive. Yet where there is reason to doubt that every agent actually does reason in ac-
cordance with the categorical imperative, there is reason to doubt the adequacy of this 
view when it comes to accommodating the universal obligatoriness of practical 
laws.33   
Third, it seems difficult on this view to explain how agents can have duties that they 
fail to recognize. If substantive obligations are generated via my actively legislating 
maxims as law, the possibility of violating our legislated maxims becomes difficult to 
explain. According to Korsgaard, normativity is created by the reflective endorsement                                                         
31 At various points in Kant’s writings, the uniformity of (empirical) human nature is a re-
curring theme. 
32 Sources 257.  
33 As it happens, Kant himself seemed confident that the voice of conscience functions as a 
powerful background prompt, urging us diligently to use the categorical imperative in the 
selection of maxims. See, e.g. Rel 6:185-87.  
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of maxims. As a result, if room is to be made for moral wrongdoing, there must be a 
distinction between the reflective endorsement of a maxim as morally appropriate and 
its actual adoption as a subjective principle of action (i.e. acting on it). But then how 
are we to explain why an agent would reflectively endorse a principle or reason 
without actually acting on it?  
A final objection concerns what this view forces us to say about moral obligation in 
general. If the normative pull of obligation derives from our having adopted a certain 
self-conception and from our having reasoned in accordance with the categorical im-
perative from that perspective, then moral obligations become contingent rather than 
necessary. Korsgaard hopes to preserve the necessity of duty by arguing that we 
‘must’ adopt a conception of ourselves as members of the kingdom of ends if we are 
to value anything at all. Yet even if it could be shown that every rational agent must 
adopt this self-conception in order to be able to act for reasons – and this, of course, 
raises difficult questions of its own – what kind of ‘must’ would this be? Korsgaard’s 
presentation of this idea suggests that this would be an empirical, psychological fact 
(a fact about the reflective structure of human consciousness). To the extent that this 
is so, however, what this ‘must’ actually describes is empirical generality rather than 
genuine necessity. Our psychology could have been otherwise, which means that the 
validity of the moral law for us is a contingent fact on her view. What is more, even if 
an a priori ‘must’ could be established, Korsgaard’s position renders the authority of 
the moral law conditional on our (supposedly ‘necessary’) need to preserve our prac-
tical identity. Since it is central to her view that the normativity of principles derives 
ultimately from the normativity of self-conceptions and the importance of preserving 
them,34 Korsgaard’s moral law can only ever be a conditionally valid principle (con-                                                        
34 See, e.g. Sources 249.  
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ditional, that is, on the value or the normative pull of the relevant self-conceptions). It 
might turn out to be true that the condition she picks out is always met; yet even 
where this is so neither Korsgaard’s moral law nor the imperative she calls ‘categori-
cal’ genuinely possesses the core features of necessity and categoricity.35  
Perhaps in response to these worries, Andrews Reath departs from Korsgaard’s radi-
cal constructivism and suggests that Kant is best read as having proposed that the 
authority of a (substantive) practical law ‘comes from its having the form of law, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, from the reasoning that determines that the relevant 
maxim can or cannot be willed as a universal law without inconsistency.’36 In some 
instances, I will actually engage in reasoning fully in accord with the categorical im-
perative, in which case it is my very own reasoning which both confers validity on 
my conclusions and binds me to follow them. Even when I do not actually engage in 
this process of reasoning, however, Reath’s rather striking claim is that so long as this 
chain of reasoning is available to me, I retain the very same capacity to carry out the 
reasoning that makes a principle a law, such that there is no relevant difference that 
justifies denying me the status of legislator.37 On Reath’s view, the formula of uni-
versal law captures the reasoning that gives a principle its moral status; yet given the 
lack of relevant difference between carrying out this reasoning and possessing the 
capacity to do so, the moral requirements that would be generated from its actual ap-
plication apply to all rational beings for whom its performance is a possibility. As                                                         
35 This type of criticism is developed in John Skorupski, ‘Rescuing Obligation,’ European 
Journal of Philosophy 6 (1998): 335-55.  
36 Agency and Autonomy 140. As Reath goes on to say, ‘an agent subject to a practical law is 
bound to the law, and given sufficient reason to comply, by the reasoning that makes it a 
law.’  
37 Agency and Autonomy 142.  
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such, Reath’s particular brand of constructivism does not suppose that one is subject 
to a moral requirement only if one has actually carried out the relevant form of rea-
soning: 
It holds rather that a chain of reasoning that establishes the re-
quirement must be available to the agent, and accordingly that the 
agent have the capacity to understand and be moved by this rea-
soning, whether or not the agent actually carries this reasoning 
out.38  
 
There is thus a crucial difference between moral law and civil law: where the latter is 
in force as obligatory only once it has actually been enacted by a legislature, the for-
mer is binding upon an agent so long as there is a process of reasoning available to 
her that establishes its validity. 
 
Reath’s modification is desirable, to the extent that constructivists wish to rescue the 
possibility of having duties that we do not recognise. Perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, though, its adoption would allow constructivists to preserve the unconditional 
and universal character of duty – elements which would be lost if we were to main-
tain that moral requirements apply only to those who actually perform the relevant 
process of reasoning.39 With this said, however, the accommodation of these im-
portant features of morality comes at a hefty price, from the constructivist point of 
view. Few Kantians would object to the notion that, in order for a moral principle to 
apply to me with the force of law, I must be able to reach a reasoned understanding of 
its validity and to be motivated to act in accordance with its prescriptions (even if this 
capacity is never actualised). Yet in divorcing the idea of legislation in Kant’s central 
metaphor from the idea of the actual activity of the will – in associating it, in most                                                         
38 Agency and Autonomy 143.  
39 Reath, Agency and Autonomy 144.  
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cases, with the notion of a merely available chain of reasoning – Reath renders ob-
scure the extent to which actual agents can be viewed as generating the moral laws to 
which they are subject.40 In effect, Reath’s modification shifts law-conferring power 
from agents who are reasoning in a certain way to a universally available process of 
deliberation, in which particular agents may or may not engage. This available pro-
cess of reasoning, even in the absence of actual reasoners, is sufficient to establish a 
principle as universally binding.41 Yet to say this is just to say that certain principles 
are valid for all rational agents (agents, that is, for whom the chain of reasoning 
specified by the categorical imperative is available) independently of their actual 
volitions and exercises of thought. Reath does leave room for the idea that those who 
do actually engage in this reasoning can be viewed as giving moral law in an ex-
tended sense. But presumably even before rational agents engage in this activity, they 
possess the capacity to follow the relevant chain of thought, and so are under obliga-
tion to comply with that conclusion prior to any actual reasoning they might carry                                                         
40 To be clear, that agents generate the laws to which they are subject is something that Reath 
thinks Kant is committed to, not something that I particularly wish to see defended.  
41 ‘The FUL is a kind of legislative process that confers the status of law on a principle … 
[it] is not a way of determining whether a maxim satisfies some further substantive principle, 
but rather is the procedure that makes a principle a law; it lays out the reasoning that gives a 
principle its moral status’ (Agency and Autonomy 143). See also Reath’s synopsis of his view 
in ‘Autonomy, Taking One’s Choices to be Good, and Practical Law: Replies to Critics’: ‘I 
believe that Kant’s idea is that since a practical law applies unconditionally, its authority 
cannot be based on appeal to contingent interests, but instead must come from the reasoning 
(deliberative procedure) that makes it a law. In other words, sufficient reasons to accept the 
principle are given by whether it can be willed as universal law through the FUL. (It is im-
portant here that universalisability confers normative status on proposed principles of action.) 
That means that an agent is bound to the law by the reasoning that makes it a law. In holding 
that an agent is bound in this way, we presuppose that the agent has the capacity to carry out 
the deliberative procedure that makes the principle a law. But an agent who can employ that 
deliberative procedure has the same capacities as would be required of its legislator. I want to 
say that agents with this rational capacity can be regarded as a kind of legislator and that 
Kant’s references to giving law through one’s will are best understood in this light’ (128).  
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out. Given this shift, we might well ask what separates this view from traditional 
forms of realism, according to which the moral law is to be understood as a rational 
constraint which is valid independently of any particular exercise of the will and 
which individual agents may or may not recognise in deliberation.42  
Moreover, and more significantly for our purposes, it is crucial to note that this modi-
fied constructivist view no longer captures the principal idea behind the Command 
Thesis, which, if we recall, is the idea that the validity of the moral law finds its 
source in an act of command on the part of the rational will (or rational agents). This 
is not in itself an objection to the approach, since constructivism need not entail any-
thing like the Command Thesis as I have formulated it. Nevertheless, what Reath’s 
consideration of self-legislation would seem to illustrate is that there are inherent dif-
ficulties in reconciling the central features of moral requirement on any recognizably 
Kantian view with the idea that the volitional or rational activity of individual agents 
constitutes the ultimate source of moral obligation. Reath moves towards the idea of 
available chains of reasoning – and so of possible rational activity – in a move to 
rescue these principal features. Insofar as his version of constructivism succeeds on 
this front, it constitutes an improvement on Korsgaard’s more straightforward inter-
pretation. Yet Reath’s approach is able to secure what it does precisely at the cost of 
divorcing itself from the Command Thesis, with the result that the shortcomings of 
the latter are thrown into stark relief. In searching for a plausible version of construc-
                                                        
42 This type of worry is raised by Patrick Kain (‘Self-Legislation in Kant’s Moral Philoso-
phy,’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 [2004]: 298).  
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tivism – one which secures the universality and unconditionality of moral require-
ment – we seem to have left the thesis we were hoping to specify far behind us.43  
2.3  The Law and the Good 
Whether or not such problems plague the Command Thesis, we might nevertheless 
ask whether there is compelling evidence for this reading in Kant’s ethical writings. 
On this front, two passages in particular stand out as promising.44 The first can be 
found in the second Critique and concerns the failure of past moral theories to ac-
count for the categoricity of moral requirements. Traditionally, constructivist views in 
general have tended to rely on Kant’s descriptions of heteronomous ethical theories 
as a means of supporting the notion that the authority of moral laws must be a human 
creation. As we have already seen, Kant criticised previous moral theories for sup-
posing that the human being was merely subject to the moral law. According to 
Kant’s criticism, all such views entailed that the law 
… had to carry with it some interest by way of attraction or con-
straint, since it did not as the law arise from his will; in order to 
conform with the law, his will had instead to be constrained by 
something else to act in a certain way.45 By this quite necessary 
consequence, however, all the labour to find a supreme ground of 
duty was irretrievably lost. For, one never arrived at duty but in-
stead at necessity of an action from a certain interest. This might 
be one’s own or another’s interest. But then the imperative had to                                                         
43 This is not to say, of course, that there are no plausible versions of constructivism. It is to 
say, rather, that if there are any then they are likely not to represent the Command Thesis. 
44 As will become clear, I do not actually think that these elements of Kant’s doctrine do in 
fact support a constructivist reading of moral self-legislation.  
45 ‘… sondern dieser gesetzmäßig von etwas andern genötigt wurde, auf gewiße Weise zu 
handeln.’ 
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turn out always conditional and could not be fit for a moral com-
mand.  (G 4:433) 
Because such theories presuppose some ‘external’ attraction or constraint as the de-
termining ground of the will, none is able to account for the categoricity of moral re-
quirement. Any law which depends on something else for its normative force and for 
its motivational pull is merely conditionally valid.   
In the relevant passage from the second Critique, Kant develops this theme by casting 
his criticism of previous ethical theories in terms of their prioritisation of the good 
over the law. For Kant, good and evil are best conceived as objects of practical rea-
son: as possible (real) effects of our free volition (KpV 5:57-58). They are thus con-
cepts that represent a state of affairs which might be brought about as a result of our 
agency. Now as far as things go, there is nothing wrong in speaking about an object 
of practical reason per se, and Kant is certainly not denying that the concepts of good 
and evil ought to play a part in moral theory. What he wants to make clear, however, 
is that the categorical nature of morality makes it such that the concept of the good 
(object) must be derived from the moral law, and not vice versa. As he writes, ‘the 
concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it 
would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only … after it and by 
means of it’ (KpV 5:62.37-63.4).46  
                                                        
46 This passage is cited in Schneewind (‘Natural Law, Scepticism, and Methods of Ethics’ 
305) and in Rawls (Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 227). C.f. G 4:441.3-11: ‘If 
the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims 
for its own giving of universal law – consequently if, in going beyond itself, it seeks this law 
in a property of any of its objects – heteronomy always results. The will in that case does not 
give itself the law; instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. 
This relation, whether it rests on inclination or on representations of reason, lets only hypo-
 
A WILL GIVING UNIVERSAL LAW  62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On Kant’s view, if the concept of the good were not derived from the moral law but 
instead made to serve as its basis, then pleasure would become the ultimate practical 
criterion (the criterion of good or evil would consist only in ‘the agreement of the ob-
ject with our feeling of pleasure or displeasure’ [KpV 5:63.16-18]). There is a ques-
tion as to why this should be so. An answer is provided at KpV 5:58-9, where Kant 
suggests that a state of affairs can only determine the will by means of a feeling of 
gratification connected to the thought of the realisation of the object. The objects we 
encounter in the world (cups of coffee, another’s neediness) are empirical objects, 
and, according to Kant, the only way to bind an empirical object to my will is by 
means of an equally empirical incentive provided by inclination: in particular, a feel-
ing of pleasure or displeasure. This passage spells out a central assumption on Kant’s 
part concerning human nature – one with which we might disagree. Once this perhaps 
dubious assumption is taken on board, however, Kant’s claim concerning the neces-
sity of pleasure or displeasure when it comes to choice based on a conception of a 
good or bad object is made more intelligible.47  
Since it is impossible to determine a priori which representations of states of affairs 
will bring pleasure, putting the good before the law would thus allow for empirical 
conditions for a moral law and, as such, would preclude the universality and necessity 
of moral requirements.48 The moral law would constitute a mere means to the reali-                                                                                                                                                              
thetical imperatives becomes possible: “I ought to do something because I will something 
else”.’ 
47 In addition to spelling out this central assumption about human nature, Kant can be read in 
this passage as making a second point, employing what is close to Moore’s open question 
argument. As he says, those people who want to put the object first think that goodness is 
pleasure and displeasure, but we usually make a distinction between the pleasurable/painful 
and the good/bad. There are different criteria for the application of these terms.  
48 There are a few controversial steps, here, which for our purposes I will ignore.  
 
A WILL GIVING UNIVERSAL LAW  63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sation of some good and, ultimately, would be in the service of realising pleasure. 
Because of this, it would not possess the kind of necessity that Kant takes it to have, 
for the fact that x is a good means to y can only ever be contingent.49 In addition, 
were it empirically grounded, the moral law might not apply to all rational agents, for 
the receptivity to feeling pleasure at the representation of the relevant good cannot be 
assumed a priori to apply to all (indeed, it could not by definition apply to infinite 
rational beings such as God).50 Precisely as a result of this, Kant proposes that if we 
are to maintain the hypothesis that there are categorically binding practical laws, we 
must also presume that ‘instead of the concept of the good as an object determining 
and making possible the moral law, it is on the contrary the moral law that first de-
termines and makes possible the concept of the good, insofar as it deserves this name 
absolutely’ (KpV 5:64.2-5). All previous moral theories sought an object of the will in 
order to ground the moral law, which rendered the latter only a mediate determining 
ground of the will (i.e. determining the will only by means of its object). Whether 
they placed this object in happiness, perfection, moral feeling, or harmony with the 
will of God, ‘their principle was in every case heteronomy and they had to come un-
avoidably upon empirical conditions for a moral law…’ (KpV 5:64.18-19).  
Kant’s lesson is thus that we must begin with a conception of the moral law, and only 
then may we specify a conception of the good. Kant has thus excluded one possible 
option when it comes to the source of the authority of the moral law: the option of 
grounding it in some independently identified good state of affairs. This is an obser-
vation which some constructivists find highly important: for it would seem to some to                                                         
49 Assuming that we can agree with Kant on the point that pleasure is not unconditionally 
good, this would also entail that morality (its value reduced, on this picture, to its contribu-
tion to the realisation of pleasure) is not unconditionally good.  
50 See again KpV 5:58-9.  
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provide evidence for the notion that the will itself must create moral laws. What other 
alternative to the good as a grounding for morality could Kant have conceived? If a 
law does not derive its status from its relation to something outside of the will, it is 
more than tempting to conclude that the will itself creates this necessity.51  
If we examine this passage from the second Critique carefully, however, it becomes 
clear that Kant rejects the alternatives he lists precisely because they are too entan-
gled with empirical facts to allow for the necessity and universality that Kant pres-
umes to be characteristic of morality.52 The problem with grounding the moral law in 
an independent conception of a good object lies in the fact that this renders the ulti-
mate criterion of right and wrong the agreement of compliance with our feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure. This is precisely because the agreement of an object (or state 
of affairs) with the feeling of pleasure is presented here as the ultimate criterion of 
non-moral goodness, which on the rejected views is to serve as the basis for the moral 
law. But this does not imply that the same fate must belong to any view according to 
which the moral law is valid for us without having been created by individual agents. 
Kant’s discussion on the primacy of the law does indeed foreclose one class of op-
tions, but it does this for very specific reasons. So long as it avoids grounding mo-
rality in empirical (and so contingent) fact, a view according to which the moral law 
                                                        
51 Rawls diagnoses Kant’s worry as follows: ‘Kant thinks that once we start from the good as 
a prior and independently given object, the moral conception must be heteronomous. This is 
because in this case pure practical reason is not, as it should be, its own sovereign authority 
as the supreme maker of law … Heteronomy means precisely this lack of sovereign auth-
ority’ (Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 267). For more on this theme, see 
Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) chs. 9 and 11.  
52 See Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques 270-71.  
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is valid independently of the creative activity of individual agents would seem to 
present a genuine alternative.  
2.4  The Two Faces of Legislation  
Though this first supposed bit of textual evidence for the Command Thesis is in fact 
inconclusive, a perhaps more promising passage from the Metaphysics of Morals has 
likewise been highlighted in the recent literature as having something important to 
say on this front. Here, Kant again appeals to the notion that the rational will is in 
some sense the ‘author’ of the moral law,53 only unlike the passage from the 
Groundwork, in which this notion most famously appears, this passage distinguishes 
two senses in which one might stand in such a relation to a law:  
A (morally practical) law is a proposition that contains a categori-
cal imperative (a command). The one who commands (imperans) 
through a law is a lawgiver (legislator). He is the author (auctor) 
of the obligation in accordance with the law, but not always the 
author of the law. In the latter case the law would be a positive 
(contingent) and chosen [willkürlich] law. A law that binds us a 
priori and unconditionally by our own reason can also be ex-
pressed as proceeding from the will of a supreme lawgiver, that is, 
one who has only rights and no duties (hence from the divine 
will); but this signifies only the idea of a moral being whose will 
is law for everyone, without his being thought of as the author of 
the law.  (6:227.10-20) 
                                                        
53 I first mention this passage on p. 41. If we recall, this is where Kant suggests that ‘the will 
is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must also be viewed as 
self-legislating, and just because of this as subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as 
the author) in the first place’’ (G 4:431.21-24). See also G 4:448.17-18: ‘Reason must regard 
herself as the author of her principles independently of alien influences.’  
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Kant here suggests that a lawgiver can be the author of the obligation to act in ac-
cordance with a law without also being the author of the law. As Kant describes 
things, not even God himself can be viewed as the author of the moral law, for this 
would render the law contingent.54 When we look at this passage in isolation, how-
ever, Kant leaves us rather in the dark concerning just what this notion – and the par-
allel notion of commanding through a law – amounts to. In what sense can the moral 
law be said to ‘proceed’ from someone’s will without his being its author, and how 
does this relate to ‘authoring’ the obligation to act in accordance with the law?   
In his thoughts on this passage, Andrews Reath suggests that, by ‘author of the law,’ 
Kant presumably means ‘the agent who “writes” the law, or determines its content at 
his discretion.’55 By contrast, the author of the obligation should be understood as the 
agent who confers the status of law onto the relevant principle and who makes it 
binding for those whom he addresses. As he puts it:  
The author of the obligation in some sense addresses the law to 
some group of agents, and this volitional act is an authoritative 
reason to comply with the law that is independent of its content (or 
additional to any reason for complying that may be found in the 
content of the law) … By addressing a law whose content is given 
by reason to a group of agents, a supreme lawgiver with authority 
over those agents can make the law binding for them; his volition 
is a sufficient reason for them to comply with the law (i.e., a rea-
son for compliance over and above any reasons based on the con-
tent of the law).56 
                                                        
54 On the one hand, the fact of its being commanded would seem to be contingent rather than 
necessary. On the other, such a move would need to postulate that the agent takes an interest 
in obeying this command – which again leaves room for contingency.  
55 Agency and Autonomy 145.  
56 Agency and Autonomy 145-6.  
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One immediate question is whether there is any sense in which a purely formal moral 
law can be said to have a content that could give us a sufficient reason to act. With 
this worry bracketed, however, we still might ask whether Reath’s characterisation of 
the two senses of authorship genuinely captures Kant’s meaning. On Reath’s reading, 
this passage proposes that the author of the obligation makes the law binding for 
those whom he or she addresses. Since there can be no one who determines the con-
tent of the moral law, Kant’s description of rational agents as authors of the law in the 
Groundwork must appeal to the idea that we are authors in the sense that our com-
mand makes the law – whose content is already given – binding for ourselves and 
perhaps for others. In this way, the above passage might well be taken in conjunction 
with the passage from the Groundwork directly to support the Command Thesis. 
With careful attention to relevant passages elsewhere in Kant’s works, however, it 
becomes clear that this segment from the Metaphysics of Morals provides inconclu-
sive evidence for this version of the Command Thesis, leaving ample space for the 
kind of alternative I mentioned above. That is to say, the notion of authorship of ob-
ligation is less straightforward than we might first suppose.  
In the Metaphysics of Morals passage quoted above, Kant is primarily concerned to 
describe the relationship that God might have to the moral law. Insofar as he uses the 
language of authorship also to describe our relation to morality, the temptation is to 
view what he says as applying in exactly the same way to human agents. Given his 
starting point, however, it will be useful to trace Kant’s thoughts on God’s authorship 
when it comes to morality, as this notion appears elsewhere in his works.  
To begin, it is important to emphasise that Kant absolutely wished to avoid what he 
called ‘theological morality’ [theologische Moral]: ‘[t]hat religion, in which I must 
 
A WILL GIVING UNIVERSAL LAW  68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
first know that something is a divine command in order that I recognise it as my duty’ 
(Rel 6:153.29-154.1).57  That is, he rejects as heteronomous those views which 
ground the moral law in the authority of God’s will. All the same, however, Kant is 
happy to allow for what he calls ‘moral theology’ [Moraltheologie], which he de-
scribes as ‘a conviction of the existence of a highest being which grounds itself on 
moral laws’ (KrV A 632/B 660.n).58 On this alternative to theological morality, belief 
in divine command is wholly legitimate, so long as my acknowledgement of some-
thing as my duty does not in the least depend on an idea of its having sprung from the 
will or existence of God. This, according to Kant, would render duty conditional. Our 
ability to understand moral laws as categorically binding thus depends on denying 
that God’s relation to the moral law is one in which he straightforwardly confers onto 
duties the status of law.  
When it comes to the positive conception of this relation, Kant has a number of inter-
esting things to say. In the Collins lecture notes of 1784-85, for instance, Kant rejects 
theological voluntarism in favour of a view according to which the nature of certain 
actions in itself is viewed as the source of obligation. As he argues, obligation can be 
divided into two exhaustive kinds: positive [positiva] and natural [naturalis]. The 
former, he explains, arises by a ‘positive and voluntary choice,’ whereas the latter 
arises ‘from the nature of the action itself’ (27:261.38-262.2).59 All positive obliga-                                                        
57 In the first Critique, theological morality is described as containing moral laws that ‘pre-
suppose the existence of a highest governor in the world’ (KrV A 632/B 660.n).  
58 See also Rel 6:153-4. 
59 As Kant points out, ‘Crusius believes that all obligation is related to the will of another. So 
in his view all obligation would be a necessitation per arbitrium alterius; but in fact I am ne-
cessitated by an arbitrium internum, not externum, and thus by the necessary condition of 
universal will; hence there is also a universal obligation’ (VC 27:261.6-13). When it falls on 
post-Groundwork ears, this talk of being necessitated by an arbitrium internum and of uni-
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tion is such that we are obliged to an action which is, in itself, indifferent. That is to 
say, I am bound to do or omit some action not because it is good or bad in itself, but 
because it stems from the choice of some putative authority and constitutes the means 
to fulfilling a command. Had it pleased that authority to choose something else, then 
that other action would be my duty. But since the moral worth of an action depends 
on the fact that the action is not performed because of fear of sanction or promise of 
reward (even in this pre-autonomy text, Kant takes this to be true), the possibility of 
moral goodness depends on there being an alternative to positive obligation: on the 
possibility of actions being good in themselves, and thus of there being a sufficient 
incentive to do an act for its own inner nature. God might very well demand various 
things of us, but if he does, then he does so because he recognises (or has made the 
world such) that an obligation arises from the nature of the action itself, independ-
ently of divine command (VC 27:261-2).60 
                                                                                                                                                              
versal will points naturally to the idea of autonomy. We must be careful, however, not to im-
pose such a reading too hastily, for the language of an action’s being good or bad in itself, 
due to its inner nature, is just as naturally read as pointing to a pre-autonomy conception of 
obligation (I am not necessitated by anything external to the action, such as the will of an-
other, but rather by the nature of the action itself) (see e.g. 27:280.19-24: ‘In ethical obliga-
tions the motivating ground must be internal; one must do the action because it is proper, I 
must pay my debt, not because the other can compel me, but because it is proper to do so.’ 
See also the quotation in footnote 60, p. 69). Later in the Collins lectures, Kant’s discussion 
of internal and external obligation would seem to hinge on the difference between having a 
duty extracted from us by another and having a duty where no one else compels me (e.g. 
27:269-70). In the Mrongovius lectures, Kant discusses internal moral compulsion as occur-
ring ‘if duty makes the action necessary, against all the other’s inclinations, not by the will of 
another, but through his own will,’ which carries strong hints of autonomy (29:617).  
60 ‘All morality, however, rests on the fact that the action is performed because of the inner 
nature of the act itself; so it is not the action that makes for morality, but the disposition from 
which I do it. If I do a thing because it is commanded [geboten] or brings advantage, and 
omit a thing because it is forbidden or brings harm, that is not a moral disposition. But if I do 
it because it is absolutely good in itself, that is a moral disposition. So action must be done, 
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If it does not ground obligation as such, then what role does God’s will play, on this 
account?61 In this regard, an important clue is provided at 27:282-3: 
Anyone who declares that a law in conformity with his will ob-
liges others to obey it, is giving a law. The lawgiver is not always 
simultaneously an author [Urheber] of the law; he is only that if 
the laws are contingent. But if the laws are practically necessary, 
and he merely declares that they conform to his will, then he is a 
lawgiver. So nobody, not even the deity, is an author of moral 
laws, since they have not arisen from choice, but are practically 
necessary; if they were not so, it might even be the case that lying 
was a virtue. But moral laws can still be subject to a lawgiver; 
there may be a being who is omnipotent and has power to execute 
these laws, and to declare that this moral law is at the same time a 
law of His will and obliges everyone to act accordingly. Such a 
being is then a lawgiver, though not an author, just as God is no 
originator of the fact that a triangle has three corners. 
Here we find the same lesson as above: if moral laws had been chosen laws, then they 
would not be necessary; but it is a necessary truth that lying is wrong, just as it is ne-
cessarily true that a triangle has three angles.62 In addition, we encounter a further 
spelling out of the role that God’s command might play in this story: moral require-
ments are indeed binding without his prior sanction, but God may declare that these 
                                                                                                                                                              
not because God wills it, but because it is righteous or good in itself; and it is because of this 
that God wills it and demands it of us’ (VC 27:261-2). C.f. Rel 6:99.5-10: ‘But neither can 
ethical laws be thought of as proceeding from the will of this superior (as statutes that would 
not be binding without his prior order [Befehl]), for then they would not be ethical laws, and 
the duty commensurate to them would not be a free virtue but an externally enforceable legal 
duty.’ 
61 Again, for the moment, I am restricting us to the account given in the Collins lectures.  
62 At least, according to Kant. As Kant makes clear at the start of the lectures, ‘[a]ll neces-
sary rules must hold good a priori, and hence the principles are intellectual’ (27:254.30-32). 
Where a system of ethics is based on intellectual grounds, ‘all morality is derived from the 
conformity of the action with the laws of reason’ (27:252.36-253.1).  
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necessary requirements are in any case in conformity with his will, thus providing a 
posterior incentive to observe them.63  
The Collins lectures express positions that resemble Kant’s mature views in a number 
of ways, and this is particularly so with regards to Kant’s rejection of voluntarism, 
ethical egoism, and Wolffian perfectionism. Nevertheless, these texts are best read as 
pre-dating Kant’s discovery of autonomy. Indeed, many passages give the distinct 
impression that Kant accepted a certain form of sentimentalism at the level of moral 
motivation at this stage in his thinking.64 Although Kant makes clear that the under-
standing is that which apprehends the inner nature of an action (VC 27:254) – in par-
ticular, its agreement or disagreement with the laws of reason – he nonetheless holds 
that the moral motive is an added feeling of abhorrence (stemming from the faculty of 
sensibility) for what the understanding picks out as morally wrong: a feeling which is 
in addition to and separate from the understanding, and which is needed in order to 
make action possible.65 As such, the usefulness of these lectures when it comes to 
understanding self-legislation may be limited.   
                                                        
63 Of course, this is not to say that we ought to follow the law from this posterior incentive. 
Kant’s pre-autonomy view of moral motivation involves the thought that the moral sense, 
separate from reason, somehow miraculously latches on to reason’s apprehension of the law 
and provides a spring to action. As Kant explains at VM 27:1428, to be able to explain how 
the understanding on its own should have motivating power would be to possess the ‘phi-
losopher’s stone’ (here the term is likely used pejoratively). In any case, even at this early 
stage in Kant’s thinking on moral motivation we see that the moral motive must latch on to 
the action’s inherent goodness or obligatoriness, as ascertained by reason, and not to the fact 
that it has been endorsed by the deity or to the fact that we ourselves have legislated it.  
64 This is despite the fact that the ground of moral principle must lie in reason, on this view. 
65 See e.g. VM 27:1428-9, VC 27:275-76. 
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On Reath’s account, there is no ‘originator’ (or author) of the law, in the sense of 
someone who writes the law, or formally determines its content. What the legislator 
of the law achieves, however, is the conferral of the status of law onto principles, 
such that an obligation is generated where there wasn’t one before. Presumably, what 
this means is that not even God can be the author of the law, insofar as he does not 
determine the content of the candidate principles that in the end achieve the status of 
law. But in a sense, Reath’s view is one according to which God determines the con-
tent of the law, to the degree that his legislative activity determines what counts as 
belonging to the class of principles that carry the status of ‘law.’ In the above passage 
from VC 27:282-3, however, we would seem to encounter a different picture entirely. 
Here, the lawgiver is described as someone who makes a certain kind of declaration 
(‘The law is in conformity with my will, and I oblige others to follow it!’), though he 
declares this of a law that is in any case practically necessary, such that it cannot be 
the case that the opposite of what it commands could be made a virtue by any contin-
gent decision. This lawgiver might indeed possess the power to execute a practically 
necessary law, in the sense of imposing punishment or reward, of offering posterior 
incentives to ensure that it is observed, but this is altogether distinct from making a 
principle a law in the first place.66 To the degree that this is so, however, Kant’s text                                                         
66 C.f. VV 27:529, where Kant suggests that God’s command may perhaps be significant as a 
feature that emphasises the ‘force’ of natural obligation. C.f. also VC 27:277: ‘Because moral 
laws run, Thou shalt not, it is supposed that there must be a third being who has forbidden it. 
It is true that any moral law is an order, and that they may be commands of the divine will, 
but they do not flow from such a command. God has commanded it because it is a moral law, 
and His will coincides with the moral law. It also seems that all obligation has a relation to 
one who obliges, and thus God appears to be the obligator of human laws. In performance, to 
be sure, there must indeed be a third being, who constrains us to do what is morally good. But 
for the making of moral judgements we have no need for any third being. All moral laws can 
be correct without such a being. But in execution they would be empty if no third being could 
constrain us to them. It has therefore been rightly perceived that without a supreme judge all 
moral laws would be without effect, since in that case there would be no inner motive, no 
reward and punishment.’  
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would seem to make room for the possibility of some sort of legislative activity that 
involves neither the determination of content nor the generation of obligation, pre-
suming these elements can actually be distinguished.  
Lest we think that such an option is precluded by Kant’s mature moral views, and in 
particular by the introduction of autonomy in 1784-5, evidence for this alternative can 
equally be found in the Vigilantius lecture notes, which are based on Kant’s lectures 
from 1793-94.67 As Kant is recorded to have proposed:  
…an auctor legis can be supposed only of a law that has no bind-
ing power of its own, but possesses it merely ex voluntate vel ar-
bitrio alterius [from the will or choice of another]. Since an auctor 
is causa per arbitrium liberum, and therefore everything depends 
on his choice, it [the concept of an auctor] can only be applied to a 
lex statutaria. […] [I]f we ascribe an auctor to laws that are 
known, through reason, from the nature of the case, he can only be 
author of the obligation that is contained in the law. In this way 
too is God, through the declared divine will, auctor legis, and pre-
cisely because natural laws were already in existence, and are or-
dained by Him.  (VV 27:544) 
As Kant goes on perhaps surprisingly to note, if, in addition to the moral law, we 
could think of a being who is able to unite appropriate consequences with the lawful-
ness of our actions – a being ‘who is the author of our happiness, who knows and 
gauges our worthiness to fare well, or our moral worth’ – then we would have an idea 
which would bolster a person’s moral disposition and help to strengthen his resolve in 
the face of moral obstacles (27:545). The idea of divine command thus seems, on this 
account, to serve an important, yet secondary, motivational role, strengthening and 
supporting our interest in doing the right thing, not because of threats or promises, but 
                                                        
67 The principle of autonomy is also most certainly at work in the Mrongovius II lectures. 
See, e.g. 29:628-29. 
 
A WILL GIVING UNIVERSAL LAW  74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
because connecting the law to God’s will reminds us of the law’s special status.68 In 
no sense, however, do we find hints of the idea that God ‘confers’ the status of law 
onto principles where they did not already possess necessary validity. We might of 
course want to know more about what it means for an agent to declare that a law is in 
conformity with his will and what work this notion really does in Kant’s thinking, yet 
such a question merely points toward an interesting avenue of thinking about Kant’s 
distinction: it does not on its own force us to retreat to the distinction between the de-
termination of content and the generation of obligatory force by ‘conferring’ auth-
ority.   
2.5  The Fate of Command 
In this chapter, I have been attempting to undermine the appeal of a particular version 
of the Command Thesis. I began by arguing that certain versions of Kantian con-
structivism which specify the thesis’s content face quite serious difficulties when it 
comes to the reconciliation of their central claims and the necessity and universality 
of moral requirement. I have also attempted to show that passages which are often 
taken to support a reading of Kantian autonomy along these lines are inconclusive at 
best. Indeed, when it comes to Kant’s distinction between the two senses in which 
God might be understood as the author of the moral law, we have good reason to 
think that his thinking on the matter reveals a conception of legislation which con-
cerns neither the power to determine the content of the law nor the conferral of nor-
mative force.                                                          
68 The obvious complications attached to this notion will be discussed further in chapter 
three. 
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This is not yet to show, of course, that this alternative conception of God’s legislative 
authority can or ought to be applied in any sense to the concept of the autonomy of 
the imperfectly rational will. While I hope to have identified the space for an alterna-
tive to the tack taken by some constructivist views, further work must be done in 
order to show that such an alternative holds promise in the effort to understand Kant-
ian self-legislation. It is to this task that we now turn.    
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The problems that accompany the Command Thesis would seem to hinge on its im-
plicit voluntarism about the binding force of the moral law. Where the obligatoriness 
of a practical principle for a particular agent is taken to depend on a legislative act of 
her own will, the task of accommodating its universality and necessity becomes ex-
tremely difficult. What, then, of the Rationality Thesis, which points us toward a very 
different direction?   
If we recall, this thesis states that the moral law is in some sense a ‘law of reason.’ No 
independent act of the will is required in order for it to be binding on an agent, for its 
obligatory force is secured entirely by the fact that it is a genuine rational constraint. 
At first glance, this way of thinking fits very well with many things that Kant says 
about the moral law. Kant continually emphasises the a priori nature of the funda-
mental moral principle, suggesting that if there is to be a necessarily binding moral 
law, it must determine the will via rational considerations alone, and not by reference 
to anything empirical. If there is such a law, then it must be connected, completely a 
priori, ‘with the concept of the will of a rational being as such’ (G 4:426). But what 
does it mean to say that a principle is connected a priori with the concept of the will 
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of a rational being as such? How might we develop this notion while preserving the 
notion that the moral law finds its source in our very own will? 
I begin this chapter by exploring two recently popular conceptions of the sense in 
which the moral law is a ‘law of reason.’ As I will argue, these approaches to devel-
oping the Rationality Thesis fail for a number of important reasons. I then go on to 
advance a more orthodox approach to developing this thesis – one which relies on a 
better understanding of both Kant’s conception of a ‘ground of determination’ and his 
reasons for rejecting the determining grounds at the heart of previous moral theories. 
Finally, I consider the degree to which select elements of the Command Thesis may 
be included in this picture as well, with the result that Kantian autonomy may be 
viewed as incorporating aspects of both of the original theses presented in §1.1, 
though in very particular ways.  
3.1  A Teleology of Practical Reasoning 
It is helpful to begin by asking what it means to say that the moral law is the funda-
mental law of practical reason. On this front, a recent popular interpretation seeks to 
explain this notion in terms of an inherent connection between the moral law (the 
categorical imperative) and the purpose of the activity of practical reasoning. The 
reasoning behind this view is as follows.  
Just like every human faculty, the faculty of practical reasoning has an essential end, 
and the norms that govern its exercise are determined by the nature of its proper func-
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tioning. Where an organism possesses the faculty of vision, for example, the proper 
exercise of this faculty allows for the realisation of an end that is vital to its survival 
(i.e. an essential awareness of the objects in its surroundings). Successful functioning 
toward this aim is distinguished from a dysfunctional operation by what we might 
call the ‘norms of vision.’1 Yet in just the same way, there is a certain aim present in 
every instance of practical reasoning, the nature of which gives rise to a normative 
principle that expresses how reasoning must proceed in order to realise it. In this 
sense, the moral law is the fundamental norm of this distinctive faculty, and this ex-
plains its obligatoriness for every finite rational being. To the degree that one is en-
gaged in the activity of practical reasoning at all, one is committed to the realisation 
of its essential aim. To the degree that one is committed to this, one is committed to 
following the categorical imperative.  
There might be two senses in which one is ‘committed’ to following the categorical 
imperative on this general approach. First, the claim might be that rational agents 
must in fact adopt the moral law as the principle of their behaviour in order to engage 
in practical reasoning at all. Second, the idea might be that any rational agent must, in 
the sense that he or she ought, to adopt the categorical imperative as her guiding prin-
ciple of action, simply by virtue of engaging in the activity of practical reasoning. Let 
us consider each option in turn.  
                                                        
1 See Wood, Kantian Ethics 115.  
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(i) Constitutivism  
On this first line of thought, the key idea is that if you do not actually follow the mo-
ral law, you cannot be said genuinely to be engaged in the activity of practical rea-
soning. Because of this, the categorical imperative can be seen as a ‘constitutive’ 
norm of that very activity (a norm which makes the exercise of the faculty of practical 
reasoning possible).2 To the degree that one is (or takes oneself to be) engaged in the 
practice of practical reasoning, this principle must be adopted.3 It is a standard which 
an agent must aim to meet simply in virtue of being an agent. 
In coming to understand this idea, it is useful to think of an analogy. In the craft of 
medicine, for example, we say that a good doctor is one who makes his patients well 
(where he can). To the extent that this is so, health is the aim of the activity of medi-
cine. On the view we are considering, however, to say this is just to say that someone 
who is genuinely engaged in the activity of medicine cannot simply put aside the 
question of whether the means she is taking are conducive to the health of those she is                                                         
2 Alison Hills offers a view which might also be called ‘constitutivism,’ although her posi-
tion focuses on the role that rational nature plays when it comes to the value of our non-moral 
ends. Hills’s constitutivism differs from the above view in important ways; rather than argu-
ing that the moral law is a constitutive norm of practical reasoning as such, she argues that a 
given non-moral project is valuable to the degree that it is a constitutive means of exercising 
our rational nature. Although she does not offer a full-fledge vindication of the categorical 
imperative, she does acknowledge that her view gives support to the Formula of the End in 
Itself: on her view, the value of non-moral ends depends on the role that they play in the ex-
ercise of rational nature, which means that there is no reason for a person to pursue an end at 
the expense of rational nature. Because of this, we are required to respect rational nature in 
all of our actions. See Hills’s ‘Kantian Value Realism,’ Ratio 21 (2008): 182-200. 
3 Versions of constitutivism concerning the categorical imperative have been offered by An-
drews Reath (see in particular Agency and Autonomy ch. 5); Christine Korsgaard 
(‘Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant’ The Journal of Ethics [1999]: 1-29); and 
Barbara Herman (Moral Literacy [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007] ch. 7.  
 
 
PURE RATIONAL CONSTRAINT  80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
treating. Should she stray too far from the internal aim of medicine, she can no longer 
be said to be engaged in that activity at all. In just the same way, an agent cannot 
simply set aside the question of whether her maxims are universalisable, because this 
attaches directly to the question of whether her practical reasoning fulfils its aim. If a 
person rejects the standard that governs practical reasoning, she can no longer be said 
to be engaging in that activity at all. In this sense, even the most substandard agent 
must try to adopt universalisable maxims, for there simply is no other way to engage 
in the activity of practical reasoning.4  
Is there evidence in Kant’s writing to support the claim that this is his view? At first 
glance, the most promising support for this interpretation would seem to be found in a 
series of claims spanning Groundwork II and III. Kant begins the latter section by de-
fining the will as a kind of causality of rational beings insofar as they are rational. 
Cast in negative terms, the freedom of this will consists in independence from deter-
mination by ‘alien causes’; yet because a lawless will is an absurdity [ein Unding], a 
positive statement of the will’s freedom ‘flows’ from this negative conception. As a 
form of causality, the will must be determined by some law or principle.5 Yet it must 
also determine itself independently of externally given laws. It must, in other words,                                                         
4 Korsgaard, ‘Self-Constitution’ 15. On Korsgaard’s view, genuinely willing a maxim 
(through the faculty of practical reason) requires that one at least take one’s maxim to be 
universal (27). Willing which is undertaken with this aim in sight, but which in fact falls 
short of this ideal, is still a species of willing, only ‘badly done.’     
5 Kant’s insistence that in general a cause must operate according to laws (so that every will 
must operate in accordance with some law or another) is of course controversial. Here, it 
would seem to be presented by Kant as self-evident, though, as Karl Ameriks notes in his 
study of Groundwork III, Kant does seem to oppose freedom and law at one point in the first 
Critique, which raises doubts concerning its immediate self-evidence (see ‘Kant’s Ground-
work III Argument Reconsidered,’ Interpreting Kant’s Critiques 233n.13). 
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express determination by a principle that it gives to itself (G 4:446-7). But what this 
seems to imply is that the free exercise of practical reason requires that the will be 
guided by its own internal principle – a principle which, as Reath puts it, ‘positively 
constitutes the capacity for free volition’ and which, when specified for the imperfect 
will, corresponds to the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative.6 In 
this way, the categorical imperative can be thought of as the principle which captures 
the general form of free practical reasoning.7  
Notoriously, this argument faces a cluster of very serious objections. Particularly 
worrying for the constitutivist who appeals to it is the fact that she must be able to 
make sense of a necessary and immediate connection between the activity of practical 
reasoning as such and the activity of free practical reasoning (in the relevant sense of 
‘free’). Here, things get especially murky.8 Yet even if these standard worries could                                                         
6 Reath, Agency and Autonomy 154-55. 
7 On Reath’s view, Kant maintains that all action is necessarily undertaken under the idea of 
freedom (G 4:448). A commitment to one’s freedom is an inescapable feature of the deliber-
ative perspective, such that if one is engaging in practical reasoning at all, one is committed 
to viewing oneself as free, and so as guided by the categorical imperative. See Agency and 
Autonomy 156-7. For an important criticism of this kind of argument, see Ameriks, Inter-
preting Kant’s Critiques ch. 9.  
8 This is especially true for views like Reath’s, where the link is established via an appeal to 
how we must ‘take’ ourselves to be functioning whenever we engage in deliberation. See also 
Korsgaard, ‘Self-Constitution’ 23: ‘You take yourself, rather than the incentive on which you 
choose to act, to be the cause of your action. And Kant thinks that in order for this to be so, 
you must act on a universal law. You cannot regard yourself as the cause of your action – you 
cannot regard the action as the product of your will – unless you will universally.’ As Karl 
Ameriks quite rightly points out, what is needed in order to make the argument work is 
something more than this phenomenological point, even if at least this could be established: 
‘despite our operating often “through” reason in a phenomenological sense – that is, simply 
with explicit thought (or later “rationalisations”) of rational grounds for what we are doing – 
it might be the case that the real power that makes the events that are those thoughts “effec-
tive” is nothing more than nature ... in its subrational power. In that case, we might be said to 
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be resolved, the constitutivist would nonetheless face the problem of explaining how 
clear-headed moral wrongdoing is possible on its own terms, and here the prospects 
look even worse.9 On this view, in order to be reasoning at all, a rational agent must 
in some sense adopt the categorical imperative. If this is so, then any actual deviation 
from the moral law must be explained either as a case in which one is not in fact en-
gaged in practical reasoning or as one in which one has adopted the categorical im-
perative but has made a mistake in its use. In the first case, the category of practical 
wrongdoing cannot be applied, for ‘moral transgression’ is possible only where be-
haviour has resulted from practical reasoning. Yet the same conclusion would seem to 
hold true for the second case as well, to the extent that it must explain genuine in-
stances of practical reasoning which miss the mark (which do not in fact conform to 
the categorical imperative) as involving the misuse of the categorical imperative, and 
so as involving a cognitive error rather than a rejection of the moral law.10 This is 
troubling both to the degree that Kant’s conception of moral wrongdoing depends 
heavily on the idea of an active rejection of or turning away from the moral law – a 
real choosing of evil as an alternative to goodness – and to the extent that clearheaded                                                                                                                                                               
be working “through” the appearance of reason but not “really by” it, and our whole every-
day intentional life would be little more than a mere “stance,” an epiphenomenon at best’ 
(Interpreting Kant’s Critiques 235). 
9 By ‘clearheaded wrongdoing’ I mean deviation from the moral law which is not explain-
able as a mere cognitive mistake – as a misapplication of the moral law.  
10 As Barbara Herman explains (re: her own particular version of constitutivism), ‘[i]f by 
free action one means, as Kant does, action derived from the will’s own principle, then the 
[morally bad] action is free in that sense. (Analogously, we say that mistakes in addition are 
mistakes in addition – that is, a result is derived from relevant arithmetic principles mis-
applied, perhaps with self-serving lack of care. Unfree action is like a child’s assertion of a 
sum, for no arithmetic reason.) Faulty action is thus imputable to the autonomous will, since 
the principle of the maxim is a representation – albeit a misrepresentation – of the will’s own 
law’ (Moral Literacy 172). 
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wrongdoing is, in general and beyond what Kant himself wants to say, paradigmatic 
of culpable action.11  
In effect, this view collapses the distinction between two very different kinds of 
standard, and it is precisely this move which effects the preclusion of the possibility 
of genuine wrongdoing. Consider, again, our physician analogy. Suppose that a good 
and an inferior physician both aim at the same end: the health of the patient (let us 
call the good physician A and the inferior one B). In this case, the relevant difference 
between A and B lies only in their effectiveness: one operates well toward this end, 
the other badly. Now consider a third physician, C. C is as skilled as A in terms of 
technique and medical know-how and is as effective a doctor, but in a certain circum-
stance C rejects the aim of healing her patient and adopts the aim of poisoning him 
instead. She makes use of all kinds of medical technique, in some sense acting just as 
a doctor would: knowing what she is doing and why, exercising her skill. In another 
sense, however, she is not acting as a doctor would at all. But what our dual sense of 
this situation illustrates is the fact that there is a distinction between what we might 
call standards of efficiency (where if you fall too far below, you really aren’t engag-
ing in the relevant activity) and standards that have to do with the achievement of the 
proper end of that activity (standards that express what we must do if our exercise of 
that activity is to promote its essential aim). The actions of the first ‘bad’ doctor (B) 
conform to the second but not to the first standard, while the actions of our second 
                                                        
11 As Kant makes clear at G 4:424.15-20, though we acknowledge the validity of the cate-
gorical imperative, our problem is that we sometimes ‘permit ourselves (with all respect for 
it) just a few exceptions …’ See also Rel 6:22n, where Kant quite explicitly argues that any 
lack of agreement with the moral law is possible only as an active resistance on the part of 
Willkür to the law (an ‘antagonism to the good’).  
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‘bad’ doctor (C) conform to the first but not to the second.12 Yet unless there is room 
in our thinking about practical reasoning for a character parallel to C, who is in some 
sense effectively engaged in the activity of practical reasoning but who has rejected 
that activity’s characteristic aim, genuine wrongdoing becomes impossible. To the 
degree that we want to be able to make room for such a notion, our theory must be 
able to distinguish between the end(s) sought in good practical reasoning and the 
end(s) sought in bad practical reasoning.13    
(ii) The Aim of Practical Reasoning 
Suppose that we try to avoid these difficulties by adapting the above view. One way 
to do this is to propose that the moral law, while not constitutive of practical reason-
ing as such, simply expresses what we must do in order to realise the essential aim of 
practical reasoning, where this aim is to be understood as the realisation of the proper 
functioning of practical reasoning. Does this bring us any closer to a plausible con-
ception of the way in which the categorical imperative might be viewed as a law of 
practical reasoning?  
                                                        
12 In his discussion of the meaning of ‘perfection’ in his lectures on ethics, Kant draws a re-
lated distinction between perfection and morality. Where the ‘perfect’ villain possesses a ca-
pacity or fitness for all of his ends (talent, skill, craft, or know-how, we might say), moral 
goodness consists in the property of making good use of these perfections (see VC 27:265-66 
and VV 27:517-18). See also KpV 5:41. As Aristotle acknowledges in Book VI of the Ni-
comachean Ethics, a person of bad character might deliberate ‘correctly’ in one sense to the 
degree that he achieves what his project requires. In another sense, however, he of course 
deliberates badly, where this badness has to do with the relation of his action to a particular 
end (acting morally well). See 1142b18-20. See also Aristotle’s discussion of cleverness at 
VI.12.1144a24-29.     
13 Ultimately, as we will see, the categorical imperative is neither a norm of efficiency nor a 
standard that has to do with the achievement of the end of an activity.  
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This view faces a twofold task: first, it must be able to explain the connection be-
tween the aim of practical reasoning and the categorical imperative; second, it must 
preserve the sense in which the moral law is a universally and necessarily binding 
practical principle. In the end, this approach faces serious difficulties on both of these 
fronts.  
When it comes to explaining the connection between the aim of practical reason and 
the categorical imperative, the problem is that we would seem to be able to draw the 
relevant connection only at the cost of reducing this aim exclusively to the generation 
of moral maxims. On a very natural view, we might suppose that practical reasoning 
is an activity that aims principally at bringing about a certain state of affairs – at 
changing the world in some way or another. This is a morally neutral conception of 
the point or purpose of practical reasoning and one that does not invoke the idea of 
universalisability of maxims in the least. I might effectively bring about an object of 
the will (a state of affairs) by acting on the principle of self-love, and on this concep-
tion my doing so constitutes the achievement of the will’s central aim. In order to rule 
this out as a candidate conception of the aim of practical reasoning, however, we 
must restrict the aim of practical reasoning to action which expresses universalisable 
maxims. In effect, we must say that the chief end of practical reasoning consists in 
the generation of morally good actions.14  
                                                        
14 It might, as a matter of psychological fact, be the case that some of us aim in our action to 
be morally good. Kant’s example of the scoundrel who is generally accustomed to using rea-
son to help him to pursue his ends, yet who, when presented with examples of great benevo-
lence and moral strength of will, wishes that he could be so disposed, seems to be someone of 
this sort (G 4:454.21-27). Even here, however, Kant would seem to be describing a psy-
chological point about human beings rather than providing an argument for the necessity of 
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Once we make this move, however, this approach loses one of its key assets. One of 
the benefits of the approach I have been sketching is that, if successful, it provides us 
with a way of vindicating the bindingness of the moral law. On this view, the cate-
gorical imperative procedure stems analytically from an articulation of the essential 
concern of practical reasoning, such that we can say that the nature of practical rea-
soning yields a law that can guide its own proper exercise. To the degree that we 
ought to pursue this activity’s central aim, we ought to follow the categorical impera-
tive. Yet to the extent that this view is forced to define the aim of practical reasoning 
precisely in terms of universalisable maxim selection (in order to draw the appropri-
ate connection between the aim and the moral law), the key move in this vindicatory 
project – the introduction of the idea of an aim of practical reasoning – loses all its 
usefulness. When an agent asks why she ought to act only on those maxims such that 
she can will at the same time that they be a universal law, the reply on this view must 
be that she ought to because she ought to pursue the aim of practical reasoning. When 
pushed on what this aim is, the supporter of this view will be forced to say that it 
consists in acting on maxims that can be willed as a universal law. But then we are 
back to where we were with our first question, and our search for vindication, should 
we wish to pursue it, has not really progressed at all.  
Most serious of all, however, is an objection that applies to both versions of this te-
leological conception of the activity of practical reasoning and which concerns their 
ability to account for the necessity of the moral law. On both interpretations, the law 
is conceived as a norm that directs us to the realisation of the essential aim of practi-
cal reasoning. Our faculty of practical reason, the power by which we engage in the                                                                                                                                                               
acting morally well. The gap between instrumental and non-instrumental reasoning is and 
ought to remain unbridgeable, for Kant.  
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activity of practical reasoning, has an essential function, and the moral law expresses 
the principle it must follow in order to realise this function.15 One glaring problem 
with this approach, which I will not explore here, is the difficulty of specifying a sin-
gle aim or function of practical reasoning. Yet even if such an aim can be identified, 
we face a more serious problem – for a story like this is unable to preserve the abso-
lute universality and necessity that Kant requires of morality. On this view, the nor-
mativity of the moral principle is only as strong as the normativity of the aim of prac-
tical reasoning. The moral law’s status as a norm we ought to follow is grounded in 
the fact that practical reasoning is an activity that commits us to pursuing a specific 
aim. If this fact is contingent, such that our aim could have been otherwise, then our 
subjection to the moral law is rendered contingent as well. The moral law is reduced 
to a problematic imperative of skill rather than an apodictic imperative of morality, 
for it specifies the means one must take in order to realise a purpose that human be-
ings contingently pursue.16 Conversely, if we deny the contingency of our having 
this aim and suppose instead that this fact represents a natural necessity of sorts (such 
that our adopting this aim is an empirically necessary part of human nature), we are 
no better off, for the moral law is still rendered hypothetical (conditional on the 
agent’s aims). What we end up with, in effect, is an assertoric imperative, for the mo-
ral law must then be taken to specify the means one must take in order to realise a 
purpose that human beings non-contingently pursue.17  
                                                        
15 For this kind of story, see Wood, Kantian Ethics 114-16.  
16 For Kant’s association of problematic imperatives and the idea of possible purpose, see G 
4:414-15.  
17 For Kant’s association of assertoric imperatives and the idea of necessary aims or ends, 
see G 4:415-16. See also KpV 5:25.12-13, where Kant articulates the notion that happiness is 
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A version of this teleological approach has been offered by Paul Guyer, who, in a 
self-consciously controversial move, interprets Kant as having intended adherence to 
universal law to be understood as a means to the realisation of freedom.18 On 
Guyer’s interpretation, the value of freedom is prior to the moral law; it provides the 
end to be realised by following the moral law and the reason why it has authority over 
us. Quite interestingly, however, Kant criticises just this very sort of move in the 
Dialectic of the second Critique, where the target is the Stoic belief that conscious-
ness of strength of soul might constitute the ultimate end of morally good action, ser-
ving as that which gives it value.19 Although the Stoic doctrine constitutes an im-
provement compared to the view offered by the Epicureans, according to Kant, the 
Stoics make that which is merely a by-product of moral action (the ‘elevation of 
one’s cast of mind’) the end to be realised. It might well be the case that morally good 
action gives a person strength of soul – or, as Guyer emphasises, makes a person truly 
free – but these rightly valued consequences cannot be the grounds of determination 
when it comes to morally worthy choice. Exposing people to examples of the connec-                                                                                                                                                              
‘necessarily the demand of every rational but finite being …’ As Kant goes on to explain, one 
problem with assertoric principles of prudence in particular is that happiness is just a general 
concept, and the pursuit of this end will take various forms for various agents. Because of 
this, the assertoric imperative cannot be regarded as genuine law, since a law ‘must contain 
the very same determining ground of the will in all cases and for all human beings’ (5:25). 
Even if all rational beings were somehow to be agreed when it comes to the content of hap-
piness, however, we could not therefore conclude that the principle of happiness is a genuine 
practical law, for this unanimity would be merely contingent. The agreement itself would be 
an empirically universal fact, in which case the relevant law would only contain subjective 
and not objective necessity (KpV 5:26).   
18 See, e.g. Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 1. For Guyer’s articulation of his position, see esp. ch. 3. See also Andrews Reath’s 
commentary on Guyer’s view in ‘Value and Law in Kant’s Moral Theory,’ Ethics 114 
(2003): 127-155.  
19 See KpV 5:127n. 
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tion between moral action and freedom, happiness, wisdom, and so on, might help 
them to act morally, and so might play a secondary motivational role, but this is not 
to say that we should conceive of such things as the end of following the categorical 
imperative – as that for the sake of which good people act morally well.  
3.2  The Rational Grounds of Morality 
The central danger affecting the above approach is that it effectively seeks to trans-
form Kantian ethics into a teleological ethics. On such a view, where priority is given 
to some goal an agent might or must pursue (free agency, for example), the moral law 
can only ever serve as a conditional imperative; good actions are only ever instru-
mentally good, relative to their role in the realisation of some end. Yet from the very 
start of the Groundwork Kant draws a strict and clear distinction between conditional 
and unconditional goodness, and here moral goodness is placed squarely on the side 
of the latter. The good will, he writes,  
is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of 
its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its vo-
lition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be 
valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought 
about by it …  (4:394.13-18)  
Although it may be presented by certain of Kant’s interpreters as a particularly 
worthy or ‘necessary’ end, free agency (or properly functioning free agency) on the 
above view constitutes a goal the achievement of which is that upon which the value 
of morally good action must be seen to depend. Where the above approach offers 
what at first seemed a promising way of explaining the idea that the moral law is a 
law of practical reason, it thus ultimately fails to secure this law’s unconditional 
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bindingness. As such, if we are to pursue the Rationality Thesis as a viable option in 
coming to understand Kantian autonomy, it seems as though we must take a different 
tack.  
In one sense, a practical principle might be considered a law of reason to the extent 
that its ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) is rational rather than empiri-
cal.20 On Kant’s view, moral theories that ground the moral law in happiness must 
necessarily posit as a condition of a rule’s being a practical law empirical determining 
grounds. That is to say, they must posit an empirically determined end in order to ex-
plain why a given precept is a rule that we ought to follow and in order to explain 
how we can recognize what we ought to do. On such theories, the ability of the rule 
formally to determine my will in this way is conditional on the relation of a repre-
sented object to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and this can only ever be 
                                                        
20 A ground of determination can be thought of as that which ‘contains’ the law (see Tim-
mermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary 181). In general, 
we can think of a ground of determination as that which accounts for why a rule is a law for a 
person (a principle with overriding normative force). In this sense, it will explain how we can 
recognise what our duty is (by examining the ground, we derive the duty) and it will play a 
role in explaining why we might be motivated to follow this rule. See, e.g. Rel 6:4: ‘…since 
its laws bind through the mere form of universal lawfulness as the highest condition (itself 
unconditional) of all ends, morality needs absolutely no material determining ground of the 
free power of choice, that is no end, either in order to recognize what duty is or to impel its 
performance; on the contrary, when duty is the issue, morality can perfectly well abstract 
from ends altogether, and ought so to do. For example, to know whether I should (or even 
can) be truthful in my testimony before a court of justice, or faithful when someone else’s 
goods entrusted to me are being reclaimed, there is no need to demand an end which I might 
perhaps propose to myself to realise my declaration, for what sort of end this would be does 
not matter at all; rather, one who still finds it necessary to look around for some end when his 
testimony is rightfully demanded of him, is in this respect already contemptible.’ 
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specified empirically.21 As such, my cognition of what I ought to do and the explan-
ation of why it is a rule can only ever hinge on empirical considerations.  
By contrast, Kant takes the tradition of Leibnizian and Wolffian perfectionism, along 
with the theological perfectionism articulated by Crusius, to draw the principle of 
morality from something which can only be thought of by means of rational con-
cepts, and so from rational grounds of determination. In the first case, the binding 
force of the moral law (its status as law) is derived from the rational concept of per-
fection as such, whereas in the second, it is drawn from the concept of supreme per-
fection represented in substance (God and his will).22 On the straightforward perfec-
tionist view, our duty is to make ourselves perfect. On the theological view, our duty 
is to bring our will into agreement with the will of God, and only indirectly to seek 
our perfection (which he wills).   
As is familiar, Kant in the end includes these two approaches in his list of theories 
that rely on material principles and which cannot serve as universal and necessary 
practical laws.23 He thus opens a space for a kind of rational yet material practical 
rule. As he describes things in the second Critique, the practical concept of perfection 
signifies ‘the fitness or adequacy of a thing for all sorts of ends,’ whereas the concept                                                         
21 See KpV 5:27 and G 4:442. According to Kant, the principle of happiness is built upon 
physical or moral feeling, both of which depend on ‘the special constitution of human nature 
or the contingent circumstances in which it is placed.’ Moral feeling is here included under 
the principle of happiness because it is an empirical interest which ‘promises to contribute to 
our well-being by the agreeableness that something affords, whether this happens immedi-
ately and without a view to advantage or with regard for it’ (G 4:442n) 
22 See KpV 5:40-41 and VM 29:622. 
23 A material principle contains the ground of determination by its matter and not by its form 
(KpV 5:27).  
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of perfection in substance (God) signifies ‘the adequacy of this being to all ends in 
general’ (KpV 5:41.10-11, 14-15). Yet if the concept of perfection signifies a fitness 
for possible ends, then its ability to serve as a ground of determination depends ulti-
mately on an expectation of happiness. As Kant explains,  
…if ends must first be given to us, in relation to which alone the 
concept of perfection (whether internal in ourselves or external in 
God) can be the determining ground of the will; and if an end as 
an object which must precede the determination of the will by a 
practical rule and contain the ground of the possibility of such a 
determination – hence as the matter of the will taken as its deter-
mining ground – is always empirical; then it can serve as the Epi-
curean principle of the doctrine of happiness but never as the pure 
rational principle of the doctrine of morals and of duty (so too, 
talents and their development only because they contribute to the 
advantages of life, or the will of God if agreement with it is taken 
as the object of the will without an antecedent practical principle 
independent of this idea, can become motives of the will only by 
means of the happiness we expect from them).  (KpV 5:41)24 
 
On the perfectionist story, the direct determining ground of the will is rational insofar 
as it takes the form of one of two rational concepts. In order for this concept to func-
tion in this capacity, however, we must presuppose a given end, and so the principle 
turns out to be material. In order for this rational concept to play the determining role 
that the perfectionist theory supposes that it does, an antecedent object of the will 
must be given.  
                                                        
24 Further criticisms of this strand of thinking, many of which hinge on what Kant takes to be 
an emptiness and indeterminacy when it comes to the concept of perfection (along with the 
claim that, when it is specified, it actually presupposes the moral law which it is meant to 
explain), can be found in G 4:443, Rel 6:3n., VC 27:265-66, VV 27:517-19, 544, and VM 
29:626-27.  
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Consider, for example, a version of the theological approach that Kant attributes to 
Crusius. On this picture, the moral law is a law that God has imposed on us, and it 
directs us to do what is in accordance with his perfection. What is more, we are able 
to grasp morality’s dictates because God has implanted innate representations of the 
law in each of us. This grasping of the content of morality is thus rational, in the 
sense that we need not turn to experience in order to determine what we ought to do. 
In addition, however, this law is grounded in a concept (the perfection of God’s will) 
which we can also only grasp via reason, and so the principle is ‘rational’ (rather than 
empirical) in this sense as well. Now the primary issue that Kant takes with such a 
view is that this concept (God’s perfection) can only serve as a determining ground of 
the will to the degree that we have antecedently adopted the end of being in agree-
ment in our volition with God’s will.25 When an agent is considering what to do, she 
will be able, in theory, to tell herself a story about the justification of acting as this 
innate law tells her to which does not rely on any appeal to empirically discernable 
facts. There is a theological account of the origins of the innate law which she repre-
sents to herself in deliberation, and which is thus rationally accessible to her.26 Yet in 
order to function as a ground for the adoption of this law, this theological account 
must be available to her and must coincide with a desire on her part to harmonise her 
will with the will of God. Although in this case the ground (the reason why it is a law                                                         
25 The other charge that Kant mentions is that the concept of perfection is empty: that it is 
not a determinate concept at all, and must be filled in by a more informative notion.  
26 See VM 29:627: ‘The theological principle depends on a being whose existence is inferred 
from reason…’ As Kant makes very clear in the Religion, the idea of God cannot play a 
foundational epistemological or motivational role in moral agency: ‘So far as morality is 
based on the conception of the human being as one who is free but who also, just because of 
that, binds himself through his reason to unconditional laws, it is in need neither of the idea 
of another being above him in order that he recognise his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an 
incentive other than the law itself. At least it is the human being’s own fault if such a need is 
found in him’ (6:3). 
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to her) is grasped by reason alone, the agent’s ultimate motivation to comply with the 
law can only ever be mixed: tainted with a view to the desirability of attaining the 
object picked out by the concept of perfection.27 What this shows is that the principle 
is really a material principle, and so is unfit to serve as a necessary and universally 
binding law.  
With this brief explanation in tow, we can now make better sense of what Kant 
thought he had to say about a truly necessary law of reason. What we would seem to 
need is a story according to which i) the determining ground of the will contained in 
that law is based in reason, and ii) this ground does not derive its normative force 
from elsewhere (e.g. an antecedent desire). Even theories that satisfy this first condi-
tion can in principle offer principles which are not universally adoptable on Kant’s 
account, and this points to the idea that an adequate understanding of what makes his 
conception of reason’s lawgiving distinctive hinges in particular on making sense of 
how it accounts for the second condition.  
Let us begin by thinking about the sense in which Kant deals with the first condition, 
which concerns the rational nature of the ground of the moral law. According to Kant, 
the moral law is not grounded in any object of either reason or the senses. To suppose 
this would be immediately to reduce the moral law to a material practical principle, 
which, as we have seen, Kant cannot do. But there must be some ground of determi-
                                                        
27 Note that, in addition to this concern about the possibility of pure moral motivation, the 
objection concerning the hypothetical status of such a law is equally applicable here. To the 
degree that such a law is grounded in a given object or state of affairs, it can only command 
assertorically.  
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nation when it comes to this law – something which contains it and which explains 
why it is a law for me. What could this be? 
Kant’s answer to this question may seem curious at first. As he puts his idea, the de-
termining ground of action in accordance with the moral law can be nothing other 
than universal lawfulness as such (KpV 5:27.12-14). If no object (or material) of the 
will can ground a necessary moral law, then the only alternative available to us is to 
locate its determining ground in a formal feature of that principle: in the feature of 
universal lawfulness as such, or in the mere form of law (KpV 5:28.31).28 The mere 
form of lawfulness can be represented only by reason, and is therefore not an object 
of the senses (KpV 5:28.34-35). But to say this is just to say that the moral law finds 
its source in pure rational considerations alone, and in this specific sense is a law ‘of 
reason.’    
Now since the ground of determination associated with this principle is nothing other 
than its form (its universal bindingness), we can say that, in a very real sense, the law 
itself provides its own determining ground. If the determining ground were to consist 
in something outside of that law (for instance, an object or state of affairs represented 
through it), then we would have to draw a real distinction between the law and its 
ground. This is not the case when it comes to the categorical imperative, however, for 
here the ground consists in something essential to that very law, which cannot be 
separated from it. In this sense, the idea of a possible giving of universal law, univer-
sal lawfulness, the form of law, and the representation of the law itself are all differ-                                                        
28 See Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1960) 116. Kant sometimes explains this ground in terms of ‘the 
a priori thought of a possible giving of universal law’ through one’s maxims (KpV 5: 31, 41).  
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ent ways of describing morality’s ground of determination.29 To the degree that the 
moral law supplies its own ground, cognisable through reason alone, its authority for 
us is non-derivative. 
Notice that this kind of answer does not provide a genuinely satisfying response to 
the question of why we should think that the moral law is universally binding in the 
first place. To say that the universal lawfulness of the moral law is its own determin-
ing ground is to say that universal lawfulness is what explains why it is a law for me, 
or for anyone who might pose the question and to whom it applies. Where I ask, ‘why 
is it that I must obey this principle?’ the answer is that it is a principle which applies 
with the force of law to every morally responsible rational being (this is the relevant 
formal feature, and I just happen to be a morally responsible rational being).30 But if 
I then ask why this principle is universally binding in the first place, I cannot again 
appeal to this fact about its form – that is, to its universal bindingness – without ar-
guing in an obvious circle. What this shows is that this formal feature’s justificatory 
force is only in play from within a standpoint that already recognizes the universal                                                         
29 See G 4:401-2 for an example of where Kant speaks of the representation of the law as 
that which must determine the will.  
30 As we will see in §3.3, Kant raises the possibility of a fully rational being who would not, 
strictly speaking, be subject to the moral law (see Rel 6:26.n). This imagined rational being 
possesses an intellectual understanding of whether his maxims are suited to universal legisla-
tion, but he can only be moved to act by incentives provided by the objects of inclination. As 
Kant suggests in this footnote, the independence of our power of choice from determination 
by all non-moral incentives is what makes us accountable for our actions. This would suggest 
that, in order for the moral law to bind me with normative authority, it must function as an 
incentive for me. Whilst the formal features listed above provide the complete intellec-
tual/theoretical explanation for the bindingness of the moral law – one that any rational being 
whatever might recognise – it is not the full story. Something more must obtain in order for 
the moral law genuinely to apply to a rational agent as a constraint: its ability to motivate of 
itself. More on this in what follows.  
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validity of the moral law. The fact that God wills that I pursue my own perfection 
might serve to justify the principle of perfection to those who do not already ac-
knowledge its validity, and in this sense it serves (according to the relevant moral 
theory) as an external ground. If I am to view the universal applicability of the cate-
gorical imperative as a reason for me to obey it and as a justification for its applic-
ability to me, however, then I must already acknowledge its universal validity, and in 
this sense this formal feature can only ever serve as an internal ground (a ground that 
is internal to the moral point of view). In describing the moral law as supplying its 
own determining ground, Kant is not pointing toward an external justification of its 
normative force. The moral law’s authority for us is non-derivative, but this is pre-
cisely to say that there is no external justificatory story available to us when the scep-
tic rears her head. 
Kant criticises the theological view presented above for the reason that God’s will can 
only function as a determining ground if we presuppose an antecedent end (agree-
ment with this will). In order to distinguish his fundamental principle from those ra-
tionalist principles that turn out to be material, we must therefore conceive of the 
moral law as non-derivative in a second sense: in the sense that its ground (the form 
of universal lawfulness), does not derive its determining power from a more funda-
mental source elsewhere. Put differently, we must conceive of this ground as provid-
ing the complete story when it comes to the validity of this principle for a morally 
responsible rational agent. We need not assume, for example, that its determining 
force depends on our having an antecedent purpose or desire to be lawful (if such a 
desire is possible). When it comes to universal lawfulness, this thought alone – this 
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purely rational consideration – must be sufficient to explain why I ought to obey the 
categorical imperative.31  
What this means is that, if there is to be a universally and necessarily binding practi-
cal principle, i) its ground must consist in mere universal lawfulness as such, and ii) 
this consideration must be a sufficient determining condition on its own, without any 
support from presupposed ends or attitudes. To the degree that this is Kant’s view, we 
have arrived at one way of specifying the Rationality Thesis: the moral law is a law 
of practical reason insofar as it finds its source in a purely rational, non-derivative 
ground, which accounts entirely for its normative force and which establishes it as a 
law for those to whom it applies.  
3.3  The Legislation of Reason 
By investigating the sense in which the moral law can be viewed as a law of reason, 
we have located an account of the source of its authority, though only from the inter-                                                        
31 Strong hints that Kant at one time held a different (pre-autonomy) view can be found in 
the Critique of Pure Reason’s Doctrine of Method, where he argues that, although ‘[i]t is ne-
cessary that our whole course of life be subordinated to moral maxims … it would at the 
same time be impossible for this to happen if reason did not connect with the moral law, 
which is a mere idea, an efficient cause which determines for the conduct in accord with this 
law an outcome precisely corresponding to our highest ends, whether in this or in another 
life. Thus without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majes-
tic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration but not incentives 
for resolve and realisation, because they would not fulfil the whole end that is natural for 
every rational being and determined a priori and necessarily through the very same pure rea-
son’ (A 813/B 841). Here, the idea is that the moral incentive is dependent on some end, in 
the absence of which the moral law can indeed be an object of admiration, but not an incen-
tive for ‘resolve and realisation.’ 
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nal point of view mentioned above. Where the Command Thesis posited that this 
source is to be located in a legislative act of the will, the above account suggests that 
what explains the authority of an unconditionally binding principle (why it counts as 
a law for me) is its universal form. A personification of the form of law into ‘reason,’ 
the legislatrix of the moral law, gives us a sense in which the mixed will can be said 
to give the law to itself. This version of the Rationality Thesis thus presents a direct 
alternative to the Command Thesis, and one which finds support in Kant’s writings.  
With this said, however, we might still wonder whether this account really helps us to 
spell out the concept of Kantian self-legislation – for in what sense is this legislation 
in which I myself engage? In what sense does this account involve the idea of law-
giving at all? In the Vigilantius lecture notes, Kant offers a very helpful explanation 
of how the idea of self-legislation might be brought to bear on the above account. As 
he writes:  
Although the obligation is established by reason, it is nevertheless 
assumed that in the performance of our duty we have to regard 
ourselves as passive beings, and that another person must be 
present, who necessitates us to duty. Crusius found this necessi-
tating person in God, and Baumgarten likewise in the divine will, 
albeit known through reason, and not positively, and on this prin-
ciple a particular moral system has been erected. If, however, we 
pay heed to self-regarding duties, then man is presented in his 
physical nature, i.e., insofar as he is subject to the laws of nature, 
as the obligated, and rightly so; but if the obligator is personified 
as an ideal being or moral person, it can be none other than the 
legislation of reason; this, then, is man considered solely as an in-
telligible being, who here obligates man as a sensory being, and 
we thus have a relationship of man qua phenomenon to himself 
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qua noumenon. The situation is similar in obligations toward oth-
ers.  (LV 27:510)32 
The supposition that we are necessitated to action by another when it comes to duty is 
described here as something of a background thought that accompanies our experi-
ence of the moral law. Where Crusius located this other in God, this is not our only 
option, for reason herself may be personified and represented as an active legislating 
– that is, obligating – agent. This idea (the personification of ‘reason’) is equivalent to 
the idea of oneself, although ‘considered solely as an intelligible being,’ such that the 
idea of duty brings with it the idea of a relationship between oneself qua legislating, 
intelligible being to oneself, qua sensory being.  
Here, the idea of self-legislation is presented as a highly abstracted metaphor. Kant 
introduces self-legislation in this context as a rhetorical device of sorts: as a certain 
way of representing the foundation of duty to ourselves. Where the notion of a legis-
lating ‘self’ comes into the picture at all, the relevant concept is the self as a purely 
intelligible being, and so a concept which does not resemble in the least the self with 
which we are in any way familiar via observation, sensation or reflection. Given all 
that he has said here, we need not assume that there are actually two persons who 
stand in a relation of obligation to each other. Yet given all that we have said so far 
concerning the sense in which the moral law can be understood as a law ‘of reason,’ 
the great leap from talking about reason as a metaphorically ‘legislating’ ground of 
determination to talking about ourselves as legislators might seem a bit much. 
                                                        
32 See also my discussion of duties to the self, which begins on p. 24. The above passage is, 
of course, highly reminiscent of the standpoint discussion in Groundwork III. 
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Happily, there is a less abstractly metaphorical, more concrete sense in which we can 
describe the rational will (our own particular faculty of practical reason) as legislating 
the moral law. Whilst we might on the one hand conceive of ‘reason’ as an abstract 
domain of rational considerations (such as the formal features of universality and ne-
cessity), we are also able to speak of our own cognitive and volitional powers, by 
which we discern what we ought to do and find the motivation to pursue certain op-
tions, as belonging to the broad faculty of practical reason: to ‘the will’ in the broad 
sense of the term. As we saw in chapter one, Kant often distinguishes between two 
separate elements of agents’ wills: the legislative faculty of Wille and the faculty of 
choice, Willkür. The personification of reason need not only consist in the personifi-
cation of an abstract realm of rational considerations, but might just as significantly 
consist in the personification of the latter: of that pure power in each of us by which 
we are able epistemically to determine the content of morality and from which are 
issued representations of its fundamental principle for the consideration of the faculty 
of choice.33  
Kant quite explicitly maintains that the common understanding experiences the world 
with the moral law ‘in hand,’ such that each of us ‘knows very well how to distin-
guish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil’ (G 4:403). One way 
to interpret this notion is to suppose that moments of moral choice involve the ex-
plicit bringing to mind of the moral law itself, via a representation of pure reason, and 
indeed Kant’s language often suggests that this is his story. Thus in the second Cri-
tique, Kant speaks of consciousness of this law as something which ‘forces itself 
upon us of itself as a pure synthetic a priori proposition,’ by which reason ‘announces                                                         
33 See Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques 252.  
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itself as originally lawgiving’ (5:31). Of course, to suppose that everyday practical 
cognition must involve an explicit and conscious representation of the moral law is to 
represent a very unfamiliar picture of practical reasoning, and in fact Kant’s talk of 
the a priori representation of the moral law need not be interpreted as pointing to an 
explicit conception. As Kant makes clear, philosophical reflection on our standard 
moral beliefs yields an explicit articulation of their underlying principle, but we may 
quite reasonably suppose that the common understanding exhibits an inherent sensi-
tivity to this principle and a respect for its authority even in the absence of a con-
scious representation of the law (just as a person is able to grasp the punch line of a 
joke without being able to explain the principles – should there be any – that ulti-
mately ground its comedic force).34  
When observing this fact about common practical reasoners, and when asked how we 
might explain their inherent sensitivity to what philosophical reflection can reveal as 
a single, fundamental principle of reason, the idea of an implicit a priori representa-
tion of some sort – at times something of which we are conscious, at times not – be-
comes quite useful. Even if a person is unable to articulate the basic formula of the 
categorical imperative, it is central to Kant’s thinking that she must at least have a 
clear and immediate grasp of the moral impossibility of certain courses of action: she 
must be able appropriately to use the moral law, to reason in light of its instruction 
and to appreciate its overriding authority, even if she is unable to report it explicitly. 
In order to grasp the moral impossibility of certain maxims, an agent must be able in                                                         
34 I am indebted, for this example, to Onora O’Neill, ‘Autonomy and the Fact of Reason in 
the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,’ Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, ed. Otfried Höffe (Ber-
lin: Akademie Verlag, 2002) 82. For more on the implicit sensitivity of the common under-
standing, see G 4:403-404.  
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some sense to arrive at a representation of the form of lawfulness (or unlawfulness), 
for this is precisely the criterion by which moral distinctions are determined. What is 
more, if she is to have the chance of being morally good, she must in her judgement 
be able to appreciate the normative force of possible universality and to adopt this 
reason as the pure basis of her action. This complex cognition of a given maxim’s 
being unfit for universalisation and the necessity of refraining from adopting it is 
nothing other than the representation of the necessity of universal lawfulness – a cog-
nition which, on Kant’s account, generates a brand new practical incentive.  
If we turn to Kant’s description of the sense in which God might be understood as the 
legislator, but not the author, of the moral law, we find that it has much to do with 
just the activity we have been considering: the representation of the law and the gen-
eration of an incentive. As we have seen, Kant suggests in the Collins lectures that 
‘anyone who declares that a law in conformity with his will obliges others to obey it, 
is giving a law’ (27:282.36-283.1). Here, the idea is that a legislator of non-positive 
law is one who addresses a group of agents: one who represents the law to others and 
who pronounces that it is at the same time in conformity with his will. What is more, 
his declaration provides an incentive to obedience – one, it is important to note, that 
ultimately stems from a recognition on his part of the law’s authority, and not one 
that generates this authority. In a limited sense, the legislator’s declaration can be 
said actively to ‘give law’ to those whom he addresses, because it provides a connec-
tion, in the form of an incentive, between their wills and the law that he represents to 
them.35 Put differently, his activity (representing the law as a law in agreement with 
his will) generates a motive to comply that his audience can latch on to, providing                                                         
35 This need not be the only incentive or connection that there is. What the lawgiver in this 
context ensures is that there is at least one such incentive.  
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one avenue by which that law might be practically relevant for them. His command 
thus ensures that the law is a law for his audience – one that can be chosen, or effec-
tive. In a very limited and specific sense, he is an ‘agent of obligation’ (one who ‘ob-
liges’), insofar as his commanding activity can be thought of as a means by which 
those who are subject to the law are able to grasp its authority and to be motivated to 
act as it requires.  
Now if we think of the representation of the necessity of universal lawfulness de-
scribed above as stemming from a particular faculty, the personification of this fac-
ulty as a legislator in just this sense may easily be constructed. In a metaphorical 
sense, pure reason itself, as the faculty by which representations of universal lawful-
ness and its attendant necessity are made possible, may be thought of as ‘addressing’ 
the faculty of choice in precisely this manner, and so may be represented as engaged 
in the activity of giving law (though only in this limited, non-authorial sense). To the 
degree that this faculty is mine, a part of my own cognitive make-up, I can represent 
the moral law as a principle that I ‘give’ to myself. My own will’s representational 
activity is the means by which I grasp the authority of the moral law and am offered a 
motive to comply with it (in this case, one that is internal to the law itself and not ex-
ternal, as would be the case where God functions as this kind of legislator). In this 
sense I am the ‘agent’ of my very own obligation.  
In the Doctrine of Method of the first Critique, Kant proposed that God must play an 
indispensable motivational role when it comes to morality. By the time of the 
Groundwork, however, he had abandoned this view for one according to which the 
motive to comply with the moral law is located squarely in the human will, whatever 
other external motives there might be, and in particular in its representation of the 
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moral law to itself. What is more, Kant makes clear throughout his writings that being 
obligated by the moral law and having this direct motive go hand in hand. In an im-
portant footnote to the first section of the Religion, Kant asks us to imagine a hypo-
thetical rational being who, although he is able to grasp that this or that maxim con-
forms to universal law, has no motivation to act on this information.36 Because the 
moral law does not ‘announce itself’ as an incentive for this creature, he needs incen-
tives of inclination in order to act. He can indeed grasp the fact that a maxim is either 
morally allowed or morally forbidden, since there is nothing wrong with his cognition 
of the moral law, but because he cannot be motivated to act on this information, the 
cognition of the moral law is nothing more than an intellectual exercise for him. Put 
differently, although he is able to see that a certain course of action is morally re-
quired, he is unable to connect this purely rational consideration to his will. Yet as 
Kant points out, to the degree that he is unable to act in genuine responsiveness to the 
moral law, he cannot really be held accountable for following it. Where the moral law 
really obligates, the motivation to act in accordance must be available, for in the ab-
sence of this special kind of activity, the moral law would simply not be a law for us. 
As such, the will’s motive-offering activity is of central importance in the broader 
story of moral obligation.  
Of course, to say all this is not to say that the will’s motive-offering activity in any 
way ‘confers’ the status of law onto the categorical imperative in the first place (or 
that it ‘creates,’ ‘generates,’ or constitutes the ‘source’ of the authority of the moral 
law). As we have seen, the categorical imperative is non-derivative, in the sense that 
it does not draw its authority from (or find its ‘source’ in) anything but itself. It is true                                                         
36 See Rel 6:26n. 
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that we would not be obligated by the moral law if we did not engage in this particu-
lar kind of activity (the representation of the law and the subsequent offering to our-
selves of the moral motive), but this is only because this activity allows us to count as 
the kind of being for whom the moral law can be effective: as the kind of being for 
whom obeying the moral law can really be a practical option. All that Kant’s thoughts 
on the hypothetical rational agent described above imply is that, where there really is 
an obligation, there must be a motive to comply. They do not imply that we must 
think of the will’s activity as that which confers normative authority onto the law. 
Indeed, that the activity of motive-generation does not confer normative authority 
onto the moral law on Kant’s picture is ensured by the fact that, on this view, the in-
ternally generated moral motive results from our recognition (or representation) of 
the moral law’s overriding and non-derivative authority. Yet this is just to say that the 
will commands that the faculty of choice follow the moral law because the latter is 
absolutely authoritative; the moral law is not absolutely authoritative because it is 
commanded.  
With this more concrete interpretation of self-legislation in hand, we can incorporate 
the significance of aspects of the Command Thesis without supposing that our en-
gaging in this active representation of the moral law is what makes it binding for mo-
rally accountable rational agents. The legislation story of §3.2, which hinges on the 
personification of reason conceived as the ground of morality, constitutes one way of 
describing the source of the moral law and its binding force. When thinking of legis-
lation in this sense, we see how autonomy explains why the moral law is valid for a 
responsible rational being. By contrast, the legislation story offered in this section 
provides a way of expressing the kind of activity in which everyday moral agents en-
gage when they determine what they ought to do, and thus it is tied much more 
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closely to moral epistemology and motivation. It offers a picture of an activity of pure 
reason in relation to obligation which does not reduce to creation or construction. 
Where the account given in §3.2 focuses on the reason why a morally accountable 
rational being is bound by the moral law, the account offered in this section focuses 
on the role that reason’s activity plays in generating a motive to comply with the mo-
ral law – one which explains another sense in which we might be said to ‘give’ law to 
ourselves and to be the agents of our own obligation. In the end, both the Rationality 
Thesis and the Command Thesis, suitably modified, contain elements that help us to 
understand what Kant meant by self-legislation, though we must be careful to ap-
preciate the distinctness of their contributions.     
3.4  From Autonomy to the Dualism of Practical Interest 
In contrast to the radical individualism and concern with self-expression that charac-
terises some interpretations of Kantian autonomy, I have here been offering a more 
minimal and sober account of the moral law’s status as a law of reason. The story 
traced thus far develops threads from both the Command and the Rationality Theses 
outlined in §1.1, and I hope to have made evident its power to withstand, in particu-
lar, the deep concerns affecting the former. Yet this more modest, rationalist account 
raises important concerns of its own, some of which we have already identified (with 
reference to the Rationality Thesis) in §1.5. Attention to these complications will be 
the focus of chapters four to six.  
I argued in §3.1 that one of the more important reasons for rejecting the constitutivist 
model is the fact that it leaves no room for clearheaded moral wrongdoing. Yet as we 
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will see in chapter five, one implication of the view I am offering is that there is no 
space in Kant’s ethics for truly innocent deviation from the moral law. The episte-
mological and motivational elements of autonomy entail that the moral option is al-
ways something that we represent to ourselves (where such an option is in play) and 
the authority of which we can always grasp, even if we do not act on it. This fact 
brings with it important implications for Kant’s conception of character, attention to 
which will reveal the deep connections between this aspect of autonomy, a particular 
species of moral rigorism, and Kant’s denial of moral luck.  
Prior to exploring these issues, however, it is important to trace an equally interesting 
implication of the first element of autonomy mentioned in this chapter, which if we 
recall is the fact that the moral law does not have any ground beyond its universality 
and necessity. In chapter four, we will be exploring the connections between this fea-
ture of the moral law and its content (what the law tells us to do). As I will argue, this 
in turn entails what is best described as a strict dualism when it comes to practical 
concern – a principle which is connected to an important worry about the extent to 
which obedience to morality on Kant’s view might entail an unpalatable dichotomisa-
tion of our interests and an unnatural denial of our affective nature.  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
— 4 — 
MATERIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE FORM OF LAW 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that Kant is best interpreted as holding that the 
moral law provides its very own determining ground. To the extent that the latter is 
located in its mere lawfulness rather than any presupposed interest, the moral law is a 
formal principle of reason, to be contrasted with both rational-material and empiri-
cal-material norms. In this chapter, I consider the implications of this aspect of the 
autonomy of practical reason for Kant’s conception of what we might call the ‘con-
tent’ of morality (what the moral law commands us to do). In particular, my aim is to 
become clearer on the relationship in Kant’s ethical thinking between this aspect of 
autonomy and the role reserved for natural desire (inclination) in morally good 
maxim selection.    
Because of his strict separation of form and matter, Kant is often interpreted as pro-
posing that the moral law stands in necessary conflict with naturally grounded ma-
terial principles.1 The autonomous agent is in some sense a divided creature, in a 
                                                        
1 That Kant’s ethics often seems to be an ethics of repression of what is natural to us can be 
partially accounted for by the fact that he sought primarily to separate elements that had been 
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constant struggle to maintain the proper order between her affective and her rational 
nature. As a result, it can seem as though the central Kantian moment consists in a 
species of self-denial – of subordination of concern for happiness to the moral incen-
tive provided by reason’s very own law. Of course, this division ought not to be ex-
aggerated. Kant allows that the harmonizing of inclination and reason is genuinely to 
be welcomed and pursued.2 What is more, Kant’s picture is one according to which it 
is common that natural ends and purposes will be satisfied both in action which ac-
cords with and in that which is done from duty.3 Yet even with these points noted, it 
is central to Kant’s view that moral agents ought utterly to set aside considerations 
stemming from their sensuous nature wherever duty is at stake, and for this reason 
concerns about whether there is any real space in his ethics for the natural side of our 
being are not completely unfounded. 
The chapter consists of four sections. First, I trace Kant’s derivation of the categorical 
imperative as it appears in Sections I and II of the Groundwork. As I argue, this deri-
vation hinges on the intimate connection between a conception of the moral law as a 
formal law of reason, as discussed in §3.2, and the command that we consider only 
the form of our maxims. I then go on in §§4.2 and 4.3 to consider two recent inter-
pretations of Kant’s conception of moral interest, which seek to undermine the tradi-                                                                                                                                                              
identified as morally fundamental by other philosophers (Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason 120). 
2 See, e.g. Rel 6:23n. See also KpV 5:93: ‘But this distinction of the principle of happiness 
from that of morality is not […] at once an opposition between them, and pure practical rea-
son does not require that one should renounce claims to happiness but only that as soon as 
duty is in question one should take no account of them.’  
3 Think, for example, of the sympathetic soul and the honest shopkeeper of the Groundwork 
4:397-98.   
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tional denial of a morally relevant role to desire in moral choice. I argue that, given 
the conclusions of §4.1 (along with other substantial worries), such approaches must 
be rejected as plausible interpretations of Kant’s view. Kant’s dichotomy between 
reason and desire, between form and matter, may be strict; indeed, it raises quite in-
teresting worries, considered in chapters five and six, concerning the place within his 
moral theory for notions such as character and development. Given the relationship 
between this strict dichotomisation and a conception of the moral law as a genuine 
law of reason, however, we abandon the former only at the peril of remaining incon-
sistent with the latter.  
4.1  Form and Matter 
As we saw in §3.2, Kant conceives of the determining ground of the moral law as ly-
ing solely in its form. The argument for this thesis hinges heavily on the claim that no 
material principle – no principle which presupposes an object of desire (matter) as the 
determining ground of the will – can furnish a practical law. Where the determining 
ground of some principle is an object, whether empirically or rationally cognisable, 
the reason why it is a law must in the end reduce to the idea that following that prin-
ciple allows us to achieve the end in question. In this case, its normative force for us 
holds only on the condition that we have adopted that end (that we have an interest in 
that object). The Epicurean view, for example, presents an empirical object – happi-
ness – as intrinsically good, and the relevant rule of conduct is then derived from it. 
On this system, however, the Epicurean principle can be conceived as a rule for an 
agent only to the degree that the represented object bears a certain relation to her 
psychological disposition: only if she happens to take an interest in it. Where this re-
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lation obtains, its occurrence is a matter of contingent fact, in which case the rule 
cannot be said to possess the strict necessity and universality required by the concept 
of a law.4 Because of this, no principle of pursuing a desire-based object can play the 
role of a practical law.5  
Since no material can serve as the determining ground of a practical law, Kant’s con-
clusion is that pure reason ‘must be practical of itself alone’: that is to say, it must be 
able to determine the will simply by the form of a practical rule, without presuppos-
ing any empirical condition (KpV 5:24, 27). The moral law is formal (in this specific 
sense) because it presupposes no end that an agent intends to achieve.6 In fact, it de-
termines the end that agents ought to aim at in their maxims. We need not appeal to 
any object (matter) of the will in order to explain why it is binding; we must simply 
consider the idea of a mere law (a categorical imperative as such) and what it entails.  
                                                        
4 See also the discussion of the object of reason in §2.3. 
5 For an articulation of the claim that only a formal law can be an a priori determining 
ground of practical reason, see KpV 5:64.22-25. Importantly, and as we saw in §3.2, the con-
clusion that no material principle can play the role of a practical law must hold equally for 
those whose material is an object that is represented by reason or the understanding (as op-
posed to the senses). According to Kant, ‘[i]f a representation, even though it may have its 
seat and origin in the understanding, can determine choice only by presupposing a feeling of 
pleasure in the subject, its being a determining ground of choice is wholly dependent upon 
the nature of the inner sense, namely that this can be agreeably affected by the representation. 
However dissimilar representations of objects may be – they may be representations of the 
understanding or even of reason, in contrast to representations of sense – the feeling of pleas-
ure by which alone they properly constitute the determining ground of the will (the agree-
ableness, the gratification expected from the object, which impels activity to produce it) is 
nevertheless of one and the same kind …’ (KpV 5:23).   
6 Kant appeals to the language of a ‘merely formal law’ (as opposed to a material practical 
rule) at KpV 5:22.29. See also G 4:400.8-16.  
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Both in sections I and II of the Groundwork, Kant moves from thinking about the na-
ture of an absolute and formal practical law of this sort (a law that presupposes no 
particular end) to thinking about its content when addressed to finite rational beings: 
about what this law commands.7 His intention at this point is to discover what a 
categorical imperative commands by investigating its ‘concept.’8 The hope is not to 
derive a conception of token commands simply by examining the concept of a moral 
law, but rather to arrive at a conception of the fundamental or general law by which 
agents are able to determine in more concrete terms what they ought to do in particu-
lar circumstances.  
Kant’s conclusion on this front is of course that the categorical imperative directs us 
to ‘[a]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law’ (G 4:421; emphasis changed).9 This general for-
                                                        
7 In the discussion to follow, the focus is the content of the categorical imperative in particu-
lar, which must be distinguished from the moral law. The latter applies to every rational be-
ing as such, whereas the former is the form in which the moral law presents itself to beings 
like us, who have interests that might conflict with morality.  
8 As he puts it, his task at this point ‘is to enquire whether the mere concept of a categorical 
imperative may not also provide its formula containing the proposition which alone can be a 
categorical imperative’ (4:420.18-21). See also 4:420.26-7: ‘…when I think of a categorical 
imperative I know at once what it contains.’  
9 See also 4:402: ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my 
maxim should become a universal law.’ As Kant makes clear in Section II, there are two 
kinds of failure that might affect a maxim in this regard: ‘Some actions are so constituted that 
their maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of nature, far 
less could one will that it become such. In the case of others that inner permissibility is indeed 
not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the universality 
of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself’ (4:424). Those actions which 
cannot be thought without contradiction are the ones that strict duty requires us to avoid, 
while those that violate the second kind of consistency test are opposed to wide duty (4:424). 
In this characterisation, Kant has already identified the first variant of the general formula, 
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mula, to which Kant eventually assigns three variants, asks us to consider what we 
can will with consistency as a universal law, not what we do will or would in certain 
circumstances will as a universal law. Because of this, it makes no reference to what 
agents happen to want (or would happen to want).10  
To universalise is to consider whether what one proposes as a maxim for oneself 
could be adopted by all others. It is to consider whether we can simultaneously adopt 
the maxim and will that all others do so as well. As a result, the universality test does 
not ask us to focus on the content of our maxims, but rather on the mutual consistency 
of sets of maxims.11 When employed in our practical reasoning, it indicates whether 
we are choosing to act in a way that requires or presupposes that the same choice be 
denied to some others. Though it does not ground Kant’s derivation of this formula, 
the intuitive thought behind the claim that a universalisability condition provides a 
canon of moral permissibility is the idea that morally bad action involves singling 
oneself out for special treatment. With this noted, however, we might nonetheless 
wonder how Kant moves from the mere concept of a categorical imperative to this 
particular prescriptive formula.12 In this regard, commentators often suspect that 
there is a gap in the argument, attributable to an unbridged leap from the thought that 
the moral law is universally binding to the thought that we ought only to act on 
                                                                                                                                                              
according to which we are instructed to act only ‘as if the maxim of [our] action were to be-
come by [our] will a universal law of nature’ (4:421). 
10 As we will see, this is a very significant point.  
11 O’Neill, Constructions of Reason 103. 
12 Kant sketches his derivation of this principle in the Groundwork at 4:402 and 420.  
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maxims that can be willed as universal laws.13 It is one thing, after all, to propose 
that we ought to conform our maxims to whatever universally binding laws might ap-
ply to us, and so to act in accordance with law, but quite another to claim that our 
maxims must themselves be universalisable, or willable as law.14  
Kant’s critics often turn to two rival principles as candidates for ‘universal law’: a 
principle prescribing the impartial maximisation of utility, and an egoistic principle 
directing agents to pursue their own best interest.15 That we can eliminate these rivals 
should now be clear, however. The egoist’s principle is not actually a contender at 
this stage in Kant’s argument precisely because in cases where this principle is a 
plausible practical principle it all, its normative force can be traced to the desirable 
effect to be brought about by acting on it (e.g. the satisfaction of one’s wants, the 
achievement of one’s objective good). Where we think that this principle might rea-                                                        
13 Note that this is distinct from the charge of emptiness and lack of action-guidance that 
more commonly plagues the general formulation of the categorical imperative. (For a com-
pelling defence of the principle’s ability to yield action-guiding content in the absence of 
heteronomous considerations, see O’Neill, Constructions of Reason ch. 5.) 
14 See Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge 6. See also Paton, The Cate-
gorical Imperative (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971) 72; Bruce Aune, 
Kant’s Theory of Morals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979) 29-34, 86-90; 
Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought 78-82 and Hegel’s Ethical Thought 163-7; and Henry 
Allison, Idealism and Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 143-54. The 
whole debate is nicely discussed in Samuel Kerstein’s Kant’s Search for the Supreme Princi-
ple of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 73-94.  
15 What would seem to make these two principles attractive candidates is the fact that neither 
depends immediately for its validity on the desires that an agent happens to have. If the utili-
tarian principle applies at all, we suppose that it does so even if an agent does not happen to 
want to maximise the universal happiness, in the ordinary sense of ‘wanting.’ Similarly, if the 
egoistic principle is valid, it is natural to suppose that it must be so independently of the 
agent’s desiring his own wellbeing, in the ordinary sense of ‘desiring’ something. As I have 
been arguing, however, genuine categoricity and universality depend on more than satisfying 
this specific criterion.   
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sonably serve as a norm, we do not suppose that selfishness is itself normative; rather, 
we suppose that a principle of selfishness might be a good one to follow because of 
the goodness of getting what one wants.16 As such, the principle is grounded in the 
value of obtaining this effect or end, and so constitutes a material rule. Given that this 
effect is desirable, one ought to act only in one’s own interest. To the degree that the 
principle finds its determining force in some object of the will, however, it can never 
be categorical in the sense relevant to Kant, for its validity is conditional on the 
goodness of getting what one wants. The egoistic principle may indeed possess a sort 
of universality, in the sense that it may be valid to those for whom this effect really is 
good or desirable, but its universality is ultimately conditioned by this restriction.17  
Similar considerations show that the principle of impartially maximising utility also 
fails to count as a universally binding law. Here, again, the normative force of the 
principle directing agents to maximise utility can only stem from the goodness or de-
sirability of its effect: the achievement of maximal universal happiness. On the utili-
tarian view, it is the independent value of universal happiness that grounds the nor-
mative force of the principle directing us to its realisation.18 If this is so, however, 
                                                        
16 As Jens Timmermann points out, ‘[a]n egoist acting for the sake of – rather than in mere 
conformity with – the principle of selfishness would be a philosophical curiosity and, argu-
ably, not even selfish in any recognisable sense at all’ (Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals: A Commentary, 74n.49).  
17 Note that, on Kant’s view, the goodness of getting what one wants will always be condi-
tional on the possession of a good will (see G 4:393-4). 
18 Again, Timmermann points out that it is the happy effect of acting on the utilitarian prin-
ciple that is picked out by the theory as good (rather than conformity to this principle as 
such). As he asks, ‘could a thoroughgoing consequentialist really applaud actions for the sake 
of a utilitarian law if they did not realise the (indirectly) intended effect?’ (Kant’s Ground-
work: A Commentary 74).  
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then the utilitarian principle must be considered instrumental, its universality condi-
tioned by the goodness of universal happiness.  
The universality of rules which direct agents to the realisation of a specific end – even 
an end from which an agent cannot arbitrarily release herself, such as happiness or 
perfection – is restricted precisely by that end. Because Kant realises that no such law 
can constitute a truly categorical (and so unconditioned) imperative, he shifts our 
thinking away from the idea of a specific material rule – one that picks out an end as 
something to be pursued – altogether. As he writes: 
…since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the neces-
sity that the maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law 
contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left 
with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality 
of a law as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative 
properly represents as necessary.  (G 4:421) 
Beyond the law represented by reason as applying universally, the imperative for 
which we are searching contains only the necessity of conforming to this universal 
law. If it were to contain more – a material component (a prescribed object of the 
will) – then its universality and necessity would be conditioned by the value of this 
component, in which case it would not count as a categorically binding law. Yet pre-
cisely because the moral law can contain no material component of this sort, it cannot 
command us to realise specific states of affairs.19 As a result, nothing is left to which 
our maxim must conform except ‘the universality of a law as such.’  
                                                        
19 If, that is to say, there really is such a law that applies to us. This question is left open until 
Section III of the Groundwork.  
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What does it mean to conform my maxim to universality as such, and what does this 
have to do with being able to will that it should be a universal law? The supposed gap 
in the argument can be bridged by allowing a key starting point, stemming from 
Kant’s moral psychology.20 As Kant suggests in an important footnote at G 4:420, 
action on maxims of any kind aims to bring subjective norms into agreement with 
objective ones. As Kant puts this idea, every maxim ‘contains’ a practical rule that 
conforms in some sense with the ‘conditions of the subject.’ When it comes to action 
on hypothetical imperatives, we aim to conform our maxim to the (objective) laws of 
nature – to the regularities that we discover in experience – in order to realise an end 
represented as good. A desire presents itself to me, and I ask: Is my proposed action 
really the kind of thing that is generally and regularly conducive to my end? To ask 
this, however, is parallel to asking whether my maxim (to perform this kind of action 
for the sake of this end) could be a rule for everyone who happens to share my end. 
Here, regularity in nature when it comes to the connection between means and ends 
brings us easily to the notion of a rule or general (in this case, empirical) law; because 
of this, even action on hypothetical imperatives involves a universalisation test of 
sorts on Kant’s view – one according to which universality is assessed relative to a 
specific group of agents.21  
                                                        
20 I am indebted for this interpretation to Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork: A Com-
mentary 74-5.  
21 Andrews Reath explores a similar continuity between non-moral and moral reasoning in 
‘Kant’s Conception of Practical Rationality,’ Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory 
esp. 71-84. According to Reath, non-moral choice involves taking our reasons to justify our 
actions to those who share our ends, whereas moral choice involves taking our reasons to 
justify our actions to any agent, however situated. The formula of universal law is then pre-
sented as a procedure for determining when our reasons are able to justify our actions to any 
agent. Because Reath relies so heavily on the language of reasons, however, it is difficult to 
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In action which complies with a categorical imperative, however, universality is un-
restricted. This much is ensured by the conclusion that such an imperative must be a 
‘law of reason’ in the sense described above. In this case, rather than asking whether 
my maxim can serve as a rule for everyone who happens to share my end, I ask 
whether my maxim can serve as a rule for every rational agent as such, regardless of 
whatever needs, desires and ends might be in play. Reasoning in accordance with a 
hypothetical imperative requires that we determine whether there is a sufficient 
match, cashed out in terms of natural regularity, between an action and an end; it thus 
requires that we focus our attention on the nature of the objects of desire and on the 
empirical regularities associated with the means to their realisation. Given a particular 
end, we ask whether our maxim possesses the formal feature of possible law-likeness. 
In moral reasoning, however, our concern is purely formal. We ask simply whether 
our maxim contains the formal feature of being a possible law for all rational agents, 
and we do not refer at all to the nature of any end or to observed regularities. Thus 
there is a second sense in which the moral law may be conceived as a ‘formal’ princi-
ple, for it directs us to consider the mere form of our maxims rather than anything 
having to do with their matter.  
This derivation can be questioned simply by bringing into doubt the psychological 
starting point on which it hinges. Moreover, we might question whether the connec-
tion between acting on a maxim that can serve as a universal rule and acting on a 
maxim that can be willed as a universal law is really as straightforward as I have so                                                                                                                                                               
make out the supposed connection between acting for reasons which justify universally and 
acting on maxims which can be willed as universal laws. Although I am sympathetic with the 
broad contours of Reath’s analysis, I hope that my reconstruction has made this connection 
clearer.  
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far made it sound. Even with these worries acknowledged, however, what we can say 
for sure is that the categorical imperative, whatever its specific content, cannot pos-
sibly direct agents to consider the value of actions relative to ends. As we have seen, 
the universality of a rule that directs agents to the realisation of a specific end is con-
ditioned by that end. Because a categorical imperative must be unconditioned (see 
§3.2), no such rule can constitute a categorical imperative. Yet if moral choice does 
not involve reasoning which considers relations of fit between objects of desire, or 
the matter of our maxims, it is natural to suppose that it must instead involve con-
sideration of their formal features. What allows us to bridge the supposed gap in 
Kant’s derivation of the categorical imperative is the fact that the moral law is a for-
mal law of reason, in the sense that it does not presuppose any desire as a condition of 
its validity. The formal character of the moral law in one sense – the fact that it di-
rects us to consider only the form of our maxims – is thus intimately related to the 
formal character of the law as discussed in chapter three.  
4.2  Duty and Desire  
The above helps to explain the importance that Kant places on setting aside consider-
ations having to do with the relative value of states of affairs when duty is at stake. 
On Kant’s view, action on moral grounds expresses a direct interest in our action’s 
conformity to universality as such, and so in a very particular formal property of our 
maxim. By contrast, action on non-moral grounds expresses an ultimate interest in the 
object or effect to be realised by one’s action. From this point of view, the act is 
valued instrumentally, as a means of securing some further end. Thus, according to 
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Kant, there is a strict difference between taking an interest in an action and acting 
from interest, or from inclination:  
The first signifies practical interest in the action, the second, 
pathological interest in the object of the action. The former indi-
cates only dependence of the will upon principles of reason for the 
sake of inclination, namely where reason supplies only the practi-
cal rule as to how to remedy the need of inclination. In the first 
case the action interests me; in the second, the object of the action 
(insofar as it is agreeable to me). We have seen in the first Section 
that in the case of an action from duty we must look not to interest 
in the object but merely to that in the action itself and its principle 
in reason (the law).  (G 4:413-14.n)22 
Where pure reason directs us only to consider the universal validity of our proposed 
maxim, inclination – which relies on reason put to its empirical use – directs us to 
satisfy the interest that we take in an object. It is true that on Kant’s account all action 
involves, in addition to a law, an object of volition. The crucial factor, however, is 
whether the agent gives priority to the formal or to the material element of her maxim 
in her choice. Where the agent gives unconditional concern to the form of her maxim 
and acts precisely from that concern, her action is morally good; where her concern 
rests on the object to be realised by so acting, it is not.  
Because the moral law directs us only to consider the form of our maxims, inclination 
must stand aside where duty is at stake. As Kant writes,  
                                                        
22 See also G 4:459-60: ‘Reason takes an immediate interest in an action only when the uni-
versal validity of the maxim of the action is a sufficient determining ground of the will. Only 
such an interest is pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of another object of 
desire or on the presupposition of a special feeling of the subject, then reason takes only a 
mediate interest in the action, and since reason all by itself, without experience, can discover 
neither objects of the will nor a special feeling lying at its basis, this latter interest would be 
only empirical and not a pure rational interest.’ 
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the human being is not … required to renounce his natural end, 
happiness, when it is a matter of complying with his duty …; in-
stead he must abstract altogether from this consideration when the 
command of duty arises; he must on no account make it the condi-
tion of his compliance with the law prescribed to him reason; in-
deed he must, as far as possible for him, strive to become aware 
that no incentive derived from that gets mixed, unnoticed, into the 
determination of duty … (TP 8:278-79)23 
This conclusion is a direct consequence of accepting that the moral law must be a 
categorical imperative, and so a principle which is not conditioned by any object. Far 
from stemming from a deep-seated disdain for the inclinations, Kant’s rejection of the 
moral worth of action from inclination finds its source, in large part, in his under-
standing of the unconditioned character of moral command and of what the moral law 
tells us to do.  
With this said, however, many of Kant’s most sympathetic interpreters find this in-
sistence on purity when it comes to the concerns of moral deliberation either un-
palatable or unrealistic.24 There has thus been a move in recent criticism to find ways 
of accommodating a much more intimate partnership between the concerns of pure 
reason and those of inclination in a Kantian account of acting on the categorical im-
perative. Because two of these approaches in particular constitute such glaring devi-
ations from the interpretation I have been offering here, it will be useful to consider 
them in some detail.                                                         
23 See also G 4:400: ‘For, the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and 
its a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads; and since it must still be de-
termined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of volition as such 
when an action is done from duty, where every material principle has been withdrawn from it 
… Now, an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it 
every object of the will …’  
24 I will be addressing the ‘unrealistic’ charge in chapter six.  
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(i)  Rules of Moral Salience 
One influential attempt to reconcile inclination with the categorical imperative fo-
cuses on the role that the development of our affective nature plays in the structuring 
of moral attention. On this view, part of our normal development as embodied ra-
tional beings involves the development of patterns of feeling and desire, which in turn 
results in the acquisition of what Barbara Herman has called ‘rules of moral salience’: 
rules that structure our perception of the world, bringing into relief the specifically 
moral features of our situations.25 The key idea, here, is that human beings must be 
trained to view their situations in terms of their morally salient features if they are to 
be able correctly to apply moral principles to particular situations; the development of 
patterns of desire, which shape our attention, effects just this sort of training.  
Given that the moral law is a formal principle of reason, however, directing us to 
consider only whether our maxim can serve as a universal law, it is difficult to deter-
mine just what kind of moral work these acquired ‘rules of moral salience’ are meant 
to do. It may of course be true that agents must apply the moral maxims they adopt, 
determining how they are to implement the commands of pure reason in their specific 
contexts, and in this respect attention to various salient features of their environments 
might well be incredibly significant. Yet when it comes to determining the more 
fundamental question of which maxims we should act on (and which we must not), a                                                         
25 See esp. Herman’s Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993) 73-93. This claim is echoed in Nancy Sherman’s account of the significance of 
emotional development for morality. On her view, emotions can serve a significant role ‘as 
modes of attention that help us to track what is morally salient in our circumstances, and thus 
locate possible moments for morally permissible and required actions’ (Making a Necessity 
of Virtue [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997] 145). 
 
 
 
MATERIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE FORM OF LAW  124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
genuinely Kantian position must hold that all that agents require is the capacity to test 
their proposed maxims against the categorical imperative, and this common human 
reason can do no matter what the nature of the agent’s affective disposition.26 Since 
the moral law directs us only with respect to the selection of maxims – that is, since 
the selection of maxims is the only truly morally relevant moment on Kant’s strict 
view – the moral importance of rules of salience can only ever be secondary.27  
(ii)  The Dispersal of Duty 
Rather than focusing on the way in which desiderative states might serve as moral 
aids, a second attempt to accommodate the significance of inclination in morally 
good action seeks to develop the claim that inclination and duty need not be con-
ceived as separate incentives, such that action in which the agent takes an interest in 
an object of desire might in certain cases satisfy the conditions of being morally 
good.28   
                                                        
26 ‘I do not, therefore, need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have to do in order that 
my volition be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being 
prepared for whatever might come to pass in it, I ask myself only: can you also will that your 
maxim become a universal law? … [C]ommon human reason, with this compass in hand, 
knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is 
evil, what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if, without in the least teaching it 
anything new, we only, as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle…’ (G 4:403-4). 
27 For more on this kind of observation, see Patrick Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in 
Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 73-4.  
28 Although the view discussed below has much in common with positions according to 
which the motive of duty ought to be read as a ‘limiting condition’ (a second-order motive 
which requires that actions prompted by more basic desires satisfy the condition it lays 
down), it constitutes an important development of this view in its own right. For more on the 
‘limiting condition’ or ‘backup motive’ conception of the motive of duty, see Herman, ‘On 
 
 
MATERIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE FORM OF LAW  125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For some, a pure interest in the formal character of our maxims – their possible suita-
bility as universal law – will require a hefty amount of explanation. On what has 
come to be known as a traditional Humean view of moral motivation, natural desires 
generated under quite standard and familiar social conditions can act as the ultimate 
springs to activity that is generally recognised as morally admirable. Sadly for the 
Kantians, however, the motive of duty’s strict separation from the empirical elements 
of human nature makes its origins altogether more mysterious. Where could this 
non-empirical motive possibly come from? 
In response to this kind of worry, it may seem tempting to reinterpret the traditional 
Kantian story so as to allow for the idea that the cultivation of moral interest is 
something that can be traced through a naturalistic psychological story of normal 
human development. Something along these lines has recently been proposed by 
Barbara Herman, who suggests that certain of our motives, though they develop and 
‘draw content’ from original natural desires, can also and at the same time develop in 
response to the requirements of practical reason. Because of the fact that natural de-
sire can be shaped by our developing rational (and moral) capacities, she argues, 
Kantians need not endorse a strict opposition between inclination and reason.29   
This approach begins with the observation that we are by nature disposed to have 
certain desires, which can be developed and modified in accordance with reason.                                                                                                                                                               
the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,’ The Practice of Moral Judgement 1-22; Paul 
Benson, ‘Moral Worth,’ Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 365-382; and Richard Henson, 
‘What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action,’ 
Philosophical Review 88 (1979): 39-54.     
29 This view is developed in Herman’s ‘Making Room for Character,’ Moral Literacy 1-28. 
 
 
MATERIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE FORM OF LAW  126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Something like this idea is traced by Kant in the second Critique’s discussion of the 
so-called ‘higher’ faculty of desire, where he acknowledges that certain of our desires 
do indeed fall under our control as opposed to others. Thus it is claimed, he writes,  
that we can find satisfaction in the mere exercise of our powers, in 
consciousness of our strength of soul in overcoming obstacles 
opposed to our plans, in cultivating our talents of spirit, and so 
forth, and we correctly call these joys and delights more refined 
because they are more under our control than others, do not wear 
out but rather strengthen feeling for further enjoyment of them, 
and while they delight they at the same time cultivate.  (5:24) 
The metaphor here is of the refinement of desire, a gradual removal of impurities 
from the rough stock with which we originally find ourselves. Where Herman’s view 
moves beyond Kant’s observations is in the proposal that the moral law itself might 
play such a refining role, shaping and forming our desiderative make-up. On her 
view, we can think of the moral interest as something which is liable to be ‘dispersed’ 
in the naturally originating motives that have developed in response to the agent’s 
representation of reason’s law.30 As we develop into rational adults, ‘[d]esire for 
drink becomes a desire for safe and pleasant (not dangerous or unpleasant) drink, and 
also a desire for an available (not otherwise possessed) drink’; ‘my desire for a new 
computer or car does not (because it ought not) range over those already owned by 
others.’31 Though such motives may in the end yield the very same actions one 
would have performed for the sake of the original desire, the internal responsiveness 
                                                        
30 Moral Literacy 21. 
31 Moral Literacy 15-16. One question for Herman, here, is why we should think of the con-
straint of only wanting not otherwise possessed drink or not otherwise owned computers or 
cars as being responsive to a particularly moral principle. On the face of it, these might 
equally well be prudential constraints, having nothing to do with morality per se.  
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of the desire to the constraints of rationality means that the maxim is relevantly dif-
ferent.32  
Thus according to this view, action which expresses moral interest need not be con-
ceived as grounded in an isolated spring to action, the genealogy of which utterly 
transcends the natural. Because desires can be developed in reason-respecting ways 
via their integration with moral principle, the morally good agent can be moved to 
action by grounds which are quite intimately connected to the original springs of in-
clination. This allows us to say more than the familiar claim that there need be noth-
ing morally wrong with the mere presence of empirical desire alongside the moral 
motive. According to Herman, what we are more interestingly able to claim on this 
picture is that ‘[t]he evolution of desire is in this way the condition for having a moral 
character that does not necessarily involve the segregation (or oppression) of one’s 
affective life in general by one’s commitment to morality.’33 
4.3  The Heterogeneity of Moral and Non-Moral Concern 
Although this trend in interpretation has its obvious attractions, we would do well to 
consider it in light of the conclusions of §4.1. In particular, it is important to ask 
whether a natural motive (desire) can ever actually be said to draw content from a 
formal law of reason. On Herman’s view, the formation of a motive involves an ev-                                                        
32 Moral Literacy 20. On Herman’s alternative, motives of self-interest can be completely 
rational. To the extent that a person’s desires are evaluated in light of principles which in-
clude the moral law, her self-interest is not what it would have otherwise been (23). 
33 Moral Literacy 20-21.  
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aluative process by which certain desires are complicated and conditioned. The raw 
material of our affective nature is transformed by its coming into the relevant kind of 
contact with rational principles, such that only a more complex version of the former 
remains. While this is the story, however, what does it mean for a desire to ‘respond’ 
appropriately to moral principle? Can a coherent account of such a phenomenon be 
found?  
In a straightforward sense, familiar from Section I of the Groundwork, the actions 
undertaken by agents as a means of satisfying their desires can indeed be said to 
‘conform’ to the moral law. The prudent shopkeeper of 4:397 acts on a desire to se-
cure his own advantage, but the action that this desire happens to recommend in his 
situation – the necessary means toward his end in this very case – conforms to the 
requirement of duty (he acts honestly). Similarly, the sympathetically attuned soul of 
4:398 acts on an immediate desire to help others, and again the action that this desire 
happens to recommend conforms in outward appearance to the moral law. One way 
to interpret the idea of a desire’s being ‘shaped’ by the moral law might thus involve 
viewing morally refined desires as those which recommend actions that conform to 
duty.  
If this is the picture that Herman is suggesting, however, it faces serious problems. 
First, it is clear that any coincidence between an object of desire and a recommended 
action can only ever be external and highly contingent. Desires and the acts that 
might bring about their satisfaction do not lie in a one-to-one correspondence (or even 
a one-to-many correspondence): my desire to gain a good reputation, for example, 
might require any number of acts, depending on the company I keep, the options 
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available to me, and so on.34 What this means, however, is that nothing about a de-
sire for an object connects it inherently to a specific action (a means towards realising 
that object), and this makes it difficult to see why we should speak of a desire’s con-
formity to the moral law at all, rather than the conformity of certain actions to the 
demands of reason.  
Is there any sense in which desires themselves might be deemed morally good or bad, 
permissible or impermissible, according to the moral law? Does the moral law speak 
to the so-called ‘content’ of our desires at all, and is it in this sense that they might 
obey or disobey reason? Two possibilities on this front may be ruled out from the 
start. First, on any recognisably Kantian framework, desires are not something which 
could, in and of themselves, be deemed morally permissible or impermissible from 
the standpoint of the moral law. In a very trivial sense, of course, we are permitted to 
have any kind of desire we wish, but this is only because in this sphere the moral law 
remains silent. Because it imposes an ‘ought,’ the moral law can pronounce its ver-
dicts only on that for which we might reasonably be held responsible; since the con-
tingent fact that I possess a certain desire is not a consequence of genuine choice, but 
is rather a bare fact stemming from my sensuous nature, it is not a proper locus of 
moral assessment. Moreover, that we are the kinds of beings that have desires at all is 
a contingent fact about our makeup, and not something which Kant takes to apply to 
any rational being as such. Similarly, the range of the possible objects of the relevant 
desire cannot of themselves be deemed either permissible or forbidden from the                                                         
34 This is not to say that, in a particular circumstance, a specific action might not be the only 
means available for the satisfaction of a desire. It is rather to say that the judgement that cer-
tain desires are morally permissible or impermissible simply because they are connected to 
certain acts cannot be held a priori. 
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standpoint of the moral law. For Kant, objects of desire are states of affairs to which 
the agent attaches a certain agreeableness: they are, as we might say, ways that the 
world might be. But again, because my acts of choice might well bring about any 
number of actual consequences, depending on factors well beyond my control, the 
way the world happens to be is not something which is wholly determined by the ex-
ercise of my freedom, and thus something for which I can be held morally respon-
sible. States of affairs, like the suffering of desire, remain beyond the boundary of the 
morally assessable. On these two fronts, the moral law is silent.35  
The above observations constitute significant concerns. Given the conclusions of 
§4.1, however, we are in a position to identify an even more fundamental short-
coming of this interpretation. Precisely because the moral law pronounces only on the 
form of maxims, it directs agents to consider questions of universal consistency. As 
we have seen, this leads to the idea that the moral interest is fundamentally different 
from the non-moral: where the former constitutes a direct interest in the action to be 
performed, the latter can only ever constitute an indirect interest in the action as a 
means to securing a desired or desirable effect.36 Herman’s alternative upsets this 
distinction to the degree that it proposes that acting on the categorical imperative, 
from respect for the law, consists in action from properly formed, properly respon-
sive, inclination. In addition to the worries presented above, it thus fails to accom-                                                        
35 In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant argues that it is an indirect duty to cultivate compassionate 
feelings (see, e.g. MdS 6:457, §35). The emphasis here, however, is on the importance of 
doing so as an aid to ameliorating bad situations. As Kant makes clear, where I cannot help a 
person, my sharing of his pain merely increases the ills in the world, and is a bad thing (see 
MdS 6:457, §34).   
36 This point is developed in Jens Timmermann, ‘Acting from Duty: Inclination, Reason and 
Moral Worth,’ Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. Jens 
Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).  
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modate the very clear affirmation, repeated by Kant throughout his ethical writings, 
of the heterogeneity of moral and non-moral concern. Were the moral law at all con-
cerned with our desires and their objects – were it able to ‘speak to them,’ and so to 
‘shape’ their content – this insistence on the dualism of human volition would be an 
ultimately disposable element in Kant’s ethical thought. As we have seen, however, it 
stems directly from the formal nature of the moral law as discussed above, and so 
ultimately from Kant’s commitment to the autonomy of pure reason: to the fact that 
the moral law is not conditioned by any object. The endorsement of Herman’s alter-
native thus entails the abandonment of this fundamental Kantian principle. 
It is of course true that Kant accepts the idea that our desires may be refined through 
reflection and maturity. Where he does so, however, he warns that action on refined 
desires must not ever be presented as anything other than action on inclination. 
Though the desire on which the agent acts might be more honourable and admired 
than others, action for the sake of the former expresses the very same principle as ac-
tion for the sake of the latter, and so cannot be deemed more or less moral. As Kant 
puts this point,  
Only those who would like to deny to pure reason the ability to 
determine the will without some feeling being presupposed could 
deviate so far from their own definition so as to explain as quite 
heterogeneous what they have themselves previously brought 
under one and the same principle.  (KpV 5:24)  
Where genuine heterogeneity applies to the moral and the non-moral interest, those 
who seek to anchor morality in a ‘higher’ faculty of desire suppose, wrongly, that 
there is genuine heterogeneity among the incentives of inclination: among our refined 
motives and ‘those of the coarsest senses.’ In this way, according to Kant, they are 
like ‘ignorant people who would like to dabble in metaphysics’: who ‘think of matter 
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so refined, so superrefined, that they make themselves giddy with it and then believe 
that in this way they have devised a spiritual and yet extended being’ (KpV 5:24).  
4.4  Interest, Dialectic and Character 
What I hope to have shown thus far is that it is misguided to suppose that Kant’s dis-
tinction between inclination and the motive of duty is grounded on a strange ob-
session with dichotomies or a deep-seated disdain for our sensuous nature. Rather, it 
rests on an acknowledgement that the very concept of a categorical imperative im-
plies that the moral law must be formal in the dual sense outlined above, and thus that 
moral concern attaches solely to the form of our maxims rather than to any object of 
desire. For better or for worse, Kant has great confidence in the claim that the com-
mon understanding will recognise that actions undertaken for the sake of some effect 
lack moral worth.37 That reason is not in the business of approving (or respecting) 
the effects of my actions is meant to be a conclusion arrived at from within common 
human cognition – or so he supposes.38 His conclusions about the heterogeneity of 
duty and desire, however, do not in the least hinge on their intuitive plausibility. As 
we see in Section II of the Groundwork, Kant’s derivation of the categorical impera-
tive proceeds directly from his understanding of the moral law as a law of reason in 
conjunction with his conception of human moral psychology, and it is this under-
standing of the content of the moral command that ensures that the moral interest 
                                                        
37 The examples at G 4:397-99 are meant to make explicit this intuition.  
38 See G 4:400.19-25. 
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must be absolutely and purely formal. An acceptance of the distinctive starting point 
of Kantian ethical theory thus entails this most controversial of tenets. 
With all of this said, however, I do not wish to underplay the significance of the con-
cern to explain how it is that human beings, part sensuous and part rational, are able 
to take an interest in the moral law and in compliance with its dictates. Kant himself 
was acutely aware of the mystery associated with explaining the possibility of a mo-
ral outlook. As he writes in the Groundwork, where ‘pathological’ interest is easily 
explained by citing sensuous provocation of some kind or other, ‘it is quite impos-
sible to explain how and why the universality of a maxim as law and hence morality 
interests us’ (4:460). Unable to cognise how the thought of universality on its own 
should create in us an interest to do what the moral law commands, we can at best 
show that we must suppose that it does, if there is to be such a thing as moral neces-
sity.39 As philosophers we would of course like to investigate the grounds for believ-
ing in the moral interest, but in the end Kant has faith that its possibility (itself 
grounded in freedom) is an assumption that human reason must ultimately accept. 
With this query, we reveal the limits of moral philosophy.40   
                                                        
39 See also G 4:458-9: ‘But reason would overstep all its bounds if it took it upon itself to 
explain how pure reason can be practical...’; ‘The subjective impossibility of explaining the 
freedom of the will is the same as the impossibility of discovering and making comprehen-
sible an interest which the human being can take in moral laws, and yet he does really take an 
interest in them, the foundation of which in us we call moral feeling …’ (G 4:459-60). At 
4:461-62, Kant goes on to hint that the problem of explaining moral interest is related to the 
formal character of the categorical imperative.  
40 See G 4:462.22. See also SF 7:58-9: ‘For there is something in us that we cannot cease to 
wonder at when we have once seen it … We do not wonder at the fact that we are beings 
subject to moral laws and destined by our own reason to obey them, even if this means sacri-
ficing whatever pleasures may conflict with them … But we do wonder at our ability so to 
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A related and equally interesting problem concerns not the possibility of explaining 
the moral interest as such, but the possibility of developing an unwavering and settled 
commitment to morality’s demands. Kant’s moral law is described as an unforgiving, 
commanding and compelling force; its origin is radically different from any source 
known to us via empirical introspection, and to that degree it is likely to be con-
fronted by ordinary agents as a foreign yoke – as a constraint imposed on the self by 
some ‘other,’ majestic force rather than a principle which finds its source in the self.41 
In comparison, moreover, Kant continually observes our great attachment to the ‘dear 
self’: to the sensuous side of our nature, our identification with which renders moral 
obedience, at least at times, a species of ‘self-denial’ (G 4:407.23-28). As he contin-
ually acknowledges, though there is something ‘splendid’ about the innocence of the 
common human understanding, it is rather easily ‘seduced.’ Human beings feel 
within themselves ‘a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty,’ such that 
there arises a propensity on the part of human reason to give preference to inclination: 
‘to rationalise [vernünfteln] against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon 
their validity, or at least upon their strictness’ (G 4:405). Thus there is a resistance in 
human reason to accepting its own fundamental principle; though the implicit use and 
recognition of the moral law is natural to us, just as inherent is the tendency both to 
be concerned with our own happiness and to attempt to justify this propensity by ad-
                                                                                                                                                              
sacrifice our sensuous nature to morality that we can do what we quite readily and clearly 
conceive we ought to do. This ascendancy of the supersensible human being in us over the 
sensible, such that (when it comes to a conflict between them) the sensible is nothing, though 
in its own eyes it is everything, is an object of the greatest wonder; and our wonder at this 
moral predisposition in us, inseparable from our humanity, only increases the longer we con-
template this true (not fabricated) ideal.’ 
41 This charge is discussed in some detail in §6.1. 
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opting a heteronomous moral philosophy.42 The danger here is a lapse into what 
Kant calls a ‘natural dialectic’ of reason, where human reason surreptitiously allows 
itself to substitute the principle of happiness for the moral law.  
Given that the experience of our relative attachment to the moral law and to inclina-
tion so easily fits this pattern on Kant’s view, how are we to explain anyone’s ever 
developing a lasting and complete commitment to morality? Kantian autonomy con-
tains an inner tension when applied to finite rational beings to the degree that it com-
bines the solemn majesty of the moral law – its unanswerability, its purely formal 
disciplinary force – with the power of every agent to be motivated to do as duty pre-
scribes.43 Moral concern involves refusing to engage in a search for reasons for com-
pliance beyond those contained in the law itself. Yet because we are sensuous beings, 
vulnerable to distraction and to moral quibbling, we are easily led to resist the moral 
law and to become suspicious of its adequacy as an incentive. Questions concerning 
the possibility of the moral law’s gaining lasting access to the human heart as a sole 
incentive are thus highly important. This is a topic to which we shall return in chapter 
six.                                                          
42 Wisdom requires science, according to Kant, ‘not in order to learn from it but in order to 
provide access and durability for its precepts’ (G 4:405). For more on this interesting strand 
in Kant’s thinking, see Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness 211-212 and Susan 
Meld Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009) 130-31. On the natural acceptance of the moral law, see KpV 5:8n: ‘A reviewer who 
wanted to say something censuring this work [the Groundwork] hit the mark better than he 
himself may have intended when he said that no new principle of morality is set forth in it but 
only a new formula. But who would even want to introduce a new principle of all morality 
and, as it were, first invent it? Just as if, before him, the world had been ignorant of what duty 
is or in thoroughgoing error about it.’  
43 Kant refers to the ‘solemn majesty’ of the moral law at KpV 5:77. The notion that we stand 
under a ‘discipline of reason’ is outlined at 5:82.  
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Before turning to these worries, however, it is useful to consider the extent to which 
this aspect of Kant’s ethical thought really might expose him to the charge that he has 
no plausible account of moral character. Herman casts her alternative as an attempt 
to ‘make room for character’ in Kant’s ethics, and here her focus is on whether there 
might be space within Kantian moral philosophy for a recognisable notion of moral 
development or formation. Whilst this issue takes us, in part, into the territory of 
chapter six, chapter five will focus on a cluster of prior questions concerning Kant’s 
thoughts on the nature and origins of moral character. Does the orthodox Kantian 
picture really lack a coherent account of moral character? More importantly for our 
purposes, in what sense might such an account be influenced by his commitment to 
the autonomy of practical reason?  
     
 
 
 
 
— 5 — 
ON THE PURITY OF THE MORAL DISPOSITION 
 
 
 
A member of the English Parliament exclaimed in the heart of de-
bate: ‘Every man has his price, for which he sells himself.’1 If this 
is true (and everyone can decide by himself), if nowhere is a virtue 
which no level of temptation can overthrow, if whether the good 
or evil spirit wins us over only depends on which bids the most 
and affords the promptest pay-off, then, what the Apostle says 
might indeed hold true of human beings universally, ‘There is no 
distinction here, they are all under sin – there is none righteous (in 
the spirit of the law), no, not one.’2  (Rel 6:38.34-39.6) 
As we have seen, autonomy entails the loss of a certain kind of innocence. The au-
tonomous will can undertake the pursuit of happiness only subsequent to pure rea-
son’s permission or condemnation, such that immoral action involves not merely 
deviation from the moral law, but also a refusal properly to abide by its authority. On 
Kant’s view, this fact leads to two related ideas: the notion that there is no intermedi-
                                                        
1 This exclamation is commonly attributed to Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745).  
2 As the editors of the Cambridge edition of Kant’s writings on religion point out, this phrase 
can be found in Romans 3:9-10: ‘What then? are we better than they? No, in no wise: for we 
have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin; As it is written, There 
is none righteous, no, not one.’ 
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ate moral position between good and evil at the level of maxim selection, and the 
claim that there are no moral characters that are neither good nor bad.   
Whilst Kant accepted these implications, they are likely at first glance to seem overly 
restrictive. Kant’s sharp distinction leaves no room for the idea that an action can be 
morally good in some ways and morally bad in others – a notion at the heart of much 
commonsense moral thinking. In practice, we would seem to find evidence for the 
idea that those around us take their reasons for acting morally well from a host of 
complex sources – some having to do with reverence for the law, others from more 
earthly concerns – and we do so without supposing that human action must be reduc-
ible to only two distinct types. Even less, however, do we suppose that people’s 
underlying moral dispositions fall into two distinct categories. Rather, we tend to 
suppose that there are more than two fundamental moral types of people; that 
on-the-whole morally decent individuals may nevertheless differ in terms of the de-
gree to which they are good; and that the moral improvement of character occurs 
most commonly as a gradual process of personal improvement.  
In this chapter, I consider the deep connections in Kant’s thinking between autonomy 
of the will, as we have been considering this property, and the possession of a moral 
disposition. For many readers of Kant’s moral philosophy, his account of the latter 
notion is likely to seem impoverished. With this acknowledged, my aim is to defend 
Kant’s rigoristic account of moral disposition by bringing clarity to the question of 
why Kant felt the need to describe our moral possibilities so starkly.  
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This chapter is divided into four sections. In section one, I consider Kant’s concep-
tion of a supreme maxim, which he understands as a fundamental ground for the ad-
option of more particular maxims. Continuing to draw from Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, I then go on to discuss the implications of this notion for 
Kant’s conception of intelligible moral character, focusing in particular on the rigor-
istic conclusions to which Kant is attracted. In section three, I evaluate, and ulti-
mately reject, an alternative to Kantian moral rigorism proposed by Stephen Eng-
strom. As I argue, reflection on the inadequacy of Engstrom’s proposal reveals the 
very interesting relationship in Kant’s thinking between the moral worth of actions 
and good character.  
5.1  The Concept of a Supreme Maxim 
As we learn in the Religion, Kant takes human nature to possesses an original pre-
disposition (Anlage) to good, which is innate and so not chosen, and which contains 
three elements, themselves predispositions.3 The predisposition to animality is asso-
ciated with a kind of self-love for which reason is not required and with the natural 
drives for self-preservation, the propagation of the species, and for community with 
other human beings (Rel 6:26.12-18). The predisposition to humanity, by contrast, is 
subsumed under the general title of self-love, which is not merely instinctual but also 
requires reason. It grounds an inclination to be seen as worthy (in some cases to be                                                         
3 To say that these are predispositions to good is to say that they enjoin observance of the 
moral law (Rel 6:28.12-14); no human being is good simply in virtue of possessing them, for 
we are not accountable for having them, but according to Kant they nonetheless demand 
compliance with the moral law to the extent that the ends they pick out are either best or 
solely realised under the condition of having chosen within the bounds of morality. 
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seen as superior) in the eyes of others, and since it involves comparison, it is rooted in 
a use of reason which is practical yet subservient to other incentives (Rel 6:27.4-12, 
28.9-10).4 Finally, the predisposition to personality is described by Kant as ‘the sus-
ceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power 
of choice’ (Rel 6:27.27.29). It is because we possess this predisposition that it is pos-
sible for us to incorporate the moral incentive into our maxims. As Kant writes in the 
second Critique, personality is the very origin of duty:  
[It is] freedom and independence from the mechanism of the 
whole of nature, regarded nevertheless as also a capacity of a be-
ing subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given by 
his own reason, so that a person as belonging to the sensible world 
is subject to his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the 
intelligible world … (KpV 5:87) 
Our predispositions demand compliance with the moral law. How, then, are we to 
explain the possibility of morally evil maxims? What could possibly serve as the 
ground of the adoption of an evil maxim – as the explanation of why it, and not a 
good maxim, has been selected? One way of thinking about this is to seek the origin 
of evil in some notion of inherited sin (Rel 6:40.8-12). That this cannot be the solu-
tion on a Kantian approach, however, should be evident, for the notion that human 
beings could have inherited this way of selecting maxims from our ‘first parents’ pre-
cludes the possibility of imputing evil to individual human beings. In fact, it is Kant’s 
view that the origin of moral evil cannot be traced to any state which precedes the 
free exercise of the agent’s power of choice: whatever our ancestors may have cho-
sen, whatever the natural causes influencing us, our actions must be free from deter-
mination by external causes if we are to be morally responsible. The morally evil ef-                                                        
4 It is a familiar Kantian theme that, other things being equal – and within the bounds of mo-
rality – the fulfilment of inclination is part of what is good for us and part of what nature in-
tends for us. See, e.g. Rel 6:58.1-6.  
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fect under examination (the adoption of evil maxims) must be bound to its cause by 
the laws of freedom, in which case the ground of the morally evil exercise of choice 
must be sought, not in time, but in the representations of reason (Rel 6:39.15-41.26). 
We must take the human being to have fallen into evil from a state of innocence as 
the result of an original exercise of the power of choice, for only then can he be held 
responsible for the moral character of his actions.5  
Similarly, the ground of evil cannot be placed in the mere possession of natural incli-
nations inviting the adoption of non-moral ends. This is because it is in terms of this 
ground that we impute moral goodness or badness to a person, and nothing can be 
imputed if it is not the result of the use of his freedom. If the fundamental ground for 
our adoption of a particular maxim were a natural impulse, the exercise of our faculty 
of choice could be traced back to a determination through natural causes, and this too 
would contradict freedom and imputability (Rel 6:215-18). On Kant’s view, natural 
inclinations in and of themselves are no threat to the conformity of the will with the 
moral law, for the concept of moral evil applies to how we respond to our inherited 
drives.6 The ground of evil maxims must therefore consist in a ground of choice, and 
Kant explains this in terms of the enduring moral disposition (Gesinnung) of the hu-
                                                        
5 In addition, Kant emphasises that the adoption of evil maxims cannot be blamed on a cor-
ruption of morally legislative reason. If this were to occur, the human being would be a di-
abolical (teuflisch) being – an evil reason or an absolutely evil will, which for Kant is impos-
sible for us (Rel 6:35.20-26). It is hard to see how an agent whose morally legislative reason 
was corrupted in this way could genuinely count as a moral agent.  
6 As Allan Wood puts this idea, inclinations are necessary for choice, and so for evil, but 
they are not its source. See Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970) 
112.  
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man being – a disposition which, since it must be attributable in the strong sense re-
quired by moral responsibility, is itself a maxim (Rel 6:20.33).7  
As we saw in chapter three, because we are beings whose will contains a pure, legis-
lative power, duty is an incentive for us. Whenever inclination bids us transgress mo-
rality, we have available to us a sufficient motive for refraining from doing so, which 
finds its source not in nature but in the will’s own representation of universal law. As 
Kant puts this idea, the moral law imposes itself ‘irresistibly’ on even the one who 
transgresses it because of her moral predisposition, such that if no other incentive 
were present and working against the moral motive, she would be devoted to it as a 
wholly sufficient determination of her power of choice (Rel 6:36). Yet as a finite ra-
tional being, this agent is also dependent on the incentives of her sensuous nature, and 
so is necessarily devoted to their satisfaction (that is, to her happiness). We can thus 
think of the human being as possessing two fundamental practical commitments: on 
the one hand she is necessarily concerned with her own happiness; on the other, with 
acting on the demands of morality. To the degree that these two commitments are in-
eluctable, constituting two necessary implications of the human being’s mixed nature, 
we can think of them as combining to make up something along the lines of a basic 
practical outlook – an inescapable standpoint against which decisions about how it                                                         
7 The idea of a moral disposition is a concept which Kant takes to be relatively intuitive to 
his reader: as he notes in a reply to one of his critics, the distinction between virtus phae-
nomenon and virtus noumenon is both contained and understood (though in other words) in 
the most common teachings and sermons, such that even young children are able to distin-
guish a person’s facility in acting in conformity with duty from the possession of an under-
lying and constant disposition toward such actions from duty (Rel 6:14). This claim appears 
as a part of Kant’s reply to a critic who complained that the Religion would be of no use or 
concern at all to those who are not acquainted with his entire system (the editors of the Cam-
bridge translation to this work helpfully point out that this criticism appeared in the Neueste 
Kritische Nachrichten 29 [1793]: 225-29).  
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would be good to live are made.8 This is not to say that every particular choice actu-
ally satisfies each concern, but it is to say that particular choice necessarily reflects a 
decision about what to do with regards to the satisfaction of each, where both are in 
play. Human beings cannot fail to take into account both types of good when reckon-
ing what to do (where both types are relevant), but what they actually choose to do 
about the pressure exercised by each is not itself determined by this fact about our 
nature. 
Kant’s view on the proper relationship between these competing incentives is clear. 
Objectively speaking, morality has lexical priority over happiness. The goodness of 
happiness is conditional on the moral goodness of the relevant agent, since it becomes 
bad or evil if its pursuit conflicts with the requirements of morality. Different condi-
tionally good things can be measured against each other; I might, for instance, weigh 
up the goodness of satisfying my inclination for good health against my inclination 
for thrill seeking and find that the latter wins out over the former. Similarly, the real-
isation of happiness admits of degrees: a certain course of behaviour can be better or 
worse for me from the standpoint of prudence. Moral goodness, however, does not 
admit of degrees and actually blocks the value of conflicting options. It is incompar-
able, in this sense, and functions as a strict limit on the goodness of happiness to the 
extent that prudent action possesses genuine value only on the condition of my moral 
worth as an agent.9 Because of this, the moral law finds its rightful place far above 
                                                        
8 See KpV 5:25: ‘To be happy is necessarily the demand of every rational but finite being and 
therefore an unavoidable determining ground of its faculty of desire.’ See also G 4:414n, 
where Kant defines inclination as ‘[t]he dependence of the faculty of desire upon feelings.’  
9 See G 4:393, TP 8:283. 
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happiness on the table of kinds of value, and a well-ordered motivational disposition 
will reflect its lexical priority.  
When we say that a human being is evil, according to Kant, we mean that ‘he is con-
scious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) 
deviation from it’ (Rel 6:32.13-16).10 That is to say, we mean that he reverses the 
proper (or objective) order of the incentives furnished by morality and self-love re-
spectively, making the promotion of self-love the condition of morally acceptable ac-
tivity.11 Every morally relevant choice may be represented as reflecting an under-
lying sense of priority, and so as involving the subordination of one to the other ‘as 
its supreme condition’ (Rel 6:36.28). Yet when it comes to the evil human being,  
he makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the con-
dition of compliance with the moral law – whereas it is this latter 
that, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, 
should have been incorporated into the universal maxim of the 
power of choice as the sole incentive.’ (Rel 6:36.26-33)                                                         
10 For helpful discussions of Kant’s conception of evil character, see Allison, Kant’s Theory 
of Freedom ch. 8; Allen Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion ch. 6; Patrick Frierson, Freedom and 
Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy ch. 5; G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant’s Conception of 
Moral Character (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) esp. ch. 3; and Gordon E. 
Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) esp. chs. 2 
and 3. For a defence of Kant’s claim that the propensity to evil is possessed universally by 
human beings, see Seiriol Morgan, ‘The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity’s Radical Evil in 
Kant’s “Religion”,’ The Philosophical Review 114 (2005): 63-114. 
11 In his discussion of Gesinnung, Henry Allison suggests that we understand this notion in 
terms of ‘an underlying set of intentions, beliefs, interests, and so on’ (Kant’s Theory of 
Freedom 136), which together constitute a ‘pattern of willing’ (137). Rather than appealing to 
this cluster of terms, however, I suspect that it is more helpful to focus on the notion of a 
choice in which the two kinds of incentive which influence the mixed will are ordered and 
prioritised. A Gesinnung might well be a pattern of willing and an underlying set of interests 
in some sense, but it is primarily a prioritization of two competing incentives, with which the 
human being finds himself forced to contend.  
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A good maxim will be one in which the incentives of self-love are subordinated to the 
incentive of respect for the law – it will be one in which activity in conformity with 
the pursuit of happiness is undertaken only on the condition that it is morally permis-
sible. An evil maxim, by contrast, will reverse the relation of subordination, making 
the satisfaction of the moral law conditional on its relation to the promotion or pres-
ervation of happiness. A person’s fundamental maxim will thus express her most 
fundamental practical orientation: it will express her commitment either to the pri-
ority of morality or to the supremacy of self-love.12 For Kant, it is in this sense that a 
person’s fundamental maxim may be described as reflecting her character. 
5.2  Empirical and Intelligible Character 
As I suggested above, experience would seem to confirm that human beings are by 
nature good in some ways or parts, but evil in others. In any case, our common prac-
tices of moral discrimination, of praise and blame, generally presuppose that there are 
degrees of goodness and evil when it comes to the overall assessment of a person. Yet 
Kant makes clear that he wishes to exclude anything intermediate when it comes to 
the moral assessment of actions and character, and so to preclude the possibility of                                                         
12 In this way, as Henry Allison observes, the Kantian choice of Gesinnung differs from a 
Sartrean projet fondamental. To the extent that the moral disposition consists in a ranking of 
the incentives provided by pure reason and inclination, the idea of a good or evil disposition 
presupposes the dictates of Wille. See Kant’s Theory of Freedom 142-3. At this point, we 
might wonder whether there is room in Kant’s ethics for one-off morally good actions, even 
when they stem from a character that is morally bad. It seems natural to think, after all, that 
even the most heard-hearted scoundrel might have a moment of moral clarity, seeing what he 
morally must do and doing it because the moral law tells him to. This possibility will be ad-
dressed in §5.3. 
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moral characters which are morally good in some ways and evil in others, as well as 
those which are neither morally good nor evil (Rel 6:22.17-18). On his view, which 
he calls moral rigorism, there are only two types of moral character, the good and the 
evil. Although we may find comfort in the intermediate view, which allows us to as-
sure ourselves that there is some goodness in ourselves and those around us though 
we are evil in other ways, it ought to be rejected.  
The denial of the morally indifferent follows straightforwardly from an acceptance of 
the notion that the moral law is always an incentive for the free power of choice 
where duty is at stake. As Kant explains in a lengthy footnote in the Religion, if the 
moral law were not an incentive of the power of choice, the agreement of the latter 
with the moral law would be good and any disagreement a morally indifferent lack of 
goodness – an action which is not good, but not because of that evil. But in the hu-
man being the law is an incentive, and so any lack of agreement with the moral law is 
possible only as an active resistance on the part of Willkür to that law, which consti-
tutes, not a mere lack of good, but rather an antagonism to the good. As such, ‘be-
tween an evil and a good disposition (the inner principle of maxims) according to 
which the morality of an action must be judged, there is no intermediate position’ 
(Rel 6:22n). Where the moral law fails to determine a person’s free power of choice, 
an incentive from inclination must have influence. Yet because morally good choice 
is a possibility for us – because the moral law never fails to announce itself to the 
faculty of choice as supremely authoritative where morality is at stake and because it 
never fails to offer an incentive to compliance with it – the incorporation of a sensu-
ous incentive just is the incorporation of the deviation from the moral law into one’s 
maxim. It follows from this that a person’s disposition as regards the moral law can 
never be indifferent (neither good nor evil) (Rel 6:24.7-15).  
 
 
ON THE PURITY OF THE MORAL DISPOSITION  147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That human dispositions and actions cannot be conceived as good in some ways and 
evil in others is ensured, on Kant’s view, by the fact that a person’s underlying dispo-
sition must express one of only two relations of priority at the level of incentives. 
This relation of subordination is absolute and without qualification; the one value 
(morality or happiness) is made the condition of the pursuit of the other, and as such 
the attitude constituted by this ordering represents a commitment to the priority of 
either morality or self-love as the spirit in which one makes one’s choices. Precisely 
because this spirit is defined by an exclusive choice between two fundamental values 
or standpoints, each reflecting a basic element of our mixed nature, it grounds actions 
which are either good or evil, but never both.13  
This designation of only two fundamental orderings entails the surprising conclusion 
that it is actually morally evil (though perhaps in conformity with the letter of the 
law) to incorporate an incentive from self-love as sufficient motivation for action in 
accordance with duty. As Kant makes clear, his particular conception of a person’s 
being evil (böse) is a designation from the standpoint of morality rather than appear-
ances, and although the word evil may at first seem overly strong when applied to                                                         
13 As Kant points out in an illuminating footnote, it is quite fitting for the Christian tradition 
to represent the moral good (and its principle) as differing from the moral evil (and its princi-
ple of self-love), ‘not as heaven from earth, but as heaven from hell. This is indeed a figura-
tive representation and, as such, a stirring one, yet not any the less philosophically correct in 
meaning – For it serves to prevent us from thinking of good and evil, the realm of light and 
the realm of darkness, as bordering on each other and losing themselves into one another by 
gradual steps (of greater and lesser brightness); but rather to represent them as separated by 
an immeasurable gap. The total dissimilarity of the basic principles by which one can be sub-
ject to either one or the other of these two realms, and also the danger associated with the il-
lusion of a close relationship between the characteristics that qualify somebody for one or the 
other, justify this form of representation which, though containing an element of horror, is 
nonetheless sublime’ (Rel 6:60 n). 
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cases of dutiful action from inclination, it designates a kind of moral failure which, 
according to Kant, even small children are able to recognise as sin: an orientation of 
spirit which at base places morality below self-love. Kant explains his position as 
follows:  
[W]henever incentives other than the law itself (e.g. ambition, 
self-love in general, yes, even a kindly instinct such as sympathy) 
are necessary to determine the power of choice to lawful actions, it 
is purely accidental that these actions agree with the law, for the 
incentives might equally well incite its violation. The maxim, by 
the goodness of which all the moral worth of the person must be 
assessed, is therefore still contrary to law, and the human being, 
despite all his good actions, is nevertheless evil. 
(Rel 6:30.34-31.5)14 
 
Thus while an externally well-behaved human being and a morally good human being 
will betray no difference at the level of the agreement of their actions with the moral 
law, a fundamental difference lies in the fact that the actions of the former do not al-
ways have (or perhaps ever have) the law as their sole and supreme incentive, 
‘whereas those of the latter always do’ (Rel 6:30.28-29).    
In a footnote commenting on certain ancient philosophers, Kant suggests that they 
were right to believe both that virtue cannot be learned and that it is unitary.15 If vir-
tue could be taught and learned, this would imply that the human being in its nature is 
indifferent to virtue and vice, which as we have seen must be denied if we are to 
make room for the possibility of autonomy. Similarly, to deny the unity of the virtues 
would allow for the thought that human beings can be good in some parts but bad in                                                         
14 By appealing to the idea of ‘good actions,’ here, Kant must be referring to actions that ap-
pear to be good, or that conform to the moral law in their outward nature.  
15 Rel 6:24n. It is not made clear who, exactly, Kant is referring to here when he speaks of 
the ‘ancient moral philosophers.’  
 
 
ON THE PURITY OF THE MORAL DISPOSITION  149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
others. These philosophers were right to hold these positions because they were con-
sidering virtue in itself, in the idea of reason. Yet Kant is also careful to note that if 
we wish to pass moral judgement on the human being as she appears in nature, and so 
as experience allows us to understand something about her, we are licensed to deny 
these ancient tenets. The person as appearance is to be judged according to empirical 
standards, by a human judge, and ‘not by the scales of pure reason (before a divine 
court of justice)’ (Rel 6:24n), and what this distinction allows for is a potential soft-
ening of the ascription of evil at the level of Gesinnung. Where an agent may be 
called evil when judged by the scales of pure reason, human judges must pronounce 
their own verdict, though it is made according to different (empirical) standards. The 
principle of the exclusion of a mean between good and evil must be the basis of one 
level of moral evaluation (in the end, that which genuinely deserves to be called mo-
ral), whereas it need not be seen to apply at the level of empirical judgement, which 
involves the discrimination of empirical deeds (actual doings or not doings). At the 
level of appearances, we find both ‘a negative mean of indifference prior to all educa-
tion’ and a positive mean – ‘a mixture of being partly good and partly evil.’ This 
second judgement, however, ‘concerns only human morality as appearance, and in a 
final judgement must be subordinated to the first’ (Rel 6:39n).16 
                                                        
16 ‘Morality as appearance’ is something that we do not find in Kant’s earlier works. His use 
of the term in the Religion would suggest that he is moving toward the allowance of some-
thing like a phenomenal morality (perhaps a small-m ‘morality’ as opposed to the capital-m 
‘Morality’ with which he is concerned in the Groundwork and the second Critique). His use 
of this idea in his later works might, on the other hand, simply be a way of accommodating 
how people speak (‘his actions might be good, but ooh, what a bad man he is!’) and of ap-
pealing to an idea which is engrained in the common understanding, even though there is, 
strictly speaking, no room for morality as appearance in his theory.  
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Upbringing and habituation can save empirical character, but they cannot by them-
selves save intelligible character. Here, Kant quite importantly points out the element 
of moral luck involved in the acquisition of empirical character – an element which is 
expressly and just as importantly denied when it comes to the free will, which selects 
for itself an intelligible disposition. People who act in accordance with the moral law 
but who do not consult that law or allow it to count the most in the selection of their 
maxims only luckily slip by the evil consequences which might well have accompa-
nied their choices had circumstances been different. Such people often enjoy a meas-
ure of peace of mind and fancy themselves blameless in comparison to those who are 
not so lucky, although they do so, according to Kant, without asking whether the 
credit is perhaps better given to good luck or whether their underlying attitude would 
have just as easily led them to similar (empirical) vices, ‘had they not been kept away 
from them by impotence, temperament, upbringing, and tempting circumstances of 
time and place (things which, one and all, cannot be imputed to us)’ (Rel 6:38.12-23). 
Intelligible character will express itself in the world in different ways, depending on 
factors such as these, and although on the whole we call a human being morally good 
because of how his character appears to us as an expression in this world, we ought 
not to lose sight of the fact that the appearance of character can only provide a means 
for the all-too-fallible inference of a certain kind of intelligible disposition. Empirical 
virtue requires the cooperation of stepmotherly nature, yet genuine moral virtue must 
be freely chosen by the will on its own. To ascribe empirical virtue is thus to point 
out a particular kind of good fortune, while to ascribe good intelligible character is to 
suppose that the agent’s apparently good actions express a purity of disposition which 
wholly transcends fortune’s grasp. We often forget the significance of luck at the 
earthly level, especially when it comes to our own apparently good actions. Yet one 
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of our first and most significant lessons as human beings lies in the teaching that 
genuine moral discrimination concerns not the world, but the heart.17  
It is important to note that one consequence of Kant’s view on this matter is that a 
person’s fundamental moral identity – the inner disposition which grounds her adop-
tion of maxims and which distinguishes her as possessing a certain sort of intelligible 
character – is not to be confused with how she sees herself when reflecting on the 
empirical expression of her choices. Nor are we to think of good intelligible character 
as inferable from the presence of peace of mind or the absence of a guilty conscience. 
Kant does in fact think that immoral action results in condemnation by the inner 
judge, from which we might run but can never fully escape, but he also acknowledges 
the complex ways, almost always involving self-deception, in which we can silence 
this voice at the level of consciousness.18 How we fancy ourselves as moral agents 
                                                        
17 As Henry Allison notes, this talk of empirical and intelligible character – along with the 
requirement that Gesinnung must be freely chosen in an intelligible act – does seem to sug-
gest a commitment to a conception of ‘a merely intelligible subject that creates its own char-
acter, together with its phenomenal manifestations, through an unconditional timeless ac-
tivity’ (Kant’s Theory of Freedom 138). In the end, however, Allison endorses a reading of 
Kant whereby his references to ‘intelligible character’ and ‘causality as noumenon’ are part 
of a conceptual claim about how human beings must take themselves if they are to hold 
themselves morally responsible rather than a metaphysical explanation. It is a claim, that is, 
‘which is grounded in a reflection of the conditions of the possibility of imputation’ (144). I 
am not sure that this move is the right one to make, but since this is not the place for a 
full-fledged discussion of Kant’s metaphysical ambitions, I must put this question to the side.  
18 At G 4:404, Kant describes the common understanding as engaging in ‘quibbling tricks’ 
with conscience. In the second Critique, Kant emphasises conscience’s ultimate upper hand 
in the matter: ‘A human being may use what art he will to paint some unlawful conduct he 
remembers as an unintentional fault … and to declare himself innocent of it; he nevertheless 
finds that the advocate who speaks in his favour can by no means reduce to silence the pros-
ecutor within him, if only he is aware that at the time he did this wrong he was in his senses, 
that is, had the use of his freedom; and while he explains his misconduct by certain bad habits 
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tells us nothing about who we really are and about the orientation of our fundamental 
maxim. That image of moral goodness with which we might identify on 
self-examination can differ quite dramatically from the moral identity chosen by our 
free power of choice, and while the ascription of empirical virtue makes up a large 
part of the practice of morality in everyday human life, we ought not to fool ourselves 
when it comes to its relation to what really matters from the standpoint of God and 
pure reason.  
5.3  Conditioned Goodness 
Up to this point, I have been explaining how Kant’s rigorism flows naturally from the 
idea that human beings have at their disposal two types of incentive to action and that 
moral character depends on adopting a fundamental orientation toward their relation. 
We might, however, question the latter of these background assumptions. In a paper 
on Kantian autonomy, for instance, Stephen Engstrom wonders whether Kant’s rig-
oristic division of character into good and evil might spring from a far too idealised 
conception of the finite rational agent. As he writes,  
[i]f agents are viewed as having rendered all of their specific 
maxims consistent with a single, unifying highest maxim in which 
some determinate, ordered relationship between the two abstract 
principles is worked out, then rigorism may seem quite plausible. 
But when our question is about the characters of actual human be-
ings, such idealisation seems out of place.’19                                                                                                                                                                
… yet this cannot protect him from the reproach and censure he casts upon himself’ (5:98). 
For related discussions of conscience, see also MdS 6:438-440 and VC 27:351.  
19 ‘Conditioned Autonomy.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1988): 443.  
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According to Engstrom’s criticism, it is rarely the case that human beings are alto-
gether committed either to morality or to self-love. His central example is that of a 
man who refrains from telling a lie on a certain number of occasions, though he 
would not have done so had the circumstances been relevantly different – if, in par-
ticular, the cost to himself had been much higher. The point of his illustration is to 
show that even though in situations of moderate difficulty this man acts honestly – 
and does so because he thinks that deception runs against the moral law – his motive 
in so acting is nevertheless not purely moral in Kant’s sense. When he views the 
possibility of practicing deception in the abstract, he is able to see that it is morally 
unacceptable. Yet where he finds himself in a situation where deception would allow 
for him to avert a personal tragedy, he deceives. Because of this, we can see that he 
has not made morality a necessary condition of his adopting his maxim: ‘though in 
ordinary circumstances his actions are in accordance with duty, he nevertheless does 
not act for the sake of duty.’20 The man is not wholly ‘wedded’ to self-love, but nei-
ther does he make morality a supreme condition of his pursuit of self-interest. Indeed, 
what we seem to find lacking in this case is any sense of a clear-cut and fundamental 
maxim ranking the one over the other.  
In light of the intuitive plausibility of his example, Engstrom’s proposed alternative is 
a picture in which evil and goodness do not exhaust our options when it comes to 
character. As he puts his view, to deny that an agent is completely good is not to as-
sert that happiness is a necessary condition of his conduct, ‘but only that morality is 
not.’ Similarly, to deny that an agent is completely evil ‘is not to assert that morality 
                                                        
20 ‘Conditioned Autonomy’ 445.  
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is a necessary condition,’ but only ‘that happiness is not.’21 Yet to say this is to make 
room for an intermediate option when it comes to moral character, for what we might 
now say is that there are some agents who commit neither to morality nor to happi-
ness as supreme conditions for choice. Unlike the completely good agent, those 
agents are not wholly wedded to morality; unlike the completely bad agent, they are 
not wholly wedded to happiness. Rather, they are moved both by duty and by happi-
ness and so are attached imperfectly – though we need not suppose in equal measure 
– to each.22  
Engstrom’s alternative is intriguing, particularly to the extent that, if tenable, it would 
seem to provide us with a way of escaping the rigorism which threatens the accept-
ability of Kantian ethics in light of our common intuitions. Attention to how this al-
ternative is spelled out, however, reveals quite interesting difficulties.  
Let us look again at the case of the generally honest man. According to Engstrom’s 
explanation, this man is not purely good; were he pressed by severe financial need, he 
would choose to act dishonestly. In his ordinary dealings, he remains honest and de-
pendable, and his honesty extends to situations of even moderate difficulty. That is to 
say, he does make some sacrifices from the standpoint of happiness because he 
chooses not to deceive, and so at times transgresses the recommendations of pru-
dence. Yet when he rejects dishonesty in such cases, he does so on moral principle, 
                                                        
21 ‘Conditioned Autonomy’ 448. 
22 ‘Conditioned Autonomy’ 448.  
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and so reveals that his choice is not conditioned by the principle of prudence. Were 
the risk to his well-being more grave, he would choose to deceive.23  
It is important to ask about the kind of principle that the generally-but-not-perfectly 
honest man adopts when he does choose to tell the truth against the bidding of pru-
dence. On Engstrom’s account, this is not to be understood as a principle of self-love, 
but nor is it to be understood as a pure moral maxim in Kant’s strict sense of this no-
tion. That is to say, it is presumably meant to carry a certain degree of goodness, but 
not perfect goodness. But what, when all is said and done, is morally good about a 
maxim of this sort?  
On the orthodox Kantian view of things, we find a clear explanation of why a maxim 
which expresses a moral price or breaking point must be considered a 
through-and-through maxim of self-love, and so as grounded in an evil fundamental 
maxim. When it comes to such a maxim, it need not be the case that one’s sole reason 
for acting concerns the straightforward promotion of one’s happiness (in this case in 
particular, the idea is that one’s immediate happiness is put at risk by telling the 
truth). Nevertheless, what is striking about this maxim is that it betrays an underlying 
attitude which allows concerns stemming from self-love to have the ultimate say over                                                         
23 ‘Conditioned Autonomy’ 449. On Engstrom’s alternative, ‘autonomy’ is to be ascribed to 
wills for whom morality ‘has sufficient reality as a maxim,’ such that ‘personal happiness is 
limited or sacrificed where necessary for the sake of conformity with the requirements of 
duty.’ Autonomy is ‘conditioned,’ however, if this limitation is incomplete: ‘if temptations, 
fears, and the like are overcome, but only so long as the stakes are not too high.’ This occurs 
when there is a limit to the amount of pressure that the power of choice can withstand before 
it gives way to self-love, and so ought to be ascribed to those who, while generally honest 
and good in their day-to-day dealings, have their price in the manner described in the epi-
graph to this chapter. 
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whether the agent will be honest, and this is why it must count for Kant as immoral. 
As it happens, the agent’s concern for happiness is such that it allows a certain 
amount of happiness to be sacrificed before it demands that he deviate from the letter 
of the law. Yet the fact that there is a threshold of this sort lurking behind the appar-
ently honest action means that a fundamental prioritisation of a very certain sort can 
indeed be attributed to the agent (though it may never be consciously considered) and 
that this fundamental standpoint– the standpoint from which the ‘final say’ is pro-
nounced – is ultimately (although perhaps in a lenient way) concerned with conse-
quences for happiness.24  
It does not help us to say that the maxim which is allowed by the agent’s concern for 
his own happiness is a maxim of duty (although the underlying character behind it is 
not wholly good), for there are good reasons to think that this cannot be the case on 
Kant’s view. When an agent acts from duty, she acts on the basis of respect for the 
law, which involves not simply the idea that so acting is required by morality, but 
also, and most importantly, an appreciation of the supreme and unconditional auth-
ority of morality in relation to happiness. As Kant writes in the Groundwork, acting 
from duty is equivalent to acting from reverence for the law. Objects which are the 
effects of our actions can be the object of inclination, but never reverence, insofar as 
they are ‘merely an effect and not an activity of a will’ (4:400). While a state of af-
fairs might well come about as a contingent result of the activity of a will, reverence 
is reserved for that which properly and directly belongs to a will: its own activity. In                                                         
24 In this way, a fundamental maxim is implied in the agent’s choice – because she is au-
tonomous and the moral law is an incentive for her – even if it is not expressly adopted. It 
would certainly count as an ‘idealistic’ view of the moral agent to suppose that the latter must 
be the case, but the former idea is much less likely to raise this concern. 
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addition, however, reverence is described by Kant as an attitude which is reserved for 
that which one takes to exclude inclination (4:400). As he writes, it signifies con-
sciousness of a very special kind of worth: ‘a worth that infringes upon my self-love’ 
(4:402n) and that far outweighs any worth claimed by happiness.25 Because rever-
ence consists in the recognition and affirmation of the incomparable worth of the 
moral law in comparison to happiness, Kant describes action from duty as involving 
the absolute exclusion of inclination in deliberation. In action from duty, he writes, 
one ‘puts aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the 
will’ (4:400), such that it is the pure thought of duty alone which determines the will 
to action.  
Our ability to see anything good in the agent who tells the truth when the price is not 
too high depends on our being able to see at least that instance of truthfulness as be-
ing done from duty. Yet as the above shows, this in turn depends on our being able to 
view his situation as one in which the influence of inclination on his decision is com-
pletely put aside. Can we do this? On the face of things, this seems doubtful. Though 
we need not construe this as a case where the agent acts from an immediate sense that 
truthfulness will bring him happiness, it is natural to think that inclination does have a 
very important influence on his choice, for it is central to this example that if the price 
of being truthful had been just high enough, the agent would have resorted to decep-
tion instead. To the degree that the almost-perfectly-good agent in our example has                                                         
25 See also 4:403: ‘Although I do not yet see what this respect is based upon (this the phi-
losopher may investigate), I at least understand this much: that it is an estimation of a worth 
that far outweighs any worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of 
my action from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every 
other motive must give way because it is the condition of a will good in itself, the worth of 
which surpasses all else.’ This theme is continued in the second Critique (see 5:72-78). 
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his price, he allows considerations that have to do with his happiness (‘would this 
cause catastrophic damage to my well-being?’) to function as an ultimate limiting 
condition on his truthfulness. Yet to the degree that he allows this, he allows inclina-
tion to influence his will in a way that would seem to be incompatible with acting 
from duty in the specific sense outlined above.26  
If a person puts any price on morality, though he might at some level appreciate good 
actions and the examples of virtue he encounters, he does not accord them the status 
that they ought to have, which is, as Kant puts it, beyond price. To put a price on mo-
rality is in effect to assign a price to oneself: a point at which one can be bought off. 
Take, for example, Kant’s description of the gallows case in the second Critique.27 
The situation here is one where we are asked to imagine someone who asserts that he 
cannot control his ‘lustful inclination’; would he find his inclination so irresistible 
were we to threaten him with a hanging should he satisfy it? We are meant to suppose 
the he would not. We are then asked to imagine whether, on pain of the same penalty, 
this person would not give false testimony against an innocent man. Here we are 
likely to be less certain about our answer, but what we can at least recognise is that 
the man who does not allow even loss of life to limit his commitment to doing the 
right thing possesses a kind of honour and self-mastery which, though achievable by 
each of us, is possibly very rare indeed. Were his price to be met when tempted with                                                         
26 An important question for Engstrom would thus concern the nature of this agent’s incen-
tive; for if it is not explainable as a species of reverence for the law, and if it is not self-love 
(as Engstrom maintains), then what could it be?  
27 See the bottom half of KpV 5:30. See also the example of Anne Boleyn at KpV 5: 155-6, 
where the thought is that our esteem for the virtuous agent who refuses all gifts and who suf-
fers all punishments is so high precisely because his virtue costs him so much, and not be-
cause of any benefit he receives.   
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the object of his inclination or with the sparing of his life, there would be a point at 
which he could be bought off, and so a point at which he could be manipulated by 
anyone in the position to pay the price he has put on himself.  
In defence of Engstrom’s alternative, it might be argued that what Kant really means 
to preclude in cases of action from duty is the direct influence of inclination on deci-
sion-making (as is the case when an agent tells the truth because doing so will di-
rectly promote her non-moral ends), rather than the indirect influence of happiness as 
an ultimate and distant limiting condition. If this is so, then we might be able to pre-
serve a sense in which the truthful man who has his price is still acting from duty 
when he tells the truth. On closer inspection, however, there is good reason to think 
that this cannot be the case on a recognisably Kantian approach to moral goodness. 
As we saw above, Kant allows for a kind of moral luck at the level of empirical char-
acter – the appearance of virtue or vice. He allows that there are all kinds of situa-
tions where a person who does not act from duty luckily avoids the evil consequences 
that might have resulted from his underlying maxim had the circumstances been dif-
ferent. Thus an underlying maxim of self-preservation might be fulfilled by the pur-
suit of all kinds of apparently noble actions (e.g. honesty, helpfulness, industrious-
ness); that such noble pursuits constitute the best means to self-preservation for a 
person, however, is determined completely by luck – by the fortuitous constitution of 
the universe – such that the connection between the motive of self-preservation and 
these pursuits is entirely contingent. On Kant’s account, a person who finds herself in 
lucky circumstances is likely to possess a peace of mind about her character, whereas 
she who is not so lucky, and whose circumstances are such that self-preservation 
recommends all kinds of apparently vicious wiles, is likely to be tormented by the 
inner judge. In the former case, however, it is clear to Kant that all credit must be 
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given to fortune rather than anything having to do with the agent’s will.28 Because 
genuine moral goodness must result from an act of freedom in Kant’s very strict 
sense, the lucky agent is far from good.  
If we look closely, we see that Kant’s insistence that morally good actions be done 
for the sake of duty hinges on this very concern about the contingent fit between cer-
tain motives and apparently praiseworthy kinds of action (actions that conform to 
duty). As he notes in the preface to the Groundwork,  
… in the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it 
conform with the moral law, but it must also be done for the sake 
of the law; without this, that conformity is only very contingent 
and precarious, since a ground that is not moral will indeed now 
and then produce actions in conformity with the law, but it will 
also often produce actions contrary to the law.  (4:390)  
Where the motive is not duty itself, a person’s maxim will be such that the con-
formity of his behaviour to duty is only accidental, ensured by the state of his cir-
cumstances and not by any necessary connection. It is in this sense that the honesty of 
Kant’s prudent shopkeeper does not evidence a good will, for had honesty not been 
the best policy in his particular case, his maxim of prudence would have committed 
him to some other, and perhaps more dubious, course of behaviour.29 Nor can Kant’s 
naturally sympathetic man be held as an example of moral goodness; had the circum-
stances dictated that sympathy was to be best served by acts contrary to duty, his 
maxim would have committed him to taking these sinister means. The connection 
between the agent’s benevolence – his conformity to duty – and his underlying mo-
                                                        
28 See again Rel 6:38. 
29 See G 4:397.  
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tive is entirely accidental.30 By contrast, in action from duty, it is no accident that the 
agent’s motive connects him to dutiful acts. Because the motive consists in reverence 
for the moral law itself and not some object to be achieved by compliance with it, it 
necessarily grounds actions which conform to duty. No cosmic cooperation is re-
quired in order for the match to be made, and thus the credit for compliance belongs 
entirely to the agent.  
What we see, then, is that action from duty is such that conformity to duty is no lucky 
accident. In the case of Engstrom’s truthful man, however, there is an important sense 
in which his conformity to law really is contingent in precisely the way that concerns 
Kant in his famous examples. Although Engstrom wishes to say that this character’s 
particular maxims possess some degree of moral worth when the stakes are not too 
high, in the end this man is simply lucky whenever this occurs. Whenever he per-
forms a dutiful action, it is a matter of fortune that the circumstances are not overly 
dire and that he need not sell himself for the price which is nonetheless set on his al-
legiance to duty. Just as fortune smiles on the prudent shopkeeper when honesty turns 
out to be the best policy, so too does it smile on the one who is not asked to sacrifice 
beyond his limit by complying with the moral law. Engstrom describes this man as 
acting on moral principle in this very case, and he thinks that because of this we can 
speak of his moral goodness as something which he possesses as a matter of degree. 
Yet to the extent that we agree with Kant and maintain that action from duty must 
                                                        
30 See G 4:398.  
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avoid accidental conformity to law, it cannot be the case that this man acts on moral 
principle, in this situation or in any one like it.31  
This is a criticism of Engstrom’s proposal, but it is also illustrative of the deep con-
nections in Kant’s thinking between moral worth, moral egalitarianism, and the rather 
peculiar conception of character outlined in §§5.1 and 5.2. The only way to ensure 
that dutiful action follows in a non-contingent way from the nature of an agent’s 
maxim, and so has moral worth, is to guarantee that she does not have a price. Where 
there is an upper limit to her commitment to morality, no matter how high, it is a con-
tingent fact that her number has not been called here and now, and so a contingent 
fact that her action has conformed to morality. Yet to say that an agent has no moral 
‘price’ is precisely to say that a fundamental attitude toward morality may be attrib-
uted to her as an implied practical commitment, such that she is unconditionally 
‘wed,’ to use Engstrom’s phrase, to the supremacy of the moral law. It is only if she 
possesses an underlying maxim of this sort, which subordinates the satisfaction of 
inclination to respect, that her action is non-contingently, and thus morally, good. Put 
differently, it is only if she possesses an underlying maxim of this sort that she may 
be described as having acted from duty in Kant’s specific sense. The possibility of 
moral worth in Kant’s sense thus implies the idea of a fundamental maxim, suggest-
ing that Kant’s conception of character is far from incidental to his moral philosophy.  
                                                        
31 In this sense, Kant must reject the possibility of what Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel 
have referred to as ‘circumstantial’ moral luck: the moral luck that affects the kinds of situa-
tions and problems one faces. See ‘Moral Luck.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 50 (1976): 115-135, 137-51.  
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5.4  Assessment and Luck 
Though Kant’s rigorism is deeply connected to his commitment to autonomy and to 
his conception of moral worth, many of his readers are liable to find this an unwel-
come result. Kant allows, as we have seen, that his view accommodates the appear-
ance of differing degrees of goodness, such that we cannot in fairness charge him 
with contradicting the evidence given by experience. Yet what his view does imply is 
that, in a very real sense, all good and all evil is as it were on par, for all cases reduce 
to the adoption of one of only two fundamental maxims. What this means is that, in 
one important sense, the general who leads the massacre of innocent villagers is 
really no worse, morally speaking, than the one who tells a lie to get out of trouble. 
Both are evil for what turns out at base to be just the same reason: they have adopted 
into their fundamental maxim the occasional deviation from duty in favour of 
self-love, such that any apparent moral difference between them can only be attrib-
uted to luck. Where one finds himself in a situation where his fundamental maxim is 
expressed by telling a lie, the other’s situation is such that his maxim finds its expres-
sion in a much more serious way (at least from the standpoint of wellbeing).  
This is not to say, however, that we cannot draw important distinctions about these 
characters at the level of what Kant comes in his later writings to call empirical char-
acter. Where we must deny a mean between good and evil character in the intellectual 
judgement of human beings, we may nonetheless apply this principle to the empirical 
judgement of humankind, based wholly on observation of their deeds. Thus Kant al-
lows that there is ‘a negative mean of indifference’ which applies to agents’ actions 
‘prior to all education’: to the degree that a person has not yet been exposed to the 
relevant empirical prompts and experiences, she is neither good nor bad. Equally, 
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there is a ‘positive’ mean, as when an agent’s character is judged to contain a mixture 
of good and evil (Rel 6:39.n). Yet in both cases the judgement concerns only ‘human 
morality as appearance’ – it must, as such, be subordinated to the intellectual judge-
ment of human beings, and so to the juridical judgement of ‘one who knows the 
heart’ (Rel 6:72).32   
As I suggested above, ‘human morality as appearance’ is a notion that does not find a 
place in Kant’s earlier ethical writings. Though there is much talk in the Groundwork 
and the second Critique of actions which merely accord with the moral law, judge-
ments of conformity are not properly moral in the strict sense which concerns Kant 
throughout these works. His continued mention of ‘empirical character’ and ‘morality 
as appearance’ in the Religion thus hints at the idea that he might have been willing to 
make room in his moral theory (though only slight, and ultimately subordinate room) 
for something like Engstrom’s suggestion of the possibility of intermediate moral 
character, and so for a level of moral evaluation beyond the strict scrutiny of hearts. 
With this said, however, Kant’s shift in language may in the end stem merely from an 
interest on his part in accommodating our everyday way of speaking about moral 
matters. Talk of empirical ‘morality,’ tied as closely as it is to mere outward con-
formity with the law, may be best read as representing a popular way of capturing 
what is at base a morally irrelevant phenomenon. Nevertheless, Kant’s repeated re-
turn to this notion in the Religion points at least to his recognition of the importance, 
in ordinary moral judgement, of this external axis of evaluation. Whilst his moral 
theory cannot allow for the genuinely moral significance of outward conformity, as                                                         
32 God is again described as fulfilling the role of ‘scrutiniser of hearts’ (via pure intellectual 
intuition) at Rel 6:67. Our own inability to ‘fathom the depths’ of the human heart is asserted 
at 6:63.  
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contingent as it is on circumstances, Kant seems at least to have allowed for the no-
tion that this level of judgement is something for which the everyday agent, in a mis-
placed and often self-serving way, shows a great deal of concern.33 
Whether or not Kant ultimately wished to leave space for a genuinely empirical level 
of morality, Engstrom’s alternative points to the fact that those who do ‘have their 
price’ are liable to differ in terms of the actual level at which they are willing to 
transgress the letter of the moral law. Where Kant might not in the end have found 
this morally interesting, many of us are likely to insist that this constitutes an import-
ant moral distinction: one connected to a particular form of strength and integrity. In 
this chapter, I hope only to have provided reasons for thinking that Engstrom’s 
non-rigoristic proposal conflicts fundamentally both with significant elements in 
Kant’s conception of autonomy and with the moral egalitarianism at the heart of his 
moral theory. Where §5.1 established a connection between the epistemologi-
cal-motivational element of autonomy and the idea of a supreme maxim, §5.2 ex-
plained why the endorsement of autonomy also leads to the view that there are only 
two types of fundamental character. The argument of §5.3 provides independent 
support for the necessity of Kant’s conception of character, in the sense that it relies 
not on an appeal to the apparatus of autonomy, but on the Kantian conception of mo-
ral worth. Because it rules out a strong and intuitive way of conceiving of a middle 
ground between complete goodness and complete evil at the level of character, it also 
provides independent support for Kant’s rigorism. 
                                                        
33 On the relationship between being satisfied with this level of evaluation and self-serving 
self-deception, see Rel 6:38.  
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Engstrom’s worry is, in part, that Kant’s conclusions about character and moral worth 
are in tension with experience, and so represent an unreasonable ideal against which 
few will measure favourably. Although I have been defending what I take to be the 
orthodox Kantian view against his alternative, it is nonetheless interesting to consider 
the degree to which Kant might have been concerned about our ability to develop a 
lasting, settled and comfortable commitment to morality, despite our obvious and 
natural attachment to the sensuous side of our nature. How might human beings, sad-
dled as they are to desire and to the propensity to make excuses for themselves, move 
beyond experiencing the moral law as a harsh and foreign inconvenience? How might 
they begin to develop a lasting attachment to the voice of pure reason and the inter-
ests to which it directs them? These questions set the agenda for chapter six.   
   
 
 
— 6 — 
MORAL IDENTITY 
 
 
 
As we noted in chapter one, certain of Kant’s followers objected to what they per-
ceived to be an unpalatable tyranny of reason and its law. Put simply, this worry 
hinges on the idea that there is a fundamental tension between the supposed freedom 
of the human being and its being subject to the dictate of reason.1 Though Kant lo-
cates the source of the moral law in the human being’s own will, this law does not 
stem from the self that we know or experience; rather, it finds its source in a mys-
terious, otherworldly, and utterly impersonal faculty, which imposes its law with 
unforgiving strictness. But if this is truly the Kantian picture – if the moral command 
finds its seat in some magisterial ‘higher self’ rather than my free choice – then what 
sense is there in the assertion that this self is mine? Is ‘autonomy’ anything more than 
a clever deception? 
 
                                                        
1 This tension is echoed by Hannah Arendt: ‘Does reason then command the will? In that 
case the will would no longer be free but would stand under the dictate of reason. Reason can 
only tell the will: this is good, in accordance with reason; if you wish to attain it you ought to 
act accordingly’ (‘Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,’ Responsibility and Judgement, ed. 
Jerome Kohn [New York: Schocken Books, 2003] 71). Note that this comment would seem 
to assume that a command actually compels.  
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This strand of concern is deeply connected to a related worry, alluded to in previous 
chapters, about the possibility of developing a lasting and settled commitment to mo-
rality in the face of the obstacles afforded by our sensuous nature. Kant accepts that 
we tend to feel most at home with the affective side of our being – that we are pow-
erfully and inescapably concerned with the satisfaction of our desires. When accepted 
in conjunction with the idea that we are likely to experience the moral law as a 
tyrannical injunction to self-denial, however, it becomes relevant to ask how we 
might find it within us to form a thorough and sincere attachment to the moral path in 
the face of life’s many obstacles. How is the deep-seated moral hesitation and 
self-deception which so plagues finite rational beings to be overcome?  
I have attempted thus far to show that we have good reason to embrace many species 
of Kant’s strictness and rigorism, given a commitment to the categoricity of the moral 
law and to autonomy. To the degree that we are genuinely attached to the latter and 
accept that we are both sensuous and moral beings, we cannot coherently object to the 
features we have been examining. This, indeed, is just one of Kant’s most central 
points. The moral law and the principle of happiness point to two radically different 
practical options, and there is no midpoint between them. Yet with this acknow-
ledged, my aim in this chapter is to bring us back to the objections identified at the 
beginning of this thesis and to consider whether the Kantian might, after all, be able 
to offer solace to those who advance them beyond pointing out that his system re-
quires it. My central questions will thus concern whether we have any reason to think 
that Kant was concerned about the apparent despotic character of reason in his ethical 
theory and, perhaps more importantly, whether there are resources in his writings 
which might allow us to address this worry on its own terms. 
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I hope to show that there is indeed scope within Kant’s ethical thinking for treating 
this concern seriously. In particular, I will be suggesting that attention to Kant’s writ-
ings on moral education yields an interesting and subtle picture of the means by 
which human beings might experience a fundamental shift in their 
self-understandings, and so to identify the voice of pure reason as that of their own 
best self rather than a foreign commanding power. What we find in this area of 
Kant’s writing is the thought that coming to grasp the awesome and utterly unique 
nature of the moral law is actually transformative of self-understanding, such that the 
experienced foreignness of its source is not inevitable. Rather than shaping his con-
ception of the source and nature of the moral law to fit the self-conceptions and at-
tachments of the common human being as they are, Kant supposes that it is our re-
sponsibility to develop our self-understandings in accordance with what his trans-
cendental arguments have shown morality to be like. What is more, however, I will 
argue that this is precisely the fit we should maintain in developing a truly normative 
and prescriptive Kantian moral philosophy. Given that the self-understandings of av-
erage human agents might not accurately represent what and who we are capable of 
being – given that identity can be highly distorted and limiting – any moral theory 
that insists on coherence with our settled sense of self as a condition of adequacy for 
its central tenets is bound to be unacceptably passive.2 Kant’s theoretical starting 
point is not the question of who we happen to think we are, but rather what we think 
we ought to do and to become. To the degree that this is so, the aim is first to deter-
mine the a priori principles on which genuinely moral action might be grounded, al-
                                                        
2 This kind of concern about passivity and a lapse into descriptive ethics is voiced by Bar-
bara Herman in ‘Responsibility and Moral Competence’ (Moral Literacy 92), where she 
criticises the trend of deriving our conception of what a person could have reason to do from 
a conception of the ‘however-formed’ adult, with her given dispositions and motivations.  
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lowing this discovery, in the end, to tell us something significant about the capacities 
we share, the dispositions we might develop, and the kinds of beings we essentially 
are. As I hope to show, Kant is indeed concerned about the possibility of feeling at 
one with the voice of pure reason – of experiencing autonomy as self-legislation. 
What he rightly refuses to do, however, is to privilege the attachments and identities 
we might happen to have formed as human beings and to adjust his supreme principle 
to that with which they allow us to be comfortable. 
6.1  The Tyranny of Reason  
At various points in his moral philosophy, Kant’s language straightforwardly con-
firms the role of pure reason as a compelling, confrontational force. In Chapter III of 
the second Critique, for example, the formation of a moral maxim is presented as 
presupposing a need to be ‘impelled to activity’ by some power because of the oppo-
sition provided by inclination (5:79). In effect, this opposition accounts for the im-
peratival form of the moral law; it is because we do not possess a holy will from 
which moral action would proceed analytically, but rather a mixed will, affected by 
needs and sensuous motives, that our relation to the moral law is one of dependence 
and constraint (5:32). While the human will is not necessarily ‘obedient’ when it 
comes to the moral law, obedience is demanded of it.    
Similar passages emphasising the centrality of notions such as command, obedience, 
dependence, submission, and constraint can be found throughout Kant’s ethical writ-
ings, a particularly clear example of which is to be found in his discussion of the na-
ture of reverence for the law: 
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There is something so singular in the boundless esteem for the 
pure moral law stripped of all advantage – as practical reason, 
whose voice makes even the boldest evildoer tremble and forces 
him to hide from its sight, presents it to us for obedience – that 
one cannot wonder at finding this influence of a mere intellectual 
idea on feeling quite impenetrable for speculative reason and at 
having to be satisfied that one can yet see a priori this much: that 
such a feeling is inseparably connected with the representation of 
the moral law in every finite rational being.  (KpV 5:79-80)  
Passages such as this evince Kant’s rhetorical flair, and we must be cautious in at-
tempting too literal a reading of reason’s commanding power. Nevertheless, Kant’s 
appeal to the terrifying power of pure reason may prompt us to wonder whether he 
avoids the spectre of natural necessity only to saddle himself with a version of moral 
tyranny. 
Far from constituting a novel observation, the charge of moral tyranny can be traced 
back to criticisms made of Kant’s moral philosophy by thinkers who were more or 
less his contemporaries. Hegel’s ‘Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate’ (1798-1799), for 
instance, uses imagery of just this sort when considering Kant’s ethical project. This 
work begins with a criticism of the self-alienation at the heart of the Hebrew religion, 
which Hegel compares to Kantian morality. Between those who are subject to posi-
tive religion and the Kantian agent, he writes, ‘the difference is not that the former 
make themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but that the former have their lord 
outside themselves, while the latter carries his lord in himself, yet at the same time is 
his own slave.’3 Far from embodying the idea of harmonious self-expression, au-                                                        
3 In On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, trans T. M Knox (New York: Harper, 
1961) 211. For the original German, see ‘Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal,’ 
Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Herman Nohl (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1907) 266. 
Quoted in Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 185; and Allen Wood, ‘The Emptiness 
of the Moral Will,’ The Monist 72 (1989): 457. 
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tonomy is described in this work as involving a tyranny of the rational over the sen-
suous part of the self.4 The Kantian moral law is not a law legislated by the whole 
self, but is rather the a priori law of a supersensible self, which imposes its rule on 
the baser elements of the will without regard to their habits or tendencies. As such, 
the charge is that the Kantian doctrine of autonomy internalises moral bondage rather 
than abolishing it, gilded in the rhetoric of freedom though it may be.5  
Prior to Hegel’s criticism, Friedrich Schiller identified in a strikingly similar way 
what he took to be an unduly harsh picture of the moral life in Kant’s ethics. Schil-
ler’s most famous criticism of Kant is contained in his epigram on the ‘scruples of 
conscience,’ where the focus is Kant’s thoughts on moral worth.6 In addition, how-                                                        
4 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 185. 
5 This criticism is articulated in Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought 128-29.  
6 It is a matter of controversy whether this epigram represents a genuine attack on Kant’s 
moral philosophy or a parody of those who criticise it. For helpful discussions on Kant and 
Schiller, see Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Com-
mentary 152-54, Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought 28-9, H. J. Paton, The Categorical 
Imperative 48-50, Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 180-84, and Marcia Baron, 
‘Acting from Duty,’ Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Allen Wood (Bing-
hamton, NY: Yale University Press, 2002) 92. The translation runs as follows:  
 Scruples of Conscience  
Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with inclination. 
And thus I am frequently nagged by my lack of virtue.  
 Decision  
There is no other advice, thou must seek to despise them,  
And do with disgust what thy duty commands.  
This translation is provided by Jens Timmermann (Kant’s Groundwork: A Commentary 152). 
The original German reads: ‘Gewissensskrupel / Gerne dien ich den Freunden, doch tu ich es 
leider mit Neigung / Und so wurmt es mir oft, daß ich nicht tugendhaft bin. // Decisum / Da ist 
kein anderer Rat, du mußt suchen, sie zu verachten. / Und mit Abscheu alsdann tun, wie die 
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ever, an important and lesser-known challenge to Kantian autonomy is also devel-
oped in the essay, ‘On Grace and Dignity,’ written in 1793.7 Schiller’s comments in 
this text are most likely directed at Kant’s mode of representation rather than the sub-
stance of his doctrine;8 whilst he expresses a basic agreement with Kant when it 
comes to the shortcomings of eudaimonism, he nonetheless complains that, because 
of Kant’s extreme rhetoric – in particular, because of the imperatival form which he 
insists on giving the moral law – he creates the impression that the principle of mo-
rality is a ‘foreign’ law, through which reason tyrannises over an oppressed sensuous 
side of the self. As Schiller writes, where the moral weakling (Weichling) relaxes the 
moral law and grounds it in pleasure, Kant seems to have exaggerated its harshness, 
causing the fulfilment of duty to be interpreted by the great number of his readers as 
little more than a laudable form of servitude.9 As a result of the harshness of Kant’s 
presentation and the strictness with which he separates the will’s two fundamental 
interests, the supreme principle of morality was bound to take on the appearance of a                                                                                                                                                               
Pflicht dir gebeut.’ (Friedrich Schiller, Werke, vol. I, ed. Julius Peterson and Friedrich 
Beißner [Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1943] 357).  
7 For much of this discussion I am indebted to Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 
180-84.  
8 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 180. It is not entirely clear whether Schiller’s concep-
tion of grace (developed in this essay) is meant to constitute a criticism of Kant’s conception 
of moral worth. There are many significant passages in Schiller’s text which indicate that he 
agreed with Kant on the idea that moral worth must concern only the agent’s principle of ac-
tion, adding only that we ought to ask more of the moral agent. For more on this interpreta-
tion, see Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom 352. 
9 Über Anmut und Würde 219.28-220.12. Presumably, the reference to the ‘moral weakling’ 
here is directed at the Epicurean (this is, indeed, how some translate ‘Weichling’ in this con-
text). The relevant German reads as follows: ‘Weil der moralische Weichling dem Gesets der 
Vernunft gern eine Laxität geben möchte, die es zum Spielwerk seiner Konvenienz macht, 
mußte ihm darum eine Rigidität beigelegt werden, die die kraftvollste Äußerung moralischer 
Freiheit nur in eine rühmlichere Art von Knechtschaft verwandelt?’ 
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foreign (fremden) and positive law,10 inherently opposed to and in conflict with our 
sensuous nature, and so incapable of participating in a harmony of the self.  
According to Schiller, ‘Kant was the Draco of his age, because the latter seemed to 
him to be not yet worthy of a Solon.’11 Thus he explains the harsh imperatival tone 
given to the moral law as a consequence of Kant’s concern radically to discredit and 
to distance himself from moral theories which ground the moral law in the principle 
of happiness. Kant’s theory can indeed be saved from the charge of tyranny with its 
central tenets intact, on Schiller’s view, but only in the wake of a careful elision of 
the strict separation of the rational and the sensuous which so deeply characterises his 
ethical works.  
6.2  Confronting the Moral Law 
At first glance, the above criticisms may seem imprecise. As we saw in chapters four 
and five, Kant does not hold that pure reason commands anything at all to our 
sensuous nature per se, and nowhere in his ethics do we encounter the idea that pure 
reason is meant to keep inclination in check in any direct fashion. Indeed, pure reason 
has nothing at all to say to our inclinations as they are, but speaks only to the faculty 
of choice, representing the moral law to this power when the latter has been prompted                                                         
10 Über Anmut und Würde 219.28-220.12. 
11 Über Anmut und Würde 219.16-23. As has been frequently noted, Schiller’s ethical 
thought can be thought of as an apology of sorts for Kant’s harsh presentation. He thus took it 
upon himself to correct this harsh picture of morality by emphasising the role in the moral 
life for the sensuous side of human nature. For Schiller, the best soul is one in which reason 
and inclination exist in perfect harmony, directed toward the same end. Where this harmony 
is present, we have a ‘beautiful soul’ (schöne Seele). See 221. 4-223.31. 
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choice, representing the moral law to this power when the latter has been prompted 
by inclination to pursue a certain practical option. What the pure will or the legisla-
tive faculty forbears and keeps in check, then, is a tendency on the part of the faculty 
of choice to grant priority to the prompting of inclination, and so to adopt the princi-
ple of happiness.  
This notion is spelled out quite clearly in Kant’s discussion of ancient Stoicism in the 
Religion.12 According to Kant, these ‘valiant men’ quite mistook their enemy when 
they identified the natural inclinations as being morally dangerous. If they can be 
faulted at all, inclinations merely lack discipline, presenting themselves to the will yet 
only ever affecting the faculty of choice, never determining it. Considered in them-
selves, they are not at all reprehensible, and to wish to be rid of them ‘would not only 
be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well’ (6:58). Instead, what they require is 
conditioning, organisation and harmonisation, whether this occurs by reasoning from 
prudence or morality: 
Thus when the Stoic thought of the human moral battle simply as 
a human being’s struggle with his inclination, so far as these (in-
nocent in themselves) must be overcome as obstacles in the com-
pliance to his duty, he could locate the cause of the transgression 
only in the omission to combat them, since he did not assume any 
special positive principle (evil in himself) …  (6:59)  
The true opponent of goodness, with whom reason must stand in combat, is not the 
inclinations or our sensuous nature per se, but rather an underlying practical princi-
ple: the propensity to give favour to inclination over the moral law, which finds its 
source in the faculty of choice alone. As such, if the above criticisms are to be made 
more precise and more fitting to Kant’s theory, they must represent the relevant                                                         
12 See 6:57-59.  
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‘slave of reason’ as a faculty of choice which is fundamentally attached to the satis-
faction of needs stemming from the human being’s sensuous nature. Only in this way 
can the criticism fit with Kant’s theory of practical reasoning and practical freedom.  
Let us suppose, then, that such an amendment may be made. Like Schiller, we might 
wish to reserve this kind of criticism for Kant’s mode of presentation when it comes 
to the moral law. Quite interestingly, however, a number of passages in Kant’s texts 
would seem to suggest that a momentary experience of strangeness and alienation – 
of being inescapably subject to a law which finds its source in a place we cannot 
know – really is part and parcel of common moral experience. Consciousness of the 
moral law is described by Kant as ‘forcing itself upon’ our faculty of choice: as aris-
ing from an active force of pure reason ‘by which it announces itself as originally 
lawgiving’ (KpV 5:31). This consciousness is, in addition, ‘absolutely inexplicable 
from any data of the sensible world and from the whole compass of our theoretical 
use of reason’; we cannot trace it to the world of experience or to our nature as it ap-
pears to us, but rather are directed by means of this consciousness to a world that is 
altogether different from that which we experience with the senses (a ‘pure world of 
the understanding’) (KpV 5:43).13 That there is an active and invisible ‘something 
else’ lurking behind the objects of the senses is a conclusion that can be found in even                                                         
13 As Kant goes on to explain, theoretical reason cannot sustain speculation that reaches be-
yond experience (see, e.g. KrV A 244/ B 303), such that consciousness of the moral law 
points to a belief in something – perhaps even a fundamental aspect of the self – the existence 
of which cannot be proven theoretically. In the Groundwork, this connection is depicted as 
one half of a threatening circle in the argument of Section III: ‘For we now see that when we 
think of ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members 
of it and cognize autonomy of the will along with its consequence, morality; but if we think 
of ourselves as put under obligation [als verpflichtet] we regard ourselves as belonging to the 
world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of understanding’ (4:453).   
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the most common understanding (though due to our attachment to the sensuous we 
continually spoil this train of thought, and our chances to be wiser, by representing 
the invisible as an object of intuition) (G 4:451-52). Though we do not experience 
ourselves as members of the intelligible realm, it is because we are conscious of our-
selves as bound by the categorical imperative that we count ourselves as members of 
an intelligible, supernatural realm subject to its very own laws. 
Despite this appeal to a genuine sense of otherness in the experience of duty, Kant 
seems to have thought that this sense of the otherworldly, of the foreignness of the 
moral law to our sensuous nature, need not – indeed, ought not – bring with it feel-
ings of being unpalatably enslaved by reason. As he writes in a response to Schiller’s 
essay, we must of course portray the concept of duty as being concerned with uncon-
ditional necessity; as Kant readily admits, he is ‘unable to associate gracefulness with 
the concept of duty by reason of its very dignity.’ Yet with this said, he also holds the 
following: 
[I]f we ask, ‘What is the aesthetic constitution, the temperament so 
to speak of virtue: is it courageous and hence joyous, or weighed 
down by fear and repressed?’ an answer is hardly necessary. The 
latter slavish frame of mind can never be found without a hidden 
hatred of the law, whereas a heart joyous in the compliance with 
its duty (not just complacency in the recognition of it) is the sign 
of genuineness in virtuous disposition ... (Rel 6:23-24.n) 
Thus while Kant denies that the concept of duty can be connected with grace and that 
any sentiment can be a worthy motive for the performance of duty, he clearly allows 
that a general attitude of feeling anxious and repressed by duty indicates a lack of 
genuine commitment to morality. This is not to say that the human being does not 
experience duty as a genuine constraint on her actions. To deny this would be to deny 
the necessitating property of pure reason’s law. Rather, Kant distinguishes the kind of 
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constraint experienced by the agent who is properly committed to the moral law from 
that of the agent who has inwardly rejected the maxim of duty. Where the former ex-
periences constraint without repression, the latter faces the moral law with a telling 
anxiety and dejection. Though it may be rare, a virtuous disposition will be manifest 
in a heart which is joyous.  
We encounter a similar conjunction of otherworldliness and joyous elevation in 
Kant’s many discussions on the moral feeling of reverence for the law. As is often 
noted, Kant initially characterises respect through the language of humiliation and 
pain. These strong feelings are a negative effect of the influence of practical reason, 
the result of pure reason’s infringement ‘upon the activity of the subject so far as in-
clinations are his determining grounds and hence upon the opinion of his personal 
worth’ (KpV 5:78). As Kant explains, 
[a]ll inclination and every sensible impulse is grounded on feeling, 
and the negative effect on feeling (through the check exercised on 
feelings) is itself a feeling. Consequently we can see a priori that 
the moral law as the determining ground of the will, since it works 
to the prejudice of all of our inclinations, must effect a feeling 
which can be called pain, and here we have the first, perhaps also 
the only case where we can determine the relation of a cognition 
(here it is one of pure practical reason) to the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure a priori from concepts.  (KpV 5:73) 
The moral agent is confronted with the representation of the moral law and realises 
that he has a free choice to make it the determining ground of his will. The represen-
tation is attended by pain, to the degree that it engenders a comparison by the agent 
between ‘the sensible propensity of his nature’ and the moral law (KpV 5:74).14 
When we compare ourselves with the ‘holy’ moral law, we discover how remote we                                                         
14 See also KpV 5:79.  
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are from complete accordance with it; the comparison is thus not between ourselves 
and other human beings, but between ourselves and the moral law.15  
With this crucial aspect noted, however, the painful frustration of inclinations is by 
no means the only element in reverence for the law. According to Kant, in the process 
of feeling wonder and awe for the moral law, we also experience respect for our-
selves, and indeed for all other rational beings. Because we recognise that we are able 
to deny our own inclinations, the painfulness of reverence reveals in us the presence 
of a higher faculty, pure practical reason, and this generates a dramatically positive 
feeling. Thus ‘the lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem – that is, humiliation 
on the sensible side – is an elevation of the moral – that is, practical – esteem for the 
law itself on the intellectual side’ (KpV 5:79). Since the relevant constraint is exer-
cised by the lawgiving power of the agent’s very own faculty of reason, ‘it also con-
tains something elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure 
practical reason is the sole cause of it, can thus be called self-approbation with refer-
ence to pure practical reason’ (KpV 5:80-81).16 This sense of independence from the 
mechanism of nature ‘elevates a human being above himself (as a part of the sensible 
world)’ and ‘connects’ him with an order of things that is radically different from the 
realm of sensible objects (KpV 5:86). Thus, while our experience of reverence in-
volves both self-frustration and a sense of otherworldly awe, it is ultimately a feeling 
of connection to a lawgiving power which demands our unconditional compliance –                                                         
15 See VC 27:349.39-50.3.  
16 As Paul Guyer notes (Kant and the Experience of Freedom 358), some commentators take 
Kant to be describing two separate feelings: the painful feeling of respect and a positive feel-
ing (perhaps the ‘moral feeling’), based on admiration for the superiority of the moral princi-
ple. I agree with Guyer in rejecting this interpretative move.  
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of identity with an active, legislative force which transcends our immediate cognition. 
Far from merely pointing to a realm beyond the senses, moral experience is described 
by Kant as bringing us to a sense of belonging and self-appreciation.17 It is of course 
the moral law which is the primary object of our awe – an awe ‘which rouses respect 
of the subject toward his master.’ In our case, however, ‘since the master lies in us, it 
rouses a feeling of the sublimity of our own vocation that enraptures us more than 
any beauty’ (Rel 6:23.n).18 
6.3  Identity and Moral Education 
It might seem to us that Kant’s discussion of reverence overstates the feeling of con-
nection and self-respect that accompanies consciousness of the moral law and its 
unconditional strictness. After all, if it is indeed possible for a sensibly bound human 
being to come to identify himself as a lawgiving member in a kingdom of ends, it is 
natural to think that this is likely to require much development and self-adjustment. 
Though the positive element of reverence is described by Kant as an experience open 
to any rational being whatever, it is clear that he is also concerned by the human ten-
dency to weaken, or in some cases to eclipse altogether, its lasting effect on 
self-understanding. Obstacles to our identification with the voice of pure reason can 
come in many forms, some of which I have already mentioned (see §4.4). Quite in-                                                        
17 The complex duality of feeling involved in reverence (its combination of frustration and 
self-reflected pleasure) is akin to the complexity involved in the feeling of the mathematical 
and the dynamical sublime, as discussed in The Critique of the Power of Judgement (see esp. 
5:248-264). 
18 See also KU 5:257, 262. 
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terestingly, however, the movement towards this species of harmonious identification 
is a significant element in Kant’s thoughts on moral education, where Kant depicts a 
connection between securing moral self-understanding and strengthening the influ-
ence of the moral law when it comes to the selection of maxims.  
Here, we embark upon murky waters, for one of the more difficult issues facing those 
who wish to make sense of Kant’s theory of moral education concerns its awkward fit 
with transcendental freedom and with Kant’s claim that the intelligible world grounds 
the empirical. If it is true that moral character is the result of a radically free choice, 
independent of the chain of natural causality, what real effect can empirical lessons 
and practices have with regards to our fundamental moral disposition? What is to be 
avoided, it would seem, is the importation of determinism into the conditions of mo-
ral agency, such that the freedom of morality is in any way threatened. Yet just how 
this is to be effected, and how Kant’s claims about moral education are to be ex-
plained within the limits set by transcendental freedom, are quite difficult questions.19 
While answering these extremely difficult questions is beyond the scope of my im-                                                        
19 Various interesting attempts to deal with this question are found in the recent literature on 
the empirical side of Kant’s moral theory. Barbara Herman, for instance, suggests that we 
ought to view the kinds of empirical helps mentioned in Kant’s accounts of moral education 
as epistemic aids: as means of developing an understanding of the ‘rules of moral salience,’ 
by which the morally significant features of circumstances are brought into view (see The 
Practice of Moral Judgement ch. 4). Others, such as Robert Louden, Allen Wood, and Fe-
licitas Munzel interpret these empirical aids as steps which either help to prepare free agents 
to choose well, or which enable agents to choose well, functioning as propaedeutics to moral 
agency (See Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics ch. 2; Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought esp. Part II; 
and Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character esp. ch. 5). See also Patrick Frierson’s 
recent account in Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, where he argues 
that empirical helps and hindrances affect not the good will itself, but its appearance in the 
world, in a way which is nonetheless morally relevant. See also Beck, ‘Kant on Education,’ 
Essays on Kant and Hume (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).   
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mediate project, my aim is to investigate how Kant’s thoughts on the development of 
moral self-understanding might also gesture toward a solution to the problem of mo-
ral commitment.  
Kant’s thoughts on moral education find their home in a variety of texts, and to touch 
on each example would take us much too far afield. For our purposes, then, we shall 
focus principally on the discussion of education set out in the second Critique’s Doc-
trine of Method, as it is here that the idea I wish to explore is set out in its most clear 
and concise form.  
As Kant explains in the opening lines of this section, a doctrine of the method of pure 
practical reason is a study of the way in which we can provide the moral law with 
‘access to the human mind and influence on its maxims’ (KpV 5:151).20 He acknow-
ledges that it must seem to most of us improbable that the presentation of the moral 
law could come to have more power over our minds than ‘all the deceptive allure-
ments of enjoyment’ (5:151). Even though the Groundwork and the previous sections                                                         
20 As is often noted, the Doctrine of Method can be seen as an enquiry into the grand old 
Enlightenment questions: By what course are human beings brought to a condition where the 
moral disposition may be engendered and flourish? How can the child be brought from inno-
cence to moral maturity? See, e.g. Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason 233. It is important to emphasise that the Doctrine of Method differs quite substan-
tially from the Groundwork and the more doctrinal passages of the second Critique in that it 
points to observations that have actual practical effects, whereas the latter two texts are pri-
marily theoretical exercises. What Kant is doing, here, is raising a very particular set of ques-
tions that have to do with how we might become better moral agents. By contrast, he never 
thought that the primary purpose of reading the Groundwork is to become morally better (al-
though there are elements, as I have noted, that would seem to serve this role at least in part). 
Although I focus on the Doctrine of Method of the second Critique in this chapter, see also 
the Doctrine of the Method of Ethics of the Metaphysics of Morals, which also outlines a 
programme for teaching people to be morally good.  
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of the second Critique have shown us that the possibility of a pure moral incentive 
must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of morally good action, this 
does not in itself give us reason to think it probable that such an incentive will in fact 
have a more lasting influence on the human faculty of choice than those provided by 
inclination. We understand at this point that the in principle sufficiency of the moral 
incentive follows from accepting that we are bound by the moral law; knowing what 
we do about ourselves, however, why should we think it likely that any of us really 
would choose the hard and lonely road of virtue? Given the strength of our desires 
and the attractiveness of happiness, how could it ever seem reasonable to suppose that 
something as formal and seemingly empty as the moral law can provide creatures like 
us with a stronger incentive to action? Kant’s hope in this section is to provide anec-
dotal proofs of the human receptivity to the moral incentive, along with a sketch of 
the method by which to facilitate the cultivation of a truly moral disposition (5:153).  
For those whose minds are still uncultivated or already degraded, Kant allows that 
being brought onto the rails of morality requires being attracted by threats and 
promises connected to happiness. As soon as these ‘leading strings’ have had even 
the slightest effect, however, ‘the pure moral motive must be brought to bear on the 
soul’ (5:152).21 One of the exercises highlighted by Kant as being extremely useful 
for moral improvement is engagement in argumentation concerning the moral worth                                                         
21 Here again, the moral motive is described by Kant as giving to the human being the power, 
‘unexpected even by himself,’ to tear himself away from all sensible attachments so far as 
they want to rule over him and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice he makes’ 
(5:153). According to Kant, and somewhat problematically given what he says about freedom 
in the Religion, this is a method for founding and cultivating genuine moral ‘dispositions’ 
(5:153). What Kantians would seem to be unable to say is that such a method is what makes 
the choice of a good moral disposition of the sort discussed in chapter five possible. What 
there may be room for, however, is the idea that the undertaking of such a method makes it 
all the more easy for ordinary moral agents to develop into the kinds of people who are com-
mitted to morality above inclination. More will be said about this at the close of this section.  
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moral improvement is engagement in argumentation concerning the moral worth of 
people’s deeds, as laid out in examples.22 Here, the primary aim is to become able to 
identify, as best one can, the nature and characteristics of good conduct. In addition to 
this skill, however, the further hope is that the agent will develop an attitude of ap-
proval of the examples of moral goodness picked out in discussion and argument and 
regret or contempt for examples of deviation from it.23 Kant’s emphasis on argument 
rather than passive instruction presumably hinges on the notion that the former 
method allows developing agents actively to engage in the search for, and construc-
tion of, reasons for ascribing moral predicates (good, evil) to certain examples of 
agents and their deeds.24 As Kant argues, this process of engaging in argument and 
critical discussion with others is observed to result in a certain habit of responding to                                                         
22 For a very helpful discussion of Kant’s thoughts on the role of examples in Kant’s moral 
philosophy, see Robert Louden, ‘Go-Carts of Judgement: Exemplars in Kantian Moral Edu-
cation,’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 74 (1992): 303-22. See also Louden’s ‘Mak-
ing the Law Visible: The Role of Examples in Kant’s Ethics,’ Kant’s Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, ed. Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming).   
23 C.f. the Lectures on Pedagogy: ‘Everything in education depends on establishing the right 
principles throughout and making them comprehensible and acceptable to children. Children 
must learn to substitute detesting things because they are disgusting and absurd for abhor-
rence out of hatred; they must learn to have inner aversion replace the external aversion to 
human beings or to divine punishment, to have self-estimation and inner worth replace the 
opinions of human beings, to have the inner value of actions and deeds replace words and 
emotions, understanding replace feeling, and joy and piety with good humour replace mo-
rose, timid, and gloomy devotion’ (UP 9:492-3). Educators, ought, however, to leave out 
examples of noble or supermeritorious actions. ‘...whatever runs up into empty wishes and 
longings for inaccessible perfection produces mere heroes of romance who, while they pride 
themselves on feeling for extravagant greatness, release themselves in return form the obser-
vance of common and everyday obligation, which then seems to them insignificant and petty’ 
(KpV 5:155). 
24 The importance of activity and independence of mind in moral education is a theme which 
lies at the centre of Kant’s thinking on the matter more generally, and here there is no excep-
tion. 
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people’s behaviour – a quite lasting impression of esteem for the good and disgust for 
the evil, which ‘would make a good foundation for uprightness in the future conduct 
of life’ (5:154-5). Gradually, the appraisal of actions becomes a ‘natural occupation’ 
– ‘a habit accompanying all our own free actions as well as our observation of those 
of others’ (5:159).25 We are then able to sharpen our appraisal by asking first 
whether the action conforms with the moral law, and then the nature of the more spe-
cific principle with which it accords (does it, for instance, accord with a principle 
grounded on what the needs of human beings require of one?) (5:159).26  
In addition, however, Kant’s method proposes that we direct our attention to whether 
the action was in fact done for the sake of the moral law. This involves a cultivation 
of our reason in making judgements about the practical, where the result is a gradual 
production of ‘a certain interest in reason’s law itself and hence in morally good ac-
tions.’ As Kant goes on to suggest, at this stage 
we finally come to like something the contemplation of which lets 
us feel a more extended use of our cognitive powers, which is es-
pecially furthered by that in which we find moral correctness,                                                         
25 Though Kant speaks in terms of building up a habit of appraisal, by no means does he be-
lieve that moral education ought to have as its final aim the development of mere habit. As he 
writes in the Lectures on Pedagogy, moral education ‘is based not on discipline but on max-
ims. Everything is spoiled if one tries to ground this culture on examples, threats, punish-
ments, and so forth. Then it would be merely discipline. One must see to it that the pupil acts 
from his own maxims, not from habit, that he not only does the good, but that he does it be-
cause it is good. For the entire moral value of actions consists in the maxims concerning the 
good. Physical education differs from moral education in that the former is passive for the 
pupil while the latter is active. He must at all times comprehend the ground of the action and 
its derivation from the concepts of duty (UP 9:475). 
26 C.f. the Lectures on Pedagogy: ‘If one wishes to form a character in children, it is very 
important to draw their attention to a certain plan in all things, certain laws, known to them, 
which they must follow exactly’ (UP 9:481). 
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since only in such an order of things can reason, with its capacity 
to determine a priori in accordance with principles what ought to 
be done, find satisfaction.  (5:160) 
This exercise thus develops in us a mediate interest in moral correctness; we value the 
latter not in itself, but because it occasions the harmony of our cognitive powers. The 
existence of moral correctness in and of itself remains indifferent to us, because ‘it is 
viewed only as the occasion of our becoming aware of the tendency of talents in us 
which are elevated above animality’ (5:160). 
The second major exercise in the course of the method involves bringing to attention 
– again, through the use of examples – the purity of the good will. Here, the primary 
focus is the fact that incentives of inclination have no influence on the will in morally 
good action. According to Kant, this works to free the agent from the feelings of dis-
satisfaction and disappointment that accompany concern for sensuous needs, such 
that his mind is made receptive to a radically different source of satisfaction. By this 
second exercise, then,  
the pupil’s attention is fixed on the consciousness of his freedom 
and, although this renunciation excites an initial feeling of pain, 
nevertheless, by its withdrawing the pupil from the constraint of 
even true needs, there is made known to him at the same time a 
deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all those 
needs entangle him ... (5:160) 
As Kant goes on to suggest, the pupil’s heart is by this method ‘freed and relieved of 
a burden that always and secretly presses upon it’ (5:161). The effect of setting before 
him examples of pure moral resolutions in which are revealed an otherwise unknown 
inner capacity is that he develops ‘the inner freedom to release himself from the im-
petuous importunity of inclinations so that none of them, not even the dearest, has 
any influence on a resolution for which we are now to make use of our rea-
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son’ (5:161).27  
As mentioned above, the observations of the Doctrine of Method are meant to show 
the reality of reverence for the law – proofs of our receptivity to it – and ‘the method 
of founding and cultivating genuine moral dispositions’ (5:153). It takes the form of a 
response to the articulation of a doubt – can the moral law really effect more power 
over our limited human minds than inclination? In this sense, this section can also be 
seen as answering the old charge that Kantian ethics is ‘false to human nature’ – that 
it puts unnatural demands on us to forsake our character and our sensuous concerns. 
What Kant’s writing suggests is that human beings might develop a strong pleasure 
and satisfaction in being able to stand above the sensuous needs which ‘entangle’ 
them: a sense of being able to withdraw from the constraints set out by nature and a 
sense of deliverance from the dissatisfactions which accompany our existence as 
natural, dependent beings. The lifting of this burden is something which, according to 
Kant, we human beings will welcome, once we’ve experienced it and trained our 
minds to be receptive to its significance. Yet this shift in consciousness, this devel-
opment of a sense of immense relief and peace in the realisation of practical freedom, 
is the result of an altogether natural process of education, observable, or so Kant 
thinks, by any human being whatever. The development of a receptive feeling of 
satisfaction in a radically different object is quite easily explainable as the result of 
the activity of the mind in contemplating the principles and motivational springs 
which in some sense have always grounded our moral evaluations. From this state of                                                         
27 Kant goes on to note that ‘through the positive worth that observance of it lets us feel, [the 
moral law] finds easier access through the respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our 
freedom ... When this is well-established ... then every good moral disposition can be grafted 
onto it, because this is the best, and indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and corruptible 
impulses from breaking into the mind’ (5:161).  
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mind, the constraint effected by the moral law is distinctly not experienced as a form 
of repression or fundamental self-denial. It is, rather, experienced as the source of a 
kind of freedom from the exhausting demands of desire not available to non-rational 
beings – the source of a unique form of escape and ensuing peace of the soul. In 
short, it is experienced as the source of a unique and otherwise unavailable option for 
the living of a human life, and for this the well-adjusted pupil of morality feels not 
dejection, but immense self-satisfaction.  
Attention to Kant’s thoughts on moral education thus reveals his concern to articulate 
the means by which agents might learn to identify with the voice of pure reason. In 
addition to autonomy, such an agent will possess integrity: a sense of unity and com-
pleteness denied to those who choose to attach themselves to the baser element of 
their nature. As a result of having acquired this self-understanding, such an agent is 
likely to find that compliance with duty comes more easily, that it meets with less re-
sistance, such that he dreads nothing more than the discovery that he has acted in a 
manner that is morally contemptible. It must of course always be possible for any 
agent to do what the moral law commands, for this is assured by the epistemological 
and motivational aspect of autonomy. Yet the degree to which compliance with the 
moral law is made difficult or effortless by one’s inner temperament is an area that 
Kant allows to vary between individuals. We thus encounter, quite interestingly, a 
second area in which luck might be said to affect virtue on the Kantian view.28 
Though the moral worth of one’s actions is not at all the kind of thing that can be 
subject to fortune on Kant’s view (see §5.3), luck will indeed affect the nature of 
one’s temperament and one’s attachments, and so the level of ease with which one is 
                                                        
28 Recall the notion that luck might be said to affect empirical character (see §5.2). 
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able to fulfil morality’s demands.29 As the Doctrine of Method aims to ‘prove,’ this 
feature of our lives is, for better or for worse, altogether conditioned by empirical in-
fluence (the having of certain experiences, exposure to the right kinds of teacher). 
Whilst autonomy promises that the path of virtue is in principle open to any moral 
agent, it does not guarantee that all shall follow it with parity of ease. 
6.4  Identity and Normative Ethics 
What the above discussion shows is that the supposed ‘tyranny’ of reason is not an 
inevitable fact of moral experience. Given the right frame of mind, finite rational be-
ings are able to bring their self-understandings in line with pure reason, and so to 
achieve the integrity that characterises a settled comfort with the moral law. Such 
comfort is not equivalent to perfection or holiness, a property possessed only by the 
Supreme Being, but rather a self-satisfaction that expresses itself in a lack of moral 
resentment. Though the dichotomisation of reason and desire is strict, this need only 
bother those who suspect that our attachment to the latter is either desirable or ines-
capable.   
Will Kant’s thoughts on the transformative power of moral education when it comes 
to self-understanding satisfy all who object to his insistence on purity? The answer 
must surely be no. What is perhaps most significant about Kant’s approach to this 
problem, however, is his refusal to alter the rigoristic conclusions that stem from au-                                                        
29 Because this form of luck deals with the kind of person you are (your attachments and 
temperament), it is similar to what Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel describe as ‘consti-
tutive’ luck. See, e.g. ‘Moral Luck’ 115-16, 140, 144-5.  
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tonomy in order better to fit the contours of our already-formed attachments and ways 
of approaching practical problems. As the Doctrine of Method makes clear, it is our 
responsibility to develop the kinds of environment in which morally helpful 
self-understandings might flourish. Rather than taking the character of his times as a 
moral starting point, Kant’s moral philosophy begins by setting out a priori, from the 
very idea of unconditional goodness and its fundamental principle, the content of 
morality and all its implications. Beyond acknowledging that the moral law must ad-
dress them as an imperative, it does not make special allowance for the particular 
characteristics of human beings. As a result, Kantian theory is one in which the 
‘ought’ is given theoretical priority over the ‘is’: if the majority happen to find the 
confrontation with the moral law uncomfortable or distressing – a species of 
self-wrought slavery – then so much the worse for humanity.  
In the Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant is reported to have said the following:  
One principle of the art of education, which particularly those of 
men who are education planners should have before their eyes, is 
this: children should be educated not only with regard to the pres-
ent but rather for a better condition of the human species that 
might be possible in the future; that is, in a manner appropriate to 
the idea of humanity and its complete vocation. This principle is 
of great importance. Parents usually educate their children merely 
so that they fit in with the present world, however corrupt it may 
be. However, they ought to educate them better, so that a future, 
better condition may thereby be brought forth.  (UP 9:447) 
Here, Kant makes clear that education is set the task of moving beyond the given in 
practical matters – of refusing to conform our practices to the ‘present world.’ Given 
that the concerns and attachments of average human agents might accurately repre-
sent neither what humanity is capable of becoming nor what it ought to become, a 
truly prescriptive (and in this sense normative) moral theory cannot strive merely for 
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coherence with our settled, if natural, sense of self. The charge of moral tyranny con-
stitutes a valuable criticism of Kantian ethics only to the degree that we understand 
coherence with our sensuous nature to be a good thing. Where we have independent 
reason to suppose that conformity with the demands of the latter does not in fact rep-
resent our best possible self (our true vocation [Bestimmung]), a lack of fit between 
the prescriptions of moral theory and our given attachments, while it might of course 
raise important practical and pedagogical issues, does not in itself render suspect the 
theory’s underlying principles. As I hope to have shown, Kant is indeed concerned 
about the possibility of feeling at one with the voice of pure reason and with experi-
encing autonomy as self-legislation. What he rightly refuses to do, however, is to 
privilege our already-formed attachments and identities. In true form, he does not put 
the end to be achieved – the securing of popular access for the law – before the law 
itself.30  
In his later years, Kant increasingly stressed the significance of the virtue of inward 
sincerity for moral progress and self-development. As he writes in the Religion, there 
is a certain dishonesty at work when people concern themselves only with the ap-
pearance of their empirical character and refuse to enquire into their inner maxims. 
By this means ‘we throw dust into our own eyes,’ hindering the development of a 
moral disposition and actually fostering a greater ease when it comes to the deception 
                                                        
30 See, e.g. G 4:409: ‘This descending to popular concepts is certainly very commendable, 
provided the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and has been carried 
through to complete satisfaction. That would mean that the doctrine of morals is first 
grounded on metaphysics and afterwards, when it has been firmly established, is provided 
with access by means of popularity. But it is quite absurd to want to comply with popularity 
in the first investigation, on which all correctness of basic principles depends.’  
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of others (6:38).31 A kind of self-deception is also at work, however, when, we allow 
our deep identification with the ‘dear self’ described in G 4:407 to interfere with the 
(morally significant) recognition that there is more to our nature. An ethics of au-
tonomy is appealing for just this reason: it takes as its starting point a conception of 
how and who we ought to be, and from there it arrives at a conception of what we 
must be capable of becoming. It thus points forward to a way of being that, while 
perhaps difficult to achieve, must nonetheless be possible, rather than deriving pre-
scriptions for living from a backward-looking conception of our settled patterns and 
dispositions as they happen to be. Because the moral law in an ethics of autonomy is 
non-derivative – because it does not depend on any antecedent correlation between 
some state of the world and our given dispositions – its prescriptions and prohibitions 
are bound to possess an unbounded normativity unparalleled in heteronomous theory. 
Of course, the most difficult task for such an ethics is to prove that our trust in the 
categorical imperative as a genuinely binding principle of action is justified, such that 
we have a right to think of ourselves as legislating members of an intelligible realm 
(for analysis alone cannot establish the validity of the moral law). I have not touched 
on this extremely difficult issue so far in this thesis, and nor shall I here. What I do 
wish to suggest, however, is that there is an inherent connection between an attraction 
to autonomous moral theory and a refusal to be bothered by a lack of fit, no matter 
how fundamental, between ‘ought’ and ‘happens to be.’ Though pure reason’s yoke is 
gentle, it is simply to be expected on such a framework that the bulk of us shall bear 
                                                        
31 As Kant goes on to note, this self-deception ‘puts out of tune the moral ability to judge 
what to think of a human being, and renders any imputability entirely uncertain…’ (6:38). 
See also G 4:407.11-12 on self-flattery. The other major deception that preoccupies Kant in 
both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason is the doctrine of determinism – 
yet another bit of sophistry by which we excuse ourselves from responsibility.  
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it reluctantly.32 
 
 
 
                                                        
32 On the ‘gentle yoke’ of the moral law, see KpV 5:84-5.  
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Kant concludes his Critique of Practical Reason by writing what would come to be 
his most famous passage:  
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration 
and awe, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: 
the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me … The 
first begins from the place I occupy in the external world of mag-
nitude with worlds upon worlds and systems upon systems ... The 
second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents 
me in a world which has true infinity but which can be discovered 
only by the understanding, and I cognize that my connection with 
that world (and thereby with all those visible worlds as well) is not 
merely contingent, as in the first case, but universal and necessary. 
The first view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it 
were, my importance as an animal creature, which after it has 
been for a short time provided vital force (one knows not how) 
must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the 
matter from which it came. The second, on the contrary, infinitely 
raises my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the 
moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even 
of the whole sensible world, at least so far as this may be inferred 
from the purposive determination of my existence by this law, a 
determination not restricted to the conditions and boundaries of 
this life but reaching into the infinite.  (5:161-2) 
Kant was well aware that our legislative power, our being as intelligence, had always 
somehow to be reconciled with our sense of ourselves as contingent animal creatures. 
The dual movement that characterises this passage (the inner humiliation that follows 
the upward and outward gaze toward the infinity of worlds upon worlds; the elevation 
that follows the inward reflection upon one’s own independence, as intelligible being, 
from the sensuous world) thus traces two views of humanity which Kant was acutely 
aware he had to accommodate in his moral theory as a whole. In this thesis, I have 
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sought to provide an explanation of the latter self-conception, a view of the self as a 
legislating member of a world of intelligences, which nonetheless addresses some of 
the more troubling problems that emerge from the intersection of this 
self-understanding with a conception of ourselves as members of the world of sensi-
bility. Where the first half of this thesis sought to account for the claim that the moral 
law is a law that we ourselves legislate, the second half addressed the problem of the 
extent to which this conception of ourselves can be integrated with the more familiar 
side of our nature: with the fact that we have inclinations, temptations, are extremely 
fallible, and can be wavering in our commitment to even the most rational of princi-
ples.   
Although I hope to have provided a compelling picture thus far, there are, of course, 
directions for further investigation that I could not pursue in this study, but that are 
clearly deserving of future reflection. In chapters two and three, for example, I pre-
sented Kant as one who is largely uninterested in providing a morally independent, 
foundationalist justification for the moral law. Whilst I argued that the moral law 
must be viewed as possessing a determining ground of some sort, which explains why 
it is a law for my will (for the will of any particular agent), this ground turned out to 
be nothing other than the categorical imperative’s universality and necessity. I offered 
no independent justification on Kant’s part for thinking that the categorical impera-
tive is universally and necessarily binding, and indeed, I altogether avoided the ques-
tion of how and whether Kant sought a vindication of this sort. There is thus much 
room for further thought on the question of whether Kant ought to be read as provid-
ing (or requiring) a justificatory picture of this more fundamental and ambitious kind 
and whether autonomy plays any role in it.  
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Second, there is certainly scope for further investigation into Kant’s theory of moral 
education and development. Given my interests in this study, I avoided some of the 
more difficult and puzzling questions surrounding the very possibility of a Kantian 
theory of moral development, including especially the important role that he seems to 
reserve for empirical aids and hindrances to moral goodness in the Doctrine of 
Method and in his anthropological works. Though recent work in this area has shed 
light on some of these questions, there is still much work to be done when it comes to 
reconciling the importance that Kant seems to place on empirical social development 
and his commitment to the connection between morality and transcendental freedom.  
Finally, although this project has been for the large part internal, seeking to provide 
an interpretation of autonomy that can and ought to be accepted by Kantians, it is 
certainly worth thinking about the challenges that the view I have been tracing might 
face from outside the comforts of Kantian ethics and whether (and how) this story 
might be maintained in light of them. I have not sought at this stage to defend the ap-
proach to ethics developed in this thesis against competing views regarding the 
source of moral requirement, though this would clearly constitute an important de-
velopment of the work presented here. For those who do not share Kant’s starting 
points, I hope in this study at least to have raised interest in the complexity of his vi-
sion of humanity, in the origins of his concern for purity, and in the source of his 
commitment to autonomy.    
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